This article first appeared on openDemocracy.
Amid an increasingly competitive global environment where Europe's future aspirations on the world stage have been questioned, Fabrizio Tassinari argues that focusing on the finer issues could help Europe to colour the bigger picture.
According to chaos theory, the butterfly effect refers to those tiny events leading to major, long-term variations in a system. The metaphor provides a moderately optimistic outlook for Europe’s influence in the 21st century world: any lasting advance in Europe’s global reach is unlikely to be executed through a grand plan; it will at best happen through some key, imperceptible, developments that may produce broader, though not entirely planned, consequences.
Strategists, always fascinated by the big picture, have rarely looked at the matter this way. During the first half of the noughties, many an observer exuded unbound confidence in Europe’s global ambitions. The introduction of the Euro and the accession of ten new member states from Europe’s east were to crown the EU as an unstoppable force in global affairs. A thinly-veiled shadenfreude for the quagmire that America was making for itself in Iraq did not hurt the cause.
The sources of Europe’s might were apparent. As multinational corporations contravening the Union’s competition rules well know, the EU is arguably the world's leading regulator. In order to sell their products in the European market, producers worldwide comply with the precautionary principle on environmental or health-related risks. Europhiles were also keen to point out that the world was being modeled on the image of Europe through the emergence of regional groupings such as the African Union and ASEAN in Southeast Asia.
Over the past couple of years, on the contrary, not a week has gone by without an irrevocable post-mortem being pronounced on Europe’s aspirations. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the new key posts of EU president and foreign policy supremo are meant to strengthen the EU’s image on the world stage. Yet, leaders of the EU member states were accused of choosing compromise figures that could not overshadow them. At the Copenhagen Climate summit in December last year, the EU performed miserably and was marginalized in the negotiations by China and the United States. The slow response to the Greek tragedy has shown that political integration lags dangerously behind the economic one.
Lisbon Treaty celebration, Portugal. Vlad Sokhin/Demotix. All rights reserved.
For all the present gloom, the truth is as always somewhere in the middle. The EU was never meant to take the world by a storm; but it is not a delusional conclave of old countries either. From sub-Saharan Africa to the Palestinian authority, the EU remains the largest donor in many parts of the globe. For all the troubles of Turkey's EU bid, the prospective accession of the Balkan countries within the next decade will constitute an accomplishment of historic proportions, especially in light of the European blunders of the 1990s.
Above all, and typically for the European integration project, the EU global power will have to be found in the myriad technical measures that nobody really notices, and that will spill over into other fields, gradually and almost accidentally amounting to a strategic vision.
An example makes the point. A couple of months ago, a group of wise persons headed by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales, and on which these pages have commented extensively, released a set of recommendations on the future of Europe for the next 20 years. One foreign policy priority focused on the introduction of a common visa policy and a consular service within the EU’s nascent diplomatic service.
Why such an emphasis on something so technical which most western citizens will most probably never even hear about? Because at the moment, EU visa application for third country nationals can be a cumbersome, arbitrary and often humiliating process. Many of the younger and better educated migrants craved by Europe give up and continue to opt for the US’s east coast or Silicon Valley instead. The release of visas concerns what kind of immigrants Europe receives and how it welcomes them. So what is at stake is the future of Europe’s aging populations and of its anemic labor markets. A more integrated bureaucracy is only a minor piece in the intricate puzzle of Europe’s troubled immigration policy. Immigration itself is not the most obvious foreign policy priority. But as in much of the history of the EU, the domestic and foreign realms often coalesce and bureaucracy might just be the only place available to start making change.
The ongoing global disorder has determined an increasingly competitive environment. The fault lines between conflict and cooperation among a plethora of different world actors are going to get fuzzier. Europe is not equipped to react swiftly and boldly. It will stand a chance if it identifies small niches where it tries to perform better. To be sure, even the smallest of measures needs serious political backing in order to fly. The hope is that the European butterfly flapping its wings in some remote corner of the world will eventually produce major, tangible effects elsewhere; starting from the non-smoking rooms of many European capitals.
Tuesday, 10 August 2010
Friday, 2 July 2010
Concretezza
Concluding remarks to the online debate on the EU-Balkans relations at Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso.
Proseguo da dove ho terminato l’intervento iniziale: meno chiacchiere e più fatti. È un’osservazione sulla quale la maggior parte dei molti spunti interessanti emersi in questo dibattito non dovrebbe aver difficoltà a convergere. Eppure, cosa vuol dire concretamente ?
Una cosa che in questa fase si può chiedere all’Ue e ai governi dei Balcani occidentali é di “portarsi avanti” con il lavoro. Ci sono diverse cose che devono essere fatte prima di avviare il processo di adesione vero e proprio. Prima fra tutte, il cosiddetto “screening’”: ovvero un’analisi complessiva, ministero per ministero, dello status quo in termini di riforme compiute e/o delle inadempienze tecnico-amministrative dei Paesi aspiranti all’adesione. Sulla base di questa analisi, la Commissione deve poi produrre un “parere” sul livello di riforme raggiunto dai singoli Stati. Procedure queste, che normalmente portano via un anno, se non più.
Non entro nei dettagli: chi fosse interessato può leggere un eccellente rapporto pubblicato dal European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) che spiega il meccanismo. La sostanza è la seguente: in un momento di crisi economica e “fatica da allargamento”, il segnale più concreto della nostra volontà di far avvicinare i Balcani all’Europa è di cominciare quel lavoro che dovremo fare comunque per negoziare l’adesione.
Nel 2005, quando la Commissione presieduta da Giuliano Amato produsse il suo rapporto, l’Ue emergeva dall’allargamento ad Est, dall’introduzione dell’Euro e si confrontava con i fallimenti degli Stati Uniti in Iraq. Era un’Europa ambiziosa e fiduciosa, e anch’io apprezzai quella presa di posizione così esplicita e forte. A prescindere dall’opportunità o meno di dare scadenze, su cui mi sono espresso nel precedente intervento, il rapporto della Commissione ricevette giustamente plausi, perché la caratura ed il peso dei membri di quel gruppo segnalavano uno slancio politico significativo.
A cinque anni di distanza, le cose si sono complicate. O meglio, quella tesi potrebbe e dovrebbe essere difesa da quegli uomini di governo (in Europa pochi, al momento) che sostengono il processo di allargamento; l’osservatore si limita a leggere ed interpretare Il clima circostante, che purtroppo non si presta a slanci.
Detto questo, l’osservatore non è mai perfettamente neutrale. Quindi per riprendere la frase di un lettore, se dovessi scommettere i fatidici 10 euro, spererei nell’adesione dell’ultimo Paese dei Balcani occidentali all’Unione europea entro il 2020.
Saturday, 19 June 2010
Balcani: accelerare o rallentare
Sto partecipando a questo dibattito online sui Balcani. Esperimento interessante.
Friday, 23 April 2010
Hidden values
First appeared on Global Europe
By Fabrizio Tassinari and Julie Herschend Christoffersen
Much has been said of the choice of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy; probably too much has been said about her initial performance. Yet, analysis on the institutional tools at Catherine Ashton’s disposal has been scant — or at least as ungenerous as the coverage of her first months in office. The EU’s External Action Service (EAS) is the case in point par excellence. In recent weeks, the mentions of the EAS in the international media have often been conflated to the ongoing bickering over the establishment of the service. But the substance, let alone the potential, of this fundamental, post-Lisbon innovation remains understudied.
With 136 delegations and some 6000 diplomats and employees spread across the globe, the EU will be represented by a foreign service roughly of the size of Germany’s. The newly obtained mandate to represent the CFSP grants EU delegations power to handle EU policies jointly — including trade, development, environment and foreign and security policies.
To be sure, the ongoing power struggle on the service underpins issues of real substance. The Commission’s desire to maintain its influence over the delegations applies to policy-areas traditionally managed from Brussels. Development, trade and EU enlargement are still included in the administration of the Commission, but the EAS will have desks covering these areas. Beneath the turf war between the Council and the Commission over staffing is a genuine anxiety about the clash of culture between national and EU diplomats. Ashton has asked the experienced Danish diplomat Poul Skytte Christoffersen to help her solve some of these problems — a move that underlines the need for the High Representative to appoint powerful deputies.
As it often happens, however, the brouhaha over institutions overshadows the hidden value of EU initiatives. Once fully in operation, the EAS will represent EU foreign policies around the world and around the clock. As an old Commission hand told one of the authors of this article, the EAS: ”will think about Europe, and it will do it all the time”.
The EAS may give smaller member states a say and a face in corners of the globe where they could never afford to be represented. Big European countries which still project geopolitical clout and strive to retain it could see this presence as a nuisance. For them, the EAS will rather have to carve a niche out of member states’ policy and representation gaps, especially at a time when a number of national ministries face budget constraints.
Above all, there is the issue of how the EAS will represent the EU, and more generally of Europe’s ability to project power globally. Severe blows to the Union’s alleged ”soft power” — most recently the marginal role played by the EU at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen — will require the EU to implement and communicate more effectively the great deal of things that it already does in the world. This includes the not-negligible “hard power” that the EU already musters in the field of civilian and military crisis management. Strategically, the ability to deliver in this sphere constitutes a most formidable task for the forthcoming service.
In the best of scenarios, the EAS will equip EU foreign policy with the degree of coordination, responsiveness, and — yes — unity, that Lady Ashton’s chimerical “red phone” was never quite meant to provide. It will take time, and the intra-institutional battles in Brussels are far from over. But if one is in search of improvements in post-Lisbon EU foreign policy, it eventually might be that getting a line to one of the delegations’ switchboards will do the trick.
By Fabrizio Tassinari and Julie Herschend Christoffersen
Much has been said of the choice of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy; probably too much has been said about her initial performance. Yet, analysis on the institutional tools at Catherine Ashton’s disposal has been scant — or at least as ungenerous as the coverage of her first months in office. The EU’s External Action Service (EAS) is the case in point par excellence. In recent weeks, the mentions of the EAS in the international media have often been conflated to the ongoing bickering over the establishment of the service. But the substance, let alone the potential, of this fundamental, post-Lisbon innovation remains understudied.
With 136 delegations and some 6000 diplomats and employees spread across the globe, the EU will be represented by a foreign service roughly of the size of Germany’s. The newly obtained mandate to represent the CFSP grants EU delegations power to handle EU policies jointly — including trade, development, environment and foreign and security policies.
To be sure, the ongoing power struggle on the service underpins issues of real substance. The Commission’s desire to maintain its influence over the delegations applies to policy-areas traditionally managed from Brussels. Development, trade and EU enlargement are still included in the administration of the Commission, but the EAS will have desks covering these areas. Beneath the turf war between the Council and the Commission over staffing is a genuine anxiety about the clash of culture between national and EU diplomats. Ashton has asked the experienced Danish diplomat Poul Skytte Christoffersen to help her solve some of these problems — a move that underlines the need for the High Representative to appoint powerful deputies.
As it often happens, however, the brouhaha over institutions overshadows the hidden value of EU initiatives. Once fully in operation, the EAS will represent EU foreign policies around the world and around the clock. As an old Commission hand told one of the authors of this article, the EAS: ”will think about Europe, and it will do it all the time”.
The EAS may give smaller member states a say and a face in corners of the globe where they could never afford to be represented. Big European countries which still project geopolitical clout and strive to retain it could see this presence as a nuisance. For them, the EAS will rather have to carve a niche out of member states’ policy and representation gaps, especially at a time when a number of national ministries face budget constraints.
Above all, there is the issue of how the EAS will represent the EU, and more generally of Europe’s ability to project power globally. Severe blows to the Union’s alleged ”soft power” — most recently the marginal role played by the EU at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen — will require the EU to implement and communicate more effectively the great deal of things that it already does in the world. This includes the not-negligible “hard power” that the EU already musters in the field of civilian and military crisis management. Strategically, the ability to deliver in this sphere constitutes a most formidable task for the forthcoming service.
In the best of scenarios, the EAS will equip EU foreign policy with the degree of coordination, responsiveness, and — yes — unity, that Lady Ashton’s chimerical “red phone” was never quite meant to provide. It will take time, and the intra-institutional battles in Brussels are far from over. But if one is in search of improvements in post-Lisbon EU foreign policy, it eventually might be that getting a line to one of the delegations’ switchboards will do the trick.
Thursday, 22 April 2010
Ghosts at the Borders
This interview on my book, by Laura Delsere, first appeared in English and Italian on the
Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso portal.
According to Tim Judah "every EU foreign minister should immediately read this book". In Why Europe Fears its Neighbors, Fabrizio Tassinari talks of the EU’s anxiety about those just beyond its borders. We interviewed him
“This is the book which all EU foreign ministers should read immediately”: Tim Judah, the Balkan correspondent for the British weekly, The Economist. The book, Why Europe Fears its Neighbors, (published by Praeger Security International and coming out in Italy soon), portrays Europe’s demographic and identity crisis and the challenges of globalisation and multiculturalism. The author, Fabrizio Tassinari, is director of the Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). In order to achieve its ambition for global power, the EU should confront the spectres located exactly on its borders. The book explores the EU’s relationship with the East and the Mediterranean, but we have asked the author to talk primarily on the challenges posed by the EU’s long eastern border.
Why this book now?
This book results from five years of work. I started by observing the “enlargement fatigue” and released the book to coincide with the new momentum from the Lisbon Treaty. First, the neighbourhood is not the same for everyone: for a Pole, the neighbour is Russia, certainly not Libya. Nevertheless, many EU members share the siege mentality: at the borders, we see migration, drug trafficking, and energy insecurity. This, however, is the moment for a new approach: rather than agonize over how to limit the enlargement, the EU should focus on practical and gradual integration of its neighbors. Enlargement, far from being a threat, has so far supported development and democracy.
Why is it important that the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy, Lady Ashton, chose to make her first official visits to Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Pristina?
Despite the unkind comments about Ashton’s inexperience in foreign affairs, she made an important choice to first visit the Balkans. She could have started with Ankara or Tel Aviv, but, in the medium term, the Balkans will be the test for the European Union’s credibility in international forums. By landing in Sarajevo, Ashton played a modest card in view of global scenarios, but which has the merit of being pragmatic, of having achievable goals. In addition, Ashton leads the creation of the first European External Action Service (EEAS) that will have permanent EU delegations in 136 countries of the world. We will see the results over the next decade.
Bosnia and Kosovo are two tests for the EU, where the EU invested considerable resources, not without considerable waste, with modest results so far. What are the major errors and what are their consequences?
Bosnia, in the coming months, rather than a return to violence, has an objective risk of secession. As described by the former Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, the EU has to aim for “electroshock treatment” and “political demining”, which will prevent the internal infighting in Bosnia. My thesis is that the prospect of EU membership does not warm hearts without new developments in the life of citizens, such as visa liberalization. With her visit to Kosovo, Ashton sent a strong message to some European capitals, such as Spain, current holder of the EU rotating presidency and among the EU member states that do not recognise Pristina. In reality, a divided institution now supervises the independence of the new state. In addition to bureaucratic contradictions with the unjustifiable result of funding going to the wrong hands, political issues also make Kosovo a thorn in the side.
Does the EU exert sufficient pressure in the fight against corruption in Bosnia and Kosovo? The elections occur in an opaque institutional and social reality.
The pressure on Kosovo, as previously on Serbia, Macedonia, and Croatia, has not been sufficiently firm. There were reasons for greater flexibility after the arrests of Gotovina and Karadzic, but that sends the signal that the non-member governments actually pull the strings. Good governance and less bureaucracy could have avoided these errors, and it could have demanded, through incentives, or suspension of funding, progress in public administration reform, hence reducing the mix of private interests and government.
You have written that energy security, crime, and migration, are the EU’s fears vis-à-vis the East. In view of these fears, could it be helpful for all the Western Balkan countries to enter into the EU by 2014, the 100th anniversary of World War I, which started in Sarajevo?
This is not a new debate, but the so-called “regatta” model for Central Europe in 2004, that is, all together in the EU, through a process of internal competition, which rewards the best, was based on conditions now missing in the Western Balkans. Croatia, which is bound to enter in 2012, is the only certain case, whereas in the other Balkan countries, the compliance with EU standards is more dubious and unclear in the long term. Thus, I do not agree with Amato’s proposal “everyone at the same time”. It seems populist. A second hypothesis, entry into the EU with varying arrangements would mean to create accessions of Type B, for example with one country being an EU member state but its citizens not having the freedom of movement in the Union. This model is more appropriate for Turkey, not the Balkans where it would open ethnic conflict. Better to move, step by step, when the countries are ready. However, if we look at the number of these new states and their national dimensions, the Balkans is not an insurmountable challenge for the EU.
Is Turkey the major challenge?
The EU above all fears the size of the country and the cost of entry. An estimate of the annual cost in terms of EU funds necessary for Ankara’s accession amounts to 0.20 % of the EU’s GDP. If we think that the EU’s budget now is 1.35 % of its GDP, it is a substantial amount. With its 70 million people, Turkey will change the balance between the big EU states. The framework for the EU-Turkey accords already contains possible restrictions to Ankara’s full membership in sectors such as free movement of people, structural policies, and agriculture. Hence, through the mode of the varying arrangements, the Turkish request to the EU has already radically changed the mechanisms of European integration. Even though a privileged partnership does not have the same attraction as EU membership, it is good for breaking the impasse and concentrating on the potential benefits. Otherwise, the process of accession would lose ground before the ever more intense politicisation of the debate on whether or not Turkey is Europe.
Will the economic crisis stop enlargement?
It would certainly influence it. The economic crisis will contribute to creating an EU with several faces when it comes to enlargement. The issue will come on the agenda in countries such as the Netherlands in the next national elections. The fear from enlargement will always weigh more in countries with stronger migration from the Balkans, such as Sweden and Switzerland. Switzerland reacted with the anti-minaret referendum. Enlargement will suffer in the next decade but there is the need to overcome this. Different types of partnership with Brussels need to be given time and space.
Looking at the EU’s eastern partnership with the Caucasus, what levers of soft power could the EU possibly use with respect to Russia’s activity in the spheres of geopolitics and energy, and Russia’s offer to local governments guarantee the status quo as opposed to the democratic progress requested by the EU?
In the Caucasus, Moscow challenges the EU at a geopolitical level and at the level of normative influence. Reform and the rule of law should be emphasised even though local heads of states do not favour it. Specific changes in the life of citizens are preferred: but the EU struggles to give visas while Russia distributes passports with both hands. The energy issue is also critical: the EU seeks market integration, whereas Moscow divides the EU through bilateral deals. In the realpolitik of the pipelines, as in the war in Georgia in 2008, Europe lost.
In addition to the South Caucasus, the North Caucasus is more unstable and yet has great expectations from the EU. What benefits can it count on?
The eastern partnership is primarily bilateral, with funding, which is in reality small, and today it deals with the waning enthusiasm for the coloured revolutions. For the North Caucasus, the funding goes primarily for cross-border cooperation, that is, to the regions, which have more legitimacy with the people than the central governments. It is complicated to include the Russians in this process. In response to the tense political and diplomatic climate with individual countries, such as Poland and Estonia, Moscow has reportedly allocated over 200 million Euros only for cross-border cooperation from the Caucasus to the Baltic republics. Cross-border cooperation can help where cooperation with states in not possible: for example, by restarting the economy of the border areas by building roads, doing a peer-review of the funds in view of the endemic corruption. For example, Kaliningrad represented a successful case, for the Polish, Lithuanian, and Russian reality, thanks to the regional funds. It was a step ahead in the reduction of the greyest area in the Russian enclave in the EU.
You have defined the eastern partnership as an “ambiguous mix”. What are the ingredients?
From the Balkans to the Caucasus, the EU risks repeating the mistakes made in Ukraine. Why did we lose it? The Orange Revolution meant free elections. Ten years ago, this was not a done deal. However, the EU was less rigorous on strategic issues, such as the energy market or corruption, which are most obvious for the citizens. And, it remained ambiguous on the issue of accession, with the door neither opened nor closed.
Why is gradual integration a guarantee against internal fragmentation of the EU?
These countries will always be our neighbours. If we ignore them, in the long run, we will have problems with internal cohesion, and as in our Russian relations, the EU will be ever more divided. We will be weaker if we do not pay attention to our borders.
Where should the EU end?
I am in favour of the Balkans, Turkey, and, in the future, also Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine. I do not think it is possible to include the Caucasus, both for geopolitical reasons as well as reasons of domestic interest. I wouldn’t say that Azerbaijan feels attracted to the EU in the same way as Moldova.
Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso portal.
According to Tim Judah "every EU foreign minister should immediately read this book". In Why Europe Fears its Neighbors, Fabrizio Tassinari talks of the EU’s anxiety about those just beyond its borders. We interviewed him
“This is the book which all EU foreign ministers should read immediately”: Tim Judah, the Balkan correspondent for the British weekly, The Economist. The book, Why Europe Fears its Neighbors, (published by Praeger Security International and coming out in Italy soon), portrays Europe’s demographic and identity crisis and the challenges of globalisation and multiculturalism. The author, Fabrizio Tassinari, is director of the Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). In order to achieve its ambition for global power, the EU should confront the spectres located exactly on its borders. The book explores the EU’s relationship with the East and the Mediterranean, but we have asked the author to talk primarily on the challenges posed by the EU’s long eastern border.
Why this book now?
This book results from five years of work. I started by observing the “enlargement fatigue” and released the book to coincide with the new momentum from the Lisbon Treaty. First, the neighbourhood is not the same for everyone: for a Pole, the neighbour is Russia, certainly not Libya. Nevertheless, many EU members share the siege mentality: at the borders, we see migration, drug trafficking, and energy insecurity. This, however, is the moment for a new approach: rather than agonize over how to limit the enlargement, the EU should focus on practical and gradual integration of its neighbors. Enlargement, far from being a threat, has so far supported development and democracy.
Why is it important that the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy, Lady Ashton, chose to make her first official visits to Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Pristina?
Despite the unkind comments about Ashton’s inexperience in foreign affairs, she made an important choice to first visit the Balkans. She could have started with Ankara or Tel Aviv, but, in the medium term, the Balkans will be the test for the European Union’s credibility in international forums. By landing in Sarajevo, Ashton played a modest card in view of global scenarios, but which has the merit of being pragmatic, of having achievable goals. In addition, Ashton leads the creation of the first European External Action Service (EEAS) that will have permanent EU delegations in 136 countries of the world. We will see the results over the next decade.
Bosnia and Kosovo are two tests for the EU, where the EU invested considerable resources, not without considerable waste, with modest results so far. What are the major errors and what are their consequences?
Bosnia, in the coming months, rather than a return to violence, has an objective risk of secession. As described by the former Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, the EU has to aim for “electroshock treatment” and “political demining”, which will prevent the internal infighting in Bosnia. My thesis is that the prospect of EU membership does not warm hearts without new developments in the life of citizens, such as visa liberalization. With her visit to Kosovo, Ashton sent a strong message to some European capitals, such as Spain, current holder of the EU rotating presidency and among the EU member states that do not recognise Pristina. In reality, a divided institution now supervises the independence of the new state. In addition to bureaucratic contradictions with the unjustifiable result of funding going to the wrong hands, political issues also make Kosovo a thorn in the side.
Does the EU exert sufficient pressure in the fight against corruption in Bosnia and Kosovo? The elections occur in an opaque institutional and social reality.
The pressure on Kosovo, as previously on Serbia, Macedonia, and Croatia, has not been sufficiently firm. There were reasons for greater flexibility after the arrests of Gotovina and Karadzic, but that sends the signal that the non-member governments actually pull the strings. Good governance and less bureaucracy could have avoided these errors, and it could have demanded, through incentives, or suspension of funding, progress in public administration reform, hence reducing the mix of private interests and government.
You have written that energy security, crime, and migration, are the EU’s fears vis-à-vis the East. In view of these fears, could it be helpful for all the Western Balkan countries to enter into the EU by 2014, the 100th anniversary of World War I, which started in Sarajevo?
This is not a new debate, but the so-called “regatta” model for Central Europe in 2004, that is, all together in the EU, through a process of internal competition, which rewards the best, was based on conditions now missing in the Western Balkans. Croatia, which is bound to enter in 2012, is the only certain case, whereas in the other Balkan countries, the compliance with EU standards is more dubious and unclear in the long term. Thus, I do not agree with Amato’s proposal “everyone at the same time”. It seems populist. A second hypothesis, entry into the EU with varying arrangements would mean to create accessions of Type B, for example with one country being an EU member state but its citizens not having the freedom of movement in the Union. This model is more appropriate for Turkey, not the Balkans where it would open ethnic conflict. Better to move, step by step, when the countries are ready. However, if we look at the number of these new states and their national dimensions, the Balkans is not an insurmountable challenge for the EU.
Is Turkey the major challenge?
The EU above all fears the size of the country and the cost of entry. An estimate of the annual cost in terms of EU funds necessary for Ankara’s accession amounts to 0.20 % of the EU’s GDP. If we think that the EU’s budget now is 1.35 % of its GDP, it is a substantial amount. With its 70 million people, Turkey will change the balance between the big EU states. The framework for the EU-Turkey accords already contains possible restrictions to Ankara’s full membership in sectors such as free movement of people, structural policies, and agriculture. Hence, through the mode of the varying arrangements, the Turkish request to the EU has already radically changed the mechanisms of European integration. Even though a privileged partnership does not have the same attraction as EU membership, it is good for breaking the impasse and concentrating on the potential benefits. Otherwise, the process of accession would lose ground before the ever more intense politicisation of the debate on whether or not Turkey is Europe.
Will the economic crisis stop enlargement?
It would certainly influence it. The economic crisis will contribute to creating an EU with several faces when it comes to enlargement. The issue will come on the agenda in countries such as the Netherlands in the next national elections. The fear from enlargement will always weigh more in countries with stronger migration from the Balkans, such as Sweden and Switzerland. Switzerland reacted with the anti-minaret referendum. Enlargement will suffer in the next decade but there is the need to overcome this. Different types of partnership with Brussels need to be given time and space.
Looking at the EU’s eastern partnership with the Caucasus, what levers of soft power could the EU possibly use with respect to Russia’s activity in the spheres of geopolitics and energy, and Russia’s offer to local governments guarantee the status quo as opposed to the democratic progress requested by the EU?
In the Caucasus, Moscow challenges the EU at a geopolitical level and at the level of normative influence. Reform and the rule of law should be emphasised even though local heads of states do not favour it. Specific changes in the life of citizens are preferred: but the EU struggles to give visas while Russia distributes passports with both hands. The energy issue is also critical: the EU seeks market integration, whereas Moscow divides the EU through bilateral deals. In the realpolitik of the pipelines, as in the war in Georgia in 2008, Europe lost.
In addition to the South Caucasus, the North Caucasus is more unstable and yet has great expectations from the EU. What benefits can it count on?
The eastern partnership is primarily bilateral, with funding, which is in reality small, and today it deals with the waning enthusiasm for the coloured revolutions. For the North Caucasus, the funding goes primarily for cross-border cooperation, that is, to the regions, which have more legitimacy with the people than the central governments. It is complicated to include the Russians in this process. In response to the tense political and diplomatic climate with individual countries, such as Poland and Estonia, Moscow has reportedly allocated over 200 million Euros only for cross-border cooperation from the Caucasus to the Baltic republics. Cross-border cooperation can help where cooperation with states in not possible: for example, by restarting the economy of the border areas by building roads, doing a peer-review of the funds in view of the endemic corruption. For example, Kaliningrad represented a successful case, for the Polish, Lithuanian, and Russian reality, thanks to the regional funds. It was a step ahead in the reduction of the greyest area in the Russian enclave in the EU.
You have defined the eastern partnership as an “ambiguous mix”. What are the ingredients?
From the Balkans to the Caucasus, the EU risks repeating the mistakes made in Ukraine. Why did we lose it? The Orange Revolution meant free elections. Ten years ago, this was not a done deal. However, the EU was less rigorous on strategic issues, such as the energy market or corruption, which are most obvious for the citizens. And, it remained ambiguous on the issue of accession, with the door neither opened nor closed.
Why is gradual integration a guarantee against internal fragmentation of the EU?
These countries will always be our neighbours. If we ignore them, in the long run, we will have problems with internal cohesion, and as in our Russian relations, the EU will be ever more divided. We will be weaker if we do not pay attention to our borders.
Where should the EU end?
I am in favour of the Balkans, Turkey, and, in the future, also Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine. I do not think it is possible to include the Caucasus, both for geopolitical reasons as well as reasons of domestic interest. I wouldn’t say that Azerbaijan feels attracted to the EU in the same way as Moldova.
Monday, 29 March 2010
First book review!
"[Tassinari's] writing style is robust, colourful and well spiced with cultural and historical references. If the result ends up somewhere between academic prose and quality journalism, the factual underpinning and referencing leaving nothing wanting" from Alyson Bailes' book review in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23:1, March 2010.
Wednesday, 3 February 2010
Europe's role in losing Ukraine
First appeared on openDemocracy
On the eve of the crucial run-off in Ukraine's presidential election, Fabrizio Tassinari argues that enlargement fatigue in the EU has meant that since the Orange Revolution Ukraine has been offered no real prospect of joining Europe
”It’s so good that you hold free elections now. But why so often?” The joke, making the rounds these days in Kiev, encapsulates the past five years of western disenchantment towards Ukraine. However, closer scrutiny has much to tell us about what has gone so badly wrong in Europe's policy towards its large neighbour, with its population of 46 million.
There is a reason why the “Orange revolution” that spectacularly swept President Viktor Yushchenko to power has faded away. It is because Ukraine has proved to be ungovernable. The presidential elections that ushered in the revolution took place in 2004-2005; parliamentary elections were called in 2006; then early parliamentary elections were held in 2007. This plethora of elections is telling.
On Sunday 7 February, the run-off presidential election will tell us whether Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko or former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovic will make it to the highest post. We can only hope for a clear outcome. The alternative will be further chaos.
Either way, Kiev is still marred by what British scholar Andrew Wilson calls “virtual politics:” Free and fair election do take place regularly now, and this is by no means a small feat. Yet, from the ability of the government to implement policies, to the quality of the public services and the level of corruption, Ukraine’s record remains disappointing. According to the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, Kiev’s performance on these issues has been worse than that of some North African autocracies.
As it happens, improving Ukraine’s governance standards was supposed to be the paramount objective of European policy.
At the time of the Orange Revolution, EU High Representative Javier Solana and the then presidents of Poland and Lithuania proved highly reactive when it came to defusing the brewing crisis. Their engagement helped broker an agreement that led to the presidential election being re-run, and then to the highpoint of this bloodless upheaval.
The troubles for Brussels came after those outstanding events. All that the EU was able to offer in the immediate aftermath of the revolution was a ten-point update to a technical “Action Plan” that had been negotiated by Yushchenko’s predecessor. Since then, the EU has stepped up its assistance; it has launched new initiatives and offered more money. But it has not properly accounted for the fact that the Orange revolutionaries have plunged the country into utter disarray.
Part of the problem is that the EU watered down its conditions. Europe's principal mechanism by way of supporting a partner country’s domestic transformation has been a rigorous set of penalties and incentives. However, in the case of Ukraine, the EU has not suspended agreements or cut off funding when Kiev strayed from its commitments.
On the other hand, Brussels has been vague about what Ukraine can aspire to if it complies with EU rules. Crucially, the EU has always stopped short of offering the one thing most Ukrainians yearn for: the prospect of membership in the EU.
Make no mistake about it: the squabbling of its politicians and the cosy relationship between business and government are problems of Ukraine’s own making. Brussels cannot be blamed. Yet the two most significant reasons behind Europe's ambiguous policy on Ukraine have remarkably little to do with that country.
The first concerns Europe’s enlargement “fatigue”. The 2004 expansion of the EU into Central Europe generated worries about the Union’s decision-making processes and its legitimacy. In 2010 we may no longer hear European policy makers claiming that bringing Ukraine into the EU would be like the United States taking in Mexico, as then Commissioner Günther Verheugen put it. Even so, the EU has not moved away from its vague formulas, which basically tell Kiev that the door is neither open nor shut.
The second reason, which is not unrelated, is Russia, of course. European engagement has never really been about replacing Russia, whose ties to Ukraine are historical and cultural, as much as they are economic and political. However, some European countries have been concerned by the aftershocks of Ukraine’s European aspirations.
The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia provided the most blatant example of possible aftershocks. In Ukraine’s case, the consequences have most notably concerned energy politics. The disruption of gas deliveries from Russia first hit news in January 2006, when supplies to Europe plunged by a third in one day. Ever since then, Ukraine—through which about 80% of Russian gas exports to Europe pass—has been at the centre of endless squabbles with Moscow over energy transit.
Between pipeline geopolitics and obscure middlemen, energy has never been an easy target for reform in Eastern Europe. But Europe has moved slowly and without much coordination over such a strategically crucial issue,.
Above all, Europe’s failure has been tangible for those in Ukraine who most deserve to benefit from closer ties to the EU: the men and women in the street.
European angst about the economy and immigration has undermined the millions of Euros thrown at improving the welfare of this and other large neighbours.
The point is illustrated by a little story that appeared in the European media a couple of years ago. It was about twenty kids from the Ukrainian countryside who braved the freezing winter and travelled 500 kilometers to Kiev at their own expense to apply for EU visas. There they were asked to sing outside the consulate buildings in order to prove that they really were a folk choir invited to a European festival, as they claimed.
The episode may be crude, but only as crude as the moral of these past five years: As long as Europeans continue to look inward, as long as those just outside it feel as if they have been left behind, whatever the EU does beyond its borders risks being pointless. Worse still, it may end up being counterproductive.
Fabrizio Tassinari, is Head of Foreign Policy and EU studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies
On the eve of the crucial run-off in Ukraine's presidential election, Fabrizio Tassinari argues that enlargement fatigue in the EU has meant that since the Orange Revolution Ukraine has been offered no real prospect of joining Europe
”It’s so good that you hold free elections now. But why so often?” The joke, making the rounds these days in Kiev, encapsulates the past five years of western disenchantment towards Ukraine. However, closer scrutiny has much to tell us about what has gone so badly wrong in Europe's policy towards its large neighbour, with its population of 46 million.
There is a reason why the “Orange revolution” that spectacularly swept President Viktor Yushchenko to power has faded away. It is because Ukraine has proved to be ungovernable. The presidential elections that ushered in the revolution took place in 2004-2005; parliamentary elections were called in 2006; then early parliamentary elections were held in 2007. This plethora of elections is telling.
On Sunday 7 February, the run-off presidential election will tell us whether Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko or former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovic will make it to the highest post. We can only hope for a clear outcome. The alternative will be further chaos.
Either way, Kiev is still marred by what British scholar Andrew Wilson calls “virtual politics:” Free and fair election do take place regularly now, and this is by no means a small feat. Yet, from the ability of the government to implement policies, to the quality of the public services and the level of corruption, Ukraine’s record remains disappointing. According to the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, Kiev’s performance on these issues has been worse than that of some North African autocracies.
As it happens, improving Ukraine’s governance standards was supposed to be the paramount objective of European policy.
At the time of the Orange Revolution, EU High Representative Javier Solana and the then presidents of Poland and Lithuania proved highly reactive when it came to defusing the brewing crisis. Their engagement helped broker an agreement that led to the presidential election being re-run, and then to the highpoint of this bloodless upheaval.
The troubles for Brussels came after those outstanding events. All that the EU was able to offer in the immediate aftermath of the revolution was a ten-point update to a technical “Action Plan” that had been negotiated by Yushchenko’s predecessor. Since then, the EU has stepped up its assistance; it has launched new initiatives and offered more money. But it has not properly accounted for the fact that the Orange revolutionaries have plunged the country into utter disarray.
Part of the problem is that the EU watered down its conditions. Europe's principal mechanism by way of supporting a partner country’s domestic transformation has been a rigorous set of penalties and incentives. However, in the case of Ukraine, the EU has not suspended agreements or cut off funding when Kiev strayed from its commitments.
On the other hand, Brussels has been vague about what Ukraine can aspire to if it complies with EU rules. Crucially, the EU has always stopped short of offering the one thing most Ukrainians yearn for: the prospect of membership in the EU.
Make no mistake about it: the squabbling of its politicians and the cosy relationship between business and government are problems of Ukraine’s own making. Brussels cannot be blamed. Yet the two most significant reasons behind Europe's ambiguous policy on Ukraine have remarkably little to do with that country.
The first concerns Europe’s enlargement “fatigue”. The 2004 expansion of the EU into Central Europe generated worries about the Union’s decision-making processes and its legitimacy. In 2010 we may no longer hear European policy makers claiming that bringing Ukraine into the EU would be like the United States taking in Mexico, as then Commissioner Günther Verheugen put it. Even so, the EU has not moved away from its vague formulas, which basically tell Kiev that the door is neither open nor shut.
The second reason, which is not unrelated, is Russia, of course. European engagement has never really been about replacing Russia, whose ties to Ukraine are historical and cultural, as much as they are economic and political. However, some European countries have been concerned by the aftershocks of Ukraine’s European aspirations.
The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia provided the most blatant example of possible aftershocks. In Ukraine’s case, the consequences have most notably concerned energy politics. The disruption of gas deliveries from Russia first hit news in January 2006, when supplies to Europe plunged by a third in one day. Ever since then, Ukraine—through which about 80% of Russian gas exports to Europe pass—has been at the centre of endless squabbles with Moscow over energy transit.
Between pipeline geopolitics and obscure middlemen, energy has never been an easy target for reform in Eastern Europe. But Europe has moved slowly and without much coordination over such a strategically crucial issue,.
Above all, Europe’s failure has been tangible for those in Ukraine who most deserve to benefit from closer ties to the EU: the men and women in the street.
European angst about the economy and immigration has undermined the millions of Euros thrown at improving the welfare of this and other large neighbours.
The point is illustrated by a little story that appeared in the European media a couple of years ago. It was about twenty kids from the Ukrainian countryside who braved the freezing winter and travelled 500 kilometers to Kiev at their own expense to apply for EU visas. There they were asked to sing outside the consulate buildings in order to prove that they really were a folk choir invited to a European festival, as they claimed.
The episode may be crude, but only as crude as the moral of these past five years: As long as Europeans continue to look inward, as long as those just outside it feel as if they have been left behind, whatever the EU does beyond its borders risks being pointless. Worse still, it may end up being counterproductive.
Fabrizio Tassinari, is Head of Foreign Policy and EU studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies
Friday, 11 December 2009
A decisive year
First appeared on Global Europe
By Fabrizio Tassinari
As the EU foreign policy adage goes, it all still depends on how the expectations that many observers had raised on the new EU foreign policy architecture will match with the actual capabilities at Catherine Ahston’s disposal.
The new High Representative will be endowed of significantly enhanced institutional tools, such as a large bureaucracy and a seat in the European Commission. But this does not mean that the EU will automatically acquire a single voice on foreign policy. Despite some additional procedural innovations provided by the Lisbon treaty, national voices, especially from larger member states, will remain far louder—and and their actions weightier—than those of the EU. On relatively less sensible issues, Lady Ashton will probably have better chances to hammer her points on behalf of the EU. But in the most important foreign policy dossiers—whether Russia or the Middle East—the ball is bound to remain in the courts of the Member States. The extent to which the High Representative will appreciate these limitations will also determine her ability to shape a role for her office.
The European External Action Service (EEAS) will provide a more visible face on the ground. Ironically, one may go as far as arguing that if the EU will indeed have the proverbial, single telephone number, it will be also to the extent that selected partners will perceive the enhanced EU delegations in their countries as responsive, useful and visible to answer basic questions about the EU and its policies. On this particular point, the year 2010 will be key. The actual composition and functioning of the EEAS will say much about the EU’s presence in the world and Lady Ashton’s leadership potential.
One last point: Would have a charismatic , “traffic-stopping” politician been a better choice for the EU foreign policy chief representative? Do personalities matter? Yes and no. On the visibility side, the EU could have used a recognizable face to put in front of both successes and failures. But one needs to be realistic in that the job of the High Representative will be about coordinating national foreign policies positions as much as (if not more than) representing a common foreign policy. For this, the EU will need a consensus-builder rather than a crowd-puller and Lady Ashton’s performance will be also judged on that basis.
By Fabrizio Tassinari
As the EU foreign policy adage goes, it all still depends on how the expectations that many observers had raised on the new EU foreign policy architecture will match with the actual capabilities at Catherine Ahston’s disposal.
The new High Representative will be endowed of significantly enhanced institutional tools, such as a large bureaucracy and a seat in the European Commission. But this does not mean that the EU will automatically acquire a single voice on foreign policy. Despite some additional procedural innovations provided by the Lisbon treaty, national voices, especially from larger member states, will remain far louder—and and their actions weightier—than those of the EU. On relatively less sensible issues, Lady Ashton will probably have better chances to hammer her points on behalf of the EU. But in the most important foreign policy dossiers—whether Russia or the Middle East—the ball is bound to remain in the courts of the Member States. The extent to which the High Representative will appreciate these limitations will also determine her ability to shape a role for her office.
The European External Action Service (EEAS) will provide a more visible face on the ground. Ironically, one may go as far as arguing that if the EU will indeed have the proverbial, single telephone number, it will be also to the extent that selected partners will perceive the enhanced EU delegations in their countries as responsive, useful and visible to answer basic questions about the EU and its policies. On this particular point, the year 2010 will be key. The actual composition and functioning of the EEAS will say much about the EU’s presence in the world and Lady Ashton’s leadership potential.
One last point: Would have a charismatic , “traffic-stopping” politician been a better choice for the EU foreign policy chief representative? Do personalities matter? Yes and no. On the visibility side, the EU could have used a recognizable face to put in front of both successes and failures. But one needs to be realistic in that the job of the High Representative will be about coordinating national foreign policies positions as much as (if not more than) representing a common foreign policy. For this, the EU will need a consensus-builder rather than a crowd-puller and Lady Ashton’s performance will be also judged on that basis.
Thursday, 19 November 2009
A lesson for Nord Stream from the Arctic
First appeared in European Voice
By Pertti Joenniemi and Fabrizio Tassinari
To ease tensions in the Baltic, consider lessons learned from the race for the High North.
The EU and Russia met this week at a time when Russia's efforts to establish a new, northern pipeline through which to transport gas to Germany are making rapid progress. In the space of a few weeks, Danish, Finnish and Swedish governments have all given the green light for the Nord Stream pipeline to be laid along the bed of the Baltic Sea. All three of them seem to have reached the conclusion that the numerous security-related and environmental questions raised do not justify giving the project the red light.
But energy politics continues to divide northern Europe. Poland, the Baltic states and some sections of the public in other countries remain unconvinced about Nord Stream's rationale and about Moscow's intentions. Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister, did not ease their concerns when, in 2006, he said that Russia would use its Baltic fleet “to resolve ecological, economic and technical tasks” in the Baltic Sea. And, although the Baltic Sea Strategy, adopted by the EU last month, is being promoted as a ‘model' of co-operation, it does little to change the terms of the debate about energy in the region, which remains frozen by the perception of a Russian threat.
There is no easy way to change that perception. However, recent developments in the Arctic suggest one way to civilise the debate. When Russia laid claim to the North Pole in August 2007 by planting its flag on its seabed, an unregulated militarisation of the Arctic and a race for its unexplored riches seemed in the offing. Canada hinted that it might establish two new stations near the North Pole; Denmark sent expeditions to the area; and the US started worrying about its own thin presence in the region, as well as its lack of ice-breakers. Logistical strength – and, possibly, military might – seemed destined to determine who would emerge victorious in the competition for the High North.
Yet, in August 2008, representatives of those four countries, plus Norway, met in Greenland and agreed that issues such as navigation rights and delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf should be settled through existing international structures. They reaffirmed that the Arctic area needs no specific legal regime. By issuing a joint statement, the Ilulissat Declaration, they chose to pre-empt any further escalation.
The terms of the debate in the Baltic may have passed the point of pre-emption, given that Germany's and Russia's decision not to involve Poland in decisions about Nord Stream has been likened to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact under which, in 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union carved up Poland. Even so, the region should consider emulating the Arctic's littoral states.
Given that the region's governments meet regularly in various formats – most notably the Council of the Baltic Sea States – it would not be difficult to choreograph a joint initiative by all nine coastal states. This could produce a political declaration to the effect that any inter-state controversy related to the pipeline would be resolved by civilian – as opposed to military – means. As in the Ilulissat Declaration, the signatories would declare themselves committed to existing legal regimes and to the “orderly settlement” of conflicting claims.
Such a move might not dispel the fears of some, but it might help to tone down the rhetoric. In a region where relations are strained, that would be a valuable improvement.
Pertti Joenniemi and Fabrizio Tassinari are senior researchers at the Danish Institute for International Studies.
By Pertti Joenniemi and Fabrizio Tassinari
To ease tensions in the Baltic, consider lessons learned from the race for the High North.
The EU and Russia met this week at a time when Russia's efforts to establish a new, northern pipeline through which to transport gas to Germany are making rapid progress. In the space of a few weeks, Danish, Finnish and Swedish governments have all given the green light for the Nord Stream pipeline to be laid along the bed of the Baltic Sea. All three of them seem to have reached the conclusion that the numerous security-related and environmental questions raised do not justify giving the project the red light.
But energy politics continues to divide northern Europe. Poland, the Baltic states and some sections of the public in other countries remain unconvinced about Nord Stream's rationale and about Moscow's intentions. Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister, did not ease their concerns when, in 2006, he said that Russia would use its Baltic fleet “to resolve ecological, economic and technical tasks” in the Baltic Sea. And, although the Baltic Sea Strategy, adopted by the EU last month, is being promoted as a ‘model' of co-operation, it does little to change the terms of the debate about energy in the region, which remains frozen by the perception of a Russian threat.
There is no easy way to change that perception. However, recent developments in the Arctic suggest one way to civilise the debate. When Russia laid claim to the North Pole in August 2007 by planting its flag on its seabed, an unregulated militarisation of the Arctic and a race for its unexplored riches seemed in the offing. Canada hinted that it might establish two new stations near the North Pole; Denmark sent expeditions to the area; and the US started worrying about its own thin presence in the region, as well as its lack of ice-breakers. Logistical strength – and, possibly, military might – seemed destined to determine who would emerge victorious in the competition for the High North.
Yet, in August 2008, representatives of those four countries, plus Norway, met in Greenland and agreed that issues such as navigation rights and delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf should be settled through existing international structures. They reaffirmed that the Arctic area needs no specific legal regime. By issuing a joint statement, the Ilulissat Declaration, they chose to pre-empt any further escalation.
The terms of the debate in the Baltic may have passed the point of pre-emption, given that Germany's and Russia's decision not to involve Poland in decisions about Nord Stream has been likened to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact under which, in 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union carved up Poland. Even so, the region should consider emulating the Arctic's littoral states.
Given that the region's governments meet regularly in various formats – most notably the Council of the Baltic Sea States – it would not be difficult to choreograph a joint initiative by all nine coastal states. This could produce a political declaration to the effect that any inter-state controversy related to the pipeline would be resolved by civilian – as opposed to military – means. As in the Ilulissat Declaration, the signatories would declare themselves committed to existing legal regimes and to the “orderly settlement” of conflicting claims.
Such a move might not dispel the fears of some, but it might help to tone down the rhetoric. In a region where relations are strained, that would be a valuable improvement.
Pertti Joenniemi and Fabrizio Tassinari are senior researchers at the Danish Institute for International Studies.
Thursday, 5 November 2009
Defusing the enlargement hype
First appeared on E!Sharp
No panacea: the carrot of EU accession has not yet persuaded Bosnia's leaders to set aside their differences. Photograph: European Commission
Presenting his annual progress report on the applicant countries in October, Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that “political de-mining” was part of the EU's job when it came to enlargement. He was referring to the countries of the western Balkans, with their persistent infighting. But he might as well have been talking about some of the EU's existing members.
With the Lisbon Treaty finally ratified, the enlargement debate may soon return to the top of the EU agenda. The “wideners” will be back to stress the importance of further expansion for Europe’s global aspirations. Opponents will reiterate warnings about the challenge enlargement poses to the European polity and its identity. Both lines of argument have strong justifications. Yet both tend to overlook a basic point: EU expansion has helped to foster prosperity, spread peace and consolidate democracy in the candidate countries and in Europe as a whole.
First and foremost, enlargement is a tool for achieving those goals, not the goal itself. And the EU is not ready to lay down that tool just yet. Brussels' credibility in the Balkans rests on its ability to fulfil the membership pledge as soon as the applicant countries have met the agreed conditions (though as Bosnia's enduring fragility shows, that pledge is not always sufficient to keep candidates on the reform track). The recent Turkish-Armenian accord may lend a new lease of life to Ankara’s EU bid, which should in turn remind EU governments that their contradictory position on Turkey cannot be maintained indefinitely. The domestic mayhem in countries such as Ukraine and Moldova means that their accession is not a topic for now - but the EU will, at some point, have to find a conclusive answer to these states' long-term membership aspirations.
Only when the EU resolves this principled ambiguity will it be able to focus on the instruments at its disposal. And when that happens, it will become clear that in many key areas, the path before Europe is largely laid out already. "Deep" free trade arrangements, such as that being negotiated with Ukraine, will open up the EU market and spur substantial economic integration with its neighbours. Some neighbours have provided significant assets in specific EU foreign policy missions - witness the Moroccan troops deployed in Bosnia. Visa liberalisation is the name of the game in the Balkans.
So in time, some of the EU's neighbours may be surprised to discover that the difference between member state and partner state is increasingly blurred. A candidate country like Turkey may have to swallow a restrictive EU accession deal, replete with exceptions and "safeguards". But for a country such as Israel, which is in many fields deeply integrated with the EU already, the question of membership has long been redundant.
No neighbourhood policy or "privileged partnership” will ever match the appeal of membership. Yet the only way for the EU to break free of the circular enlargement debate of the past half-decade is for it to focus on the concrete benefits that existing instruments can deliver, and to keep bickering to a minimum.
No panacea: the carrot of EU accession has not yet persuaded Bosnia's leaders to set aside their differences. Photograph: European Commission
Presenting his annual progress report on the applicant countries in October, Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that “political de-mining” was part of the EU's job when it came to enlargement. He was referring to the countries of the western Balkans, with their persistent infighting. But he might as well have been talking about some of the EU's existing members.
With the Lisbon Treaty finally ratified, the enlargement debate may soon return to the top of the EU agenda. The “wideners” will be back to stress the importance of further expansion for Europe’s global aspirations. Opponents will reiterate warnings about the challenge enlargement poses to the European polity and its identity. Both lines of argument have strong justifications. Yet both tend to overlook a basic point: EU expansion has helped to foster prosperity, spread peace and consolidate democracy in the candidate countries and in Europe as a whole.
First and foremost, enlargement is a tool for achieving those goals, not the goal itself. And the EU is not ready to lay down that tool just yet. Brussels' credibility in the Balkans rests on its ability to fulfil the membership pledge as soon as the applicant countries have met the agreed conditions (though as Bosnia's enduring fragility shows, that pledge is not always sufficient to keep candidates on the reform track). The recent Turkish-Armenian accord may lend a new lease of life to Ankara’s EU bid, which should in turn remind EU governments that their contradictory position on Turkey cannot be maintained indefinitely. The domestic mayhem in countries such as Ukraine and Moldova means that their accession is not a topic for now - but the EU will, at some point, have to find a conclusive answer to these states' long-term membership aspirations.
Only when the EU resolves this principled ambiguity will it be able to focus on the instruments at its disposal. And when that happens, it will become clear that in many key areas, the path before Europe is largely laid out already. "Deep" free trade arrangements, such as that being negotiated with Ukraine, will open up the EU market and spur substantial economic integration with its neighbours. Some neighbours have provided significant assets in specific EU foreign policy missions - witness the Moroccan troops deployed in Bosnia. Visa liberalisation is the name of the game in the Balkans.
So in time, some of the EU's neighbours may be surprised to discover that the difference between member state and partner state is increasingly blurred. A candidate country like Turkey may have to swallow a restrictive EU accession deal, replete with exceptions and "safeguards". But for a country such as Israel, which is in many fields deeply integrated with the EU already, the question of membership has long been redundant.
No neighbourhood policy or "privileged partnership” will ever match the appeal of membership. Yet the only way for the EU to break free of the circular enlargement debate of the past half-decade is for it to focus on the concrete benefits that existing instruments can deliver, and to keep bickering to a minimum.
Friday, 2 October 2009
But it’s not as if the EU handles its neighbourhood very adroitly
First appeared on Europe's World
Autumn 2009
by Fabrizio Tassinari
At the start of his country’s EU presidency, Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt remarked that: “Our credibility in the wider world depends on how successful we are in our own part of the world.” Nick Witney explains in his perceptive yet provocative article why this is so. He draws our attention to the ‘return of geography’ as a basis for assessing Europe’s threat perceptions. From energy dependency to immigration, many of the most daunting challenges that are shaping the EU’s security agenda are to be found in the arc of countries around its eastern and southern borders.
Witney’s main point concerns Europe’s relations with the Islamic world, and its position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A higher EU profile is sorely needed. In the candid report that the UN’s Middle East envoy Alvaro de Soto submitted upon his resignation, for example, he mentions the EU only a few times. And when he does, it is to say that, “Europeans have spent more money in boycotting the [Palestinian Authority] than they did when they were supporting it”. He also says that the EU’s border-monitoring mission between Gaza and Egypt has been “fraught with difficulties” and that “somewhat comically” the Middle East Quartet is made up of six parties since the EU is represented by three principals. All these flaws have once again become painfully apparent in the aftermath of the most recent Gaza conflict.
But Witney’s analysis is perhaps too dismissive when he addresses Russia and eastern Europe. It is true that Russia – whether measured in economic terms or by its rusting military capabilities –, may not in the long run live up to the “strategic partner” status it has obtained from Brussels. And there are good reasons for hoping that the EU will eventually prove to be the more attractive lodestone for the former-Soviet republics on its borders. Yet the cacophony of voices shooting to be heard in the Russia debate remains a textbook case of Europe’s under-performing foreign policy. Meanwhile, the Eastern Partnership doesn’t constitute a panacea for Ukraine or Moldova, and despite their severe shortcomings the political leaderships in those countries have not even welcomed it. Put another way, for now the EU is very far from applying Witney’s recipe of “forbearance and firmness.”
The broader point, of course, is that Europe cannot choose its neighbours, but must nevertheless decide what it wants to do with them. Throughout the second half of this decade, the EU’s enlargement policy has been mired in inward-looking squabbles, and the “light” enlargement version proposed through the European Neighbourhood Policy hasn’t quite taken off. Until recently, all this could be justified as an element of Europe’s ‘constructive ambiguity’, and indeed its successful “Bing-Bang” enlargement in 2004 made the phrase look apposite enough. But the regrettable truth is that there is not much that is constructive in the EU’s ambiguous policy mix towards its neighbours.
The EU’s ability to deal with its neighbours is not only a litmus test for its global aspirations. The neighbours in effect hold up a mirror to the EU’s own identity and influence. Sadly, the image it reflects is not very pretty.
Autumn 2009
by Fabrizio Tassinari
At the start of his country’s EU presidency, Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt remarked that: “Our credibility in the wider world depends on how successful we are in our own part of the world.” Nick Witney explains in his perceptive yet provocative article why this is so. He draws our attention to the ‘return of geography’ as a basis for assessing Europe’s threat perceptions. From energy dependency to immigration, many of the most daunting challenges that are shaping the EU’s security agenda are to be found in the arc of countries around its eastern and southern borders.
Witney’s main point concerns Europe’s relations with the Islamic world, and its position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A higher EU profile is sorely needed. In the candid report that the UN’s Middle East envoy Alvaro de Soto submitted upon his resignation, for example, he mentions the EU only a few times. And when he does, it is to say that, “Europeans have spent more money in boycotting the [Palestinian Authority] than they did when they were supporting it”. He also says that the EU’s border-monitoring mission between Gaza and Egypt has been “fraught with difficulties” and that “somewhat comically” the Middle East Quartet is made up of six parties since the EU is represented by three principals. All these flaws have once again become painfully apparent in the aftermath of the most recent Gaza conflict.
But Witney’s analysis is perhaps too dismissive when he addresses Russia and eastern Europe. It is true that Russia – whether measured in economic terms or by its rusting military capabilities –, may not in the long run live up to the “strategic partner” status it has obtained from Brussels. And there are good reasons for hoping that the EU will eventually prove to be the more attractive lodestone for the former-Soviet republics on its borders. Yet the cacophony of voices shooting to be heard in the Russia debate remains a textbook case of Europe’s under-performing foreign policy. Meanwhile, the Eastern Partnership doesn’t constitute a panacea for Ukraine or Moldova, and despite their severe shortcomings the political leaderships in those countries have not even welcomed it. Put another way, for now the EU is very far from applying Witney’s recipe of “forbearance and firmness.”
The broader point, of course, is that Europe cannot choose its neighbours, but must nevertheless decide what it wants to do with them. Throughout the second half of this decade, the EU’s enlargement policy has been mired in inward-looking squabbles, and the “light” enlargement version proposed through the European Neighbourhood Policy hasn’t quite taken off. Until recently, all this could be justified as an element of Europe’s ‘constructive ambiguity’, and indeed its successful “Bing-Bang” enlargement in 2004 made the phrase look apposite enough. But the regrettable truth is that there is not much that is constructive in the EU’s ambiguous policy mix towards its neighbours.
The EU’s ability to deal with its neighbours is not only a litmus test for its global aspirations. The neighbours in effect hold up a mirror to the EU’s own identity and influence. Sadly, the image it reflects is not very pretty.
Monday, 28 September 2009
At Last
Taking a novel approach to the current situation in Europe, foreign policy analyst Fabrizio Tassinari transforms external policy concerns about Europe's neighborhood into questions about Europe's internal future. His contention: that the situation on Europe's periphery is an unforgiving mirror of its identity crisis, institutional paralysis, ineffectual foreign policy, and morbid fear of migrants and multiculturalism.
Looking at each of the countries and regions surrounding Europe, from Russia and Turkey to the Western Balkans and North Africa, Tassinari unravels the challenges facing the EU, weighs the record of its policies, and explains how both can be traced back to Europe's inherent insecurity. Turning conventional wisdom on its head, he argues that gradual and diversified forms of integration with its many neighbors is Europe's best alternative to a progressive, but inexorable fragmentation of the EU. The ability to meet this challenge will not only test Europe's unfulfilled global aspirations, it will be crucial to its very survival.
Friday, 18 September 2009
The neighborhood is the test case
First appeared on Global Europe
The EU as a global actor (4) / An interview with Fabrizio Tassinari
Friday, 18 September 2009
How would you describe the European Union’s role in today’s international affairs, with regards to its neighbourhood as well as to the wider world?
Judging by the rhetoric of some European statesmen, as well as by the opinion of European citizens, the hopes surrounding Europe’s role in the world are all too often higher than what the EU can actually deliver.
It is no doubt frustrating to listen to the cacophony of European voices on key dossiers such as Russia or the Middle East. It is disappointing to witness the slowness characterizing the build-up of the EU defense capabilities.
At the same time, some of the less visible things that the EU is doing on the world stage, especially in those fields that may not be strictly categorized as “international affairs,” are remarkable. The goal of a rule-based world shaped by norms promoted also by the EU, for example, has already made considerable advances. Contravening EU competition laws may end up being extremely costly for non-compliant corporations. Producers worldwide comply with EU rules on environmental and health-related hazards in order to sell their products in the European market.
In other words: the EU still punches below its weight, but it could do much worse and we do not always realize it.
What role would you like to see the EU play on the world stage? On what regions and issues should the EU focus in its foreign relations?
Let me start by saying that I disagree with those, especially on the other side of the Atlantic, who regard Europe as a delusional conclave of countries locked in its own “post-historical” oasis of peace. Europe is one of the world regions that feels most challenged by globalization, whether because of its stagnant demography or unease with multiculturalism. However, it is also the region that, by creating the most cohesive model of regional integration, has in many ways anticipated globalization.
As I argue in my forthcoming book Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, the EU’s backyard is in many ways Europe’s miniature globalization. From immigration to energy dependency, many of the key strategic challenges facing the EU happen to coalesce in the ring of countries that surround it: the Balkans, Turkey, Eastern Europe and North Africa. In this diverse region, the EU has the opportunity and the need to move away from the inward-looking mood of the past years. That is because the neighborhood is a test-case of Europe’s global aspiration. Perhaps more importantly, it is because the way in which the EU deals with each of these countries and regions says so much about the EU’s own identity and power.
Fast forward -- do you expect that in 2020 the EU will speak with one voice and act in concert?
Horizon scanning is risky and inevitably subject to error. On the other hand, it is probably fair to say that on some of the major issues on which the EU is expected to deliver, ten years might suffice to see some tangible results.
If the Lisbon Treaty enters in force, the next decade will already give us a pretty good idea as to how the new EU foreign policy architecture operates. By 2020, the EU might have taken in most of the Balkan states as members, the planned Nabucco gas pipeline might be operational (and remind Europe's policy makers that it does not solve EU's energy conundrum). Turkey is unlikely to have become a member of the EU by the time, but the EU may have resolved to have provided a membership perspective to Ukraine and Moldova.
All these things notwithstanding, speaking with one voice and acting in concert may be too tall an order in the next ten years. Some member states will not give up their foreign policy prerogatives in favor of a yet-unclear EU role. Because of this, issues ranging from UN reform to relations with Russia are likely to remain elusive. But then again, one should not set expectations too high. An EU that acts pragmatically on some of these sensible dossier, if necessary thanks to the action of a smaller number of EU member states willing to forge ahead, would be a realistic and most welcome aspiration.
Fabrizio Tassinari is head of the Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
The EU as a global actor (4) / An interview with Fabrizio Tassinari
Friday, 18 September 2009
How would you describe the European Union’s role in today’s international affairs, with regards to its neighbourhood as well as to the wider world?
Judging by the rhetoric of some European statesmen, as well as by the opinion of European citizens, the hopes surrounding Europe’s role in the world are all too often higher than what the EU can actually deliver.
It is no doubt frustrating to listen to the cacophony of European voices on key dossiers such as Russia or the Middle East. It is disappointing to witness the slowness characterizing the build-up of the EU defense capabilities.
At the same time, some of the less visible things that the EU is doing on the world stage, especially in those fields that may not be strictly categorized as “international affairs,” are remarkable. The goal of a rule-based world shaped by norms promoted also by the EU, for example, has already made considerable advances. Contravening EU competition laws may end up being extremely costly for non-compliant corporations. Producers worldwide comply with EU rules on environmental and health-related hazards in order to sell their products in the European market.
In other words: the EU still punches below its weight, but it could do much worse and we do not always realize it.
What role would you like to see the EU play on the world stage? On what regions and issues should the EU focus in its foreign relations?
Let me start by saying that I disagree with those, especially on the other side of the Atlantic, who regard Europe as a delusional conclave of countries locked in its own “post-historical” oasis of peace. Europe is one of the world regions that feels most challenged by globalization, whether because of its stagnant demography or unease with multiculturalism. However, it is also the region that, by creating the most cohesive model of regional integration, has in many ways anticipated globalization.
As I argue in my forthcoming book Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, the EU’s backyard is in many ways Europe’s miniature globalization. From immigration to energy dependency, many of the key strategic challenges facing the EU happen to coalesce in the ring of countries that surround it: the Balkans, Turkey, Eastern Europe and North Africa. In this diverse region, the EU has the opportunity and the need to move away from the inward-looking mood of the past years. That is because the neighborhood is a test-case of Europe’s global aspiration. Perhaps more importantly, it is because the way in which the EU deals with each of these countries and regions says so much about the EU’s own identity and power.
Fast forward -- do you expect that in 2020 the EU will speak with one voice and act in concert?
Horizon scanning is risky and inevitably subject to error. On the other hand, it is probably fair to say that on some of the major issues on which the EU is expected to deliver, ten years might suffice to see some tangible results.
If the Lisbon Treaty enters in force, the next decade will already give us a pretty good idea as to how the new EU foreign policy architecture operates. By 2020, the EU might have taken in most of the Balkan states as members, the planned Nabucco gas pipeline might be operational (and remind Europe's policy makers that it does not solve EU's energy conundrum). Turkey is unlikely to have become a member of the EU by the time, but the EU may have resolved to have provided a membership perspective to Ukraine and Moldova.
All these things notwithstanding, speaking with one voice and acting in concert may be too tall an order in the next ten years. Some member states will not give up their foreign policy prerogatives in favor of a yet-unclear EU role. Because of this, issues ranging from UN reform to relations with Russia are likely to remain elusive. But then again, one should not set expectations too high. An EU that acts pragmatically on some of these sensible dossier, if necessary thanks to the action of a smaller number of EU member states willing to forge ahead, would be a realistic and most welcome aspiration.
Fabrizio Tassinari is head of the Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Wednesday, 29 July 2009
The Autumn to Come
As vacations approach, I have finalized a number of initiatives that will hopefully be in full swing by the time I come back in early Fall. The initiatives are all aimed at presenting and discussing my forthcoming book Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors. As it turns out, it will be two mini-tours: one, more extended across time and space, in Europe and the other, shorter one in the U.S.
For Europe, I have two, possibly three, events in schedule for now: a book launch in Stockholm on October 5-6, at the Baltic Development Forum, a Davos-like organization for Northern Europe which this year will feature the Swedish, Finnish and Latvian Prime Ministers, Jeremy Rifkin, Lilia Shevtsova, and... HRH Pricess Victoria of Sweden (wonder what she will have to say about Europe's neighbors..). Beginning of November, I will then launch the book in Copenhagen, at my home institution the Danish Institute for International Studies with my former CEPS colleague Michael Emerson and--hopefully--the former Ukranian foreign Minister Borys Tarasjuk as discussants. Later in the spring, I will be at the University of Cambridge and hope to arrange a small event there as well.
In the U.S. the main book-launch event in late October will be in Washington D.C., kindly hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and co-sponsored by the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins' SAIS. Other two initiatives, also during that U.S. trip in late October, are still in the making but look quite promising so far. I should present an academic paper based on the book at the Forum for Contemporary Europe at Stanford University as well as at at the Center for European Studies at Harvard.
And now, Inshallah, holidays!
For Europe, I have two, possibly three, events in schedule for now: a book launch in Stockholm on October 5-6, at the Baltic Development Forum, a Davos-like organization for Northern Europe which this year will feature the Swedish, Finnish and Latvian Prime Ministers, Jeremy Rifkin, Lilia Shevtsova, and... HRH Pricess Victoria of Sweden (wonder what she will have to say about Europe's neighbors..). Beginning of November, I will then launch the book in Copenhagen, at my home institution the Danish Institute for International Studies with my former CEPS colleague Michael Emerson and--hopefully--the former Ukranian foreign Minister Borys Tarasjuk as discussants. Later in the spring, I will be at the University of Cambridge and hope to arrange a small event there as well.
In the U.S. the main book-launch event in late October will be in Washington D.C., kindly hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and co-sponsored by the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins' SAIS. Other two initiatives, also during that U.S. trip in late October, are still in the making but look quite promising so far. I should present an academic paper based on the book at the Forum for Contemporary Europe at Stanford University as well as at at the Center for European Studies at Harvard.
And now, Inshallah, holidays!
Friday, 19 June 2009
Where Should the EU End?
This article appeared on the Washington Post's PostGlobal
In retrospect, the historic European Union expansion of May 2004 carries more than a hint of irony. The accession of eight former communist nations of Central Europe was in many ways a high point for Europe. The EU monitored these countries' transition towards liberal democracy; it influenced their political culture and guided economic transformation.
It wasn't a miracle, as one might mistakenly believe from listening to the European vulgate. But it is safe to say that the EU accompanied a remarkable development. When viewed alongside the quagmire that America was making for itself in Iraq at the time, enlargement became the epitome of Europe's power and of the scale of its ambitions.
Alas, EU enlargement has since turned into an unforgiving mirror of European paralysis. Just one year after the Eastern expansion, popular referenda in France and the Netherlands rejected the so-called Constitutional Treaty aiming at reforming EU institutions. The no vote signaled widespread dissatisfaction with the overall course of Europe, and it coalesced in a generic enlargement fatigue. The French non notoriously came down to the "Polish plumber," the imaginary new EU citizen threatening the Gallic labor market with his pipes and screws.
In January 2007, then, the EU fulfilled the ill-fated promise of admitting Bulgaria and Romania. In order to assuage their fear of being left behind, Brussels had given the two Balkan countries an entry date, irrespective of their record on domestic reforms. Those judicial and administrative reforms have slowed since the countries' accession, as contract killings and corruption at the highest levels have remained the norm.
As for the other Balkans, the troubled nations of the former Yugoslavia, the EU has reiterated ad nauseam its commitment to their "European perspective." But much of the region remains in a political and security limbo, and Brussels has fed into it by trying to adjust its scrupulous criteria and conditions to the precarious situation on the ground. The result is that, with the possible exception of Croatia, it is unclear to the Balkan people if and when they will accede to the Union.
The EU has also partly frozen accession talks with Turkey, shortly after it took the momentous step of opening those talks. It did so because of Turkey's reluctance to open its ports to vessels coming from Cyprus. Turkey's size, its large Muslim population, and geographical location are clearly the real reason for Europe's hesitance. Still, the problem is that Ankara has lost its momentum for reform, and Europe has lost its credibility.
Each of these instances shows different facets of the European malaise. EU institutions, conceived half a century ago, have adjusted as the Union has taken in more countries, but do require comprehensive reforms in order to function effectively with 30-plus potential members. Pending approval by the Irish, the forthcoming Lisbon treaty will go some way to correcting that, but it can do nothing to rewind the half-decade that Europe has lost.
EU expansion was also expected to bring about an ever more diverse Union. Yet, in western Europe, support for further expansion is at an all-time low, even in traditionally pro-enlargement countries such as Britain and Italy. In the wake of the global financial maelstrom earlier this year, politicians from the new member states warned about the descent of a new "iron curtain" in Europe. Economic and social differences have brought out profound divisions, rather than deepening the Union's cherished diversity.
Above all, the predicament of these past five years has made it plain that the EU enlargement policy is unsustainable in the long run. Expansion is routinely described as Europe's most successful foreign policy. But taking in country after country hardly qualifies as a foreign policy at all. The question is not whether the EU will again be ready to expand; it is where the EU ought to end.
Given the plethora of stakeholders in the European arena, a firm decision on this is not easy to take. But it is the single move likely to shift the focus away from enlargement as an existential question, and back to European integration as the paramount means for fostering prosperity and spreading peace on the Continent.
Enlargement has provided a powerful tool to achieve these goals. But it is now sinking the EU because it has become a goal unto itself.
Fabrizio Tassinari is a Senior Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies and a non-Resident Fellow at Johns Hopkins' SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations. His book, Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, will be published in September.
In retrospect, the historic European Union expansion of May 2004 carries more than a hint of irony. The accession of eight former communist nations of Central Europe was in many ways a high point for Europe. The EU monitored these countries' transition towards liberal democracy; it influenced their political culture and guided economic transformation.
It wasn't a miracle, as one might mistakenly believe from listening to the European vulgate. But it is safe to say that the EU accompanied a remarkable development. When viewed alongside the quagmire that America was making for itself in Iraq at the time, enlargement became the epitome of Europe's power and of the scale of its ambitions.
Alas, EU enlargement has since turned into an unforgiving mirror of European paralysis. Just one year after the Eastern expansion, popular referenda in France and the Netherlands rejected the so-called Constitutional Treaty aiming at reforming EU institutions. The no vote signaled widespread dissatisfaction with the overall course of Europe, and it coalesced in a generic enlargement fatigue. The French non notoriously came down to the "Polish plumber," the imaginary new EU citizen threatening the Gallic labor market with his pipes and screws.
In January 2007, then, the EU fulfilled the ill-fated promise of admitting Bulgaria and Romania. In order to assuage their fear of being left behind, Brussels had given the two Balkan countries an entry date, irrespective of their record on domestic reforms. Those judicial and administrative reforms have slowed since the countries' accession, as contract killings and corruption at the highest levels have remained the norm.
As for the other Balkans, the troubled nations of the former Yugoslavia, the EU has reiterated ad nauseam its commitment to their "European perspective." But much of the region remains in a political and security limbo, and Brussels has fed into it by trying to adjust its scrupulous criteria and conditions to the precarious situation on the ground. The result is that, with the possible exception of Croatia, it is unclear to the Balkan people if and when they will accede to the Union.
The EU has also partly frozen accession talks with Turkey, shortly after it took the momentous step of opening those talks. It did so because of Turkey's reluctance to open its ports to vessels coming from Cyprus. Turkey's size, its large Muslim population, and geographical location are clearly the real reason for Europe's hesitance. Still, the problem is that Ankara has lost its momentum for reform, and Europe has lost its credibility.
Each of these instances shows different facets of the European malaise. EU institutions, conceived half a century ago, have adjusted as the Union has taken in more countries, but do require comprehensive reforms in order to function effectively with 30-plus potential members. Pending approval by the Irish, the forthcoming Lisbon treaty will go some way to correcting that, but it can do nothing to rewind the half-decade that Europe has lost.
EU expansion was also expected to bring about an ever more diverse Union. Yet, in western Europe, support for further expansion is at an all-time low, even in traditionally pro-enlargement countries such as Britain and Italy. In the wake of the global financial maelstrom earlier this year, politicians from the new member states warned about the descent of a new "iron curtain" in Europe. Economic and social differences have brought out profound divisions, rather than deepening the Union's cherished diversity.
Above all, the predicament of these past five years has made it plain that the EU enlargement policy is unsustainable in the long run. Expansion is routinely described as Europe's most successful foreign policy. But taking in country after country hardly qualifies as a foreign policy at all. The question is not whether the EU will again be ready to expand; it is where the EU ought to end.
Given the plethora of stakeholders in the European arena, a firm decision on this is not easy to take. But it is the single move likely to shift the focus away from enlargement as an existential question, and back to European integration as the paramount means for fostering prosperity and spreading peace on the Continent.
Enlargement has provided a powerful tool to achieve these goals. But it is now sinking the EU because it has become a goal unto itself.
Fabrizio Tassinari is a Senior Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies and a non-Resident Fellow at Johns Hopkins' SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations. His book, Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, will be published in September.
Sunday, 31 May 2009
Parliamentary debut
On May 25th, I received a 7 a.m. phone call with the request to speak at 3pm at the Danish Parliament (Folketinget) on the European future of Ukraine.
Last minute things like this, I have discovered, are excellent to forget, and therefore win, anxiety.
Saturday, 23 May 2009
In Belgrade with B.
Just back from Belgrade after a remarkable conference by the Atlantik Brucke, a German organization bringing together "young leaders" (mind the inverted commas) from Europe and America. I took back the impression that Serbia has shifted gear. Thanks to a young, motivated, and cosmopolitan ruling class, Serbia seems at last willing to meet Europe on its own turf of rules and conditions, while remaining patient in the face of Brussels' continued ambiguity.
As it often happens in the Balkans, however, much of the tone of the discussion centered on Serbia's past, and on how much this past is embedded to the present. I have a particular feeling about this--on which I elaborate further in my forthcoming book: That much of this focus on the past has now become an obsession. It is a useful obsession for those who claim to justify in that way every one of the region's shortcomings. It is also useful for those Europeans who are concerned about the Balkans. My take is that from corruption to criminality, both Serbia and Europe have much more mundane and yet serious issues to worry about. This emphasis on what historian Maria Todorova calls the "monopoly of barbarity" marks the Balkans as a permanent Europen exception, which it is not.
Last time I was in Belgrade was in April 2008, on the night in which Berlusconi won again general elections and was back at at the helm as PM. Little over a year later, one has got to remark that travelling around Europe as an Italian has never been funnier if it weren't so sad.
As it often happens in the Balkans, however, much of the tone of the discussion centered on Serbia's past, and on how much this past is embedded to the present. I have a particular feeling about this--on which I elaborate further in my forthcoming book: That much of this focus on the past has now become an obsession. It is a useful obsession for those who claim to justify in that way every one of the region's shortcomings. It is also useful for those Europeans who are concerned about the Balkans. My take is that from corruption to criminality, both Serbia and Europe have much more mundane and yet serious issues to worry about. This emphasis on what historian Maria Todorova calls the "monopoly of barbarity" marks the Balkans as a permanent Europen exception, which it is not.
Last time I was in Belgrade was in April 2008, on the night in which Berlusconi won again general elections and was back at at the helm as PM. Little over a year later, one has got to remark that travelling around Europe as an Italian has never been funnier if it weren't so sad.
Thursday, 30 April 2009
Creative destruction
About a year ago, I was sitting at a dinner table in Venice in the rather sorry position of conference rapporteur. Keynote speaker that day was Sergio Marchionne, CEO of Fiat, the Italian automaker. Speaking at the beginning of the subprime-triggered financial crisis, Marchionne centered his whole speech on the need for "creative destruction."
Today, Chrysler heads for "surgical bankrupcy", right after which Fiat will take over a 20% stake in the restructured U.S. automaker, possibly to rise by 51% in 2013. For Marchionne at least, this seems to be a case of creative destruction indeed.
Today, Chrysler heads for "surgical bankrupcy", right after which Fiat will take over a 20% stake in the restructured U.S. automaker, possibly to rise by 51% in 2013. For Marchionne at least, this seems to be a case of creative destruction indeed.
Thursday, 9 April 2009
Fogh, Twitter, and other European stories...
La correzione delle bozze del mio libro prende gran parte del tempo in queste settimane, ma mi ha comunque permesso un paio di scorribande nelle terre e nei temi che mi appassionano.
Prima di tutto un interessante viaggio a Kiev, in un'Ucraina apparentemente devastata dalla crisi economica. Tastare il polso della situazione con ministri ed attivisti nella stessa sala, era un'occasione imperdibile per chi fa il mio lavoro. Ne ho tratto la conclusione che se l'Ucraina sta veramente messa come lamentano le sue autorita' l'Occidente e l'Europa hanno meno responsabilita' di quanto credessi. E' un paese dove lo spreco di risorse umane e' quasi offensivo. Come spesso capita in quei paesi, la sperequazione economica si vede ad ogni angolo--con tante BMW and Mercedes di alta cilindrata quanti sono i mendicanti. Poi ho incontrato casualmente alcuni cantanti lirici dell'Arena di Verona, che mi hanno invitato ad un concerto e fatto sbollire un po' il nervosismo.
Al mio ritorno mi sono ritrovato a discutere in TV della Turchia che si opponeva all'elezione del Primo Ministro Danese Anders Fogh Rasmussen a Segretario Generale della NATO. Ringraziando il cielo, l'ho fatto prima della mediazione di Berlusconi. E comunque la mia impressione e' che i Turchi facessero sul serio. Sono davvero contrari a Fogh, e non a torto a mio parere. Per il nuovo Segretario Generale, o cambia un po' modus operandi, oppure il suo nuovo lavoro si trasformera' in una specie di contrappasso dantesco per quello che ha combinato in occasione della vicenda delle vignette di Maometto (il vicesegretario e' un turco).
Per il resto nell'ultima settimana sono spettatore dalla cosiddetta rivoluzione "Twitter" in Moldova, dove circa 15.000 giovani sono scesi in piazza per protestare contro i risultati elettorali e comunicano fra di loro attraverso il social network di micro-messaging. E' un evento per molti versi simile alle rivoluzioni arancioni e rosa in Ucraina e Georgia. Il problema e' che sono entrambi finite piuttosto male, e francamente (cinicamente) non vedo perche' questa dovrebbe finire diversamente: il sistema paese in quelle terre e' in practica un feudo appannaggio di pochi boss e relative famiglie. Non si puo' ignorare una rivoluzione del genere, ma non ci si deve neanche illudere.
Come tutti, sono rimasto basito, furioso e commosso da quanto sta avvenendo in Abruzzo. Ma di questo, per rispetto, evito di commentare.
Prima di tutto un interessante viaggio a Kiev, in un'Ucraina apparentemente devastata dalla crisi economica. Tastare il polso della situazione con ministri ed attivisti nella stessa sala, era un'occasione imperdibile per chi fa il mio lavoro. Ne ho tratto la conclusione che se l'Ucraina sta veramente messa come lamentano le sue autorita' l'Occidente e l'Europa hanno meno responsabilita' di quanto credessi. E' un paese dove lo spreco di risorse umane e' quasi offensivo. Come spesso capita in quei paesi, la sperequazione economica si vede ad ogni angolo--con tante BMW and Mercedes di alta cilindrata quanti sono i mendicanti. Poi ho incontrato casualmente alcuni cantanti lirici dell'Arena di Verona, che mi hanno invitato ad un concerto e fatto sbollire un po' il nervosismo.
Al mio ritorno mi sono ritrovato a discutere in TV della Turchia che si opponeva all'elezione del Primo Ministro Danese Anders Fogh Rasmussen a Segretario Generale della NATO. Ringraziando il cielo, l'ho fatto prima della mediazione di Berlusconi. E comunque la mia impressione e' che i Turchi facessero sul serio. Sono davvero contrari a Fogh, e non a torto a mio parere. Per il nuovo Segretario Generale, o cambia un po' modus operandi, oppure il suo nuovo lavoro si trasformera' in una specie di contrappasso dantesco per quello che ha combinato in occasione della vicenda delle vignette di Maometto (il vicesegretario e' un turco).
Per il resto nell'ultima settimana sono spettatore dalla cosiddetta rivoluzione "Twitter" in Moldova, dove circa 15.000 giovani sono scesi in piazza per protestare contro i risultati elettorali e comunicano fra di loro attraverso il social network di micro-messaging. E' un evento per molti versi simile alle rivoluzioni arancioni e rosa in Ucraina e Georgia. Il problema e' che sono entrambi finite piuttosto male, e francamente (cinicamente) non vedo perche' questa dovrebbe finire diversamente: il sistema paese in quelle terre e' in practica un feudo appannaggio di pochi boss e relative famiglie. Non si puo' ignorare una rivoluzione del genere, ma non ci si deve neanche illudere.
Come tutti, sono rimasto basito, furioso e commosso da quanto sta avvenendo in Abruzzo. Ma di questo, per rispetto, evito di commentare.
Friday, 13 March 2009
Iniezione americana
E' andata a finire che ho trascorso una settimana marcatamente americana senza mai attraversare l'Atlantico.
Prima di tutto ho moderato un'interessante discussione organizzata dalla NATO al Ministero degli Esteri danese. La domanda ridondante e quasi ossessiva era ovviamente cosa fara' e cosa chiedera' Obama agli europei.
Poi il presidente Obama e il ministro Clinton hanno confermato la nomina della mia (ora ex) collega Esther come sottosegretario agli esteri per le organizzazioni internazionali. Occhio e croce, credo sia una delle posizioni piu' alte che si possano raggiungere al Dipartimento di Stato senza la conferma del Congresso.
Ieri e' uscito il mio primo (e spero non ultimo) articolo sul "PostGlobal" del Washington Post. In tempi meno grami, sarei stato meno clemente verso l'Unione europea. Ma per ora credo che possa bastare.
Infine, ho finalmente ricevuto e cominciato a leggere la mia prima copia del New York Review of Books alla quale alla fine ho deciso di abbonarmi. Per chiunque voglia staccare per un po' da Berlusconi e Mourinho, ma se e' per questo anche dal ManU. o Sarkozy, la Review mi sembra una boccata di ossigeno purissimo.
Prima di tutto ho moderato un'interessante discussione organizzata dalla NATO al Ministero degli Esteri danese. La domanda ridondante e quasi ossessiva era ovviamente cosa fara' e cosa chiedera' Obama agli europei.
Poi il presidente Obama e il ministro Clinton hanno confermato la nomina della mia (ora ex) collega Esther come sottosegretario agli esteri per le organizzazioni internazionali. Occhio e croce, credo sia una delle posizioni piu' alte che si possano raggiungere al Dipartimento di Stato senza la conferma del Congresso.
Ieri e' uscito il mio primo (e spero non ultimo) articolo sul "PostGlobal" del Washington Post. In tempi meno grami, sarei stato meno clemente verso l'Unione europea. Ma per ora credo che possa bastare.
Infine, ho finalmente ricevuto e cominciato a leggere la mia prima copia del New York Review of Books alla quale alla fine ho deciso di abbonarmi. Per chiunque voglia staccare per un po' da Berlusconi e Mourinho, ma se e' per questo anche dal ManU. o Sarkozy, la Review mi sembra una boccata di ossigeno purissimo.
Sunday, 1 March 2009
Roba tosta
Mentre gli europei (occidentali) rifiutano un piano di salvataggio per l'Europa orientale e si aggrappano allo specchio della solidarieta' comunitaria per scongiurare il fantasma del protezionismo, Obama augura buona domenica proprio cosi':
"I know that oil and gas companies won’t like us ending nearly $30 billion in tax breaks, but that’s how we’ll help fund a renewable energy economy that will create new jobs and new industries. I know these steps won’t sit well with the special interests and lobbyists who are invested in the old way of doing business, and I know they’re gearing up for a fight as we speak. My message to them is this: So am I." (Barack Obama, Podcast della Casa Bianca, 28 febbraio 2009).
"I know that oil and gas companies won’t like us ending nearly $30 billion in tax breaks, but that’s how we’ll help fund a renewable energy economy that will create new jobs and new industries. I know these steps won’t sit well with the special interests and lobbyists who are invested in the old way of doing business, and I know they’re gearing up for a fight as we speak. My message to them is this: So am I." (Barack Obama, Podcast della Casa Bianca, 28 febbraio 2009).
Friday, 20 February 2009
Tempismo
Mentre il Pd crolla (segue commento dopo il teatrino di sabato), e diversi paesi dell'Europa orientale sono sull'orlo della bancarotta (non sono sicuro se per quando arrivero' a Kiev fra un paio di settimane, l'Ucraina esistera' ancora), ho pensato bene di cambiare casacca e accettare un'offerta del Danish Institute for International Studies--che la rivista americana Foreign Policy ha recentemente incoronato come una delle quattro "stelle del mondo delle think-tank"--dove co-dirigero' un progetto sul futuro dell'"ordine liberale."
Con democrazia e mercati che vacillano, mi sembra tutto interessante assai.
Secondo Foreign Policy, fra l'altro, tutti gli istituti di ricerca con i quali sono (o sono stato) affiliato sono rappresentati: il CEPS di Brussels è quinto in Europa, il Wilson Center di Washington è sesto in America. Anche il Center for Transatlantic Relations, che ad essere precisi non è una think-tank ma parte dell'università, è fra i top-30.
Con democrazia e mercati che vacillano, mi sembra tutto interessante assai.
Secondo Foreign Policy, fra l'altro, tutti gli istituti di ricerca con i quali sono (o sono stato) affiliato sono rappresentati: il CEPS di Brussels è quinto in Europa, il Wilson Center di Washington è sesto in America. Anche il Center for Transatlantic Relations, che ad essere precisi non è una think-tank ma parte dell'università, è fra i top-30.
Monday, 2 February 2009
Tre brevi su FB
Un mese di iscrizione e 120 "amici" dopo, mi sento di fare un paio di considerazioni su Facebook.
La prima e' sulla democratizzazione della comunicazione. Se il passaggio dal web 1.0 al 2.0 e' stato caratterizzato da un'apertura del mezzo verso il basso, qui c'e' chiaramente un'ulteriore "orizzontalizzazione". Anche chi non ha molto da scrivere, anche chi non vuole scrivere molto, puo' dire parecchio.
La seconda osservazione e' sulla relativita' del mezzo. La schermata dei cosidetti feeds degli "amici" e' l'esempio lampante che fb sa essere assai dispersivo, e probabilmente la dispersione e' anche uno dei suoi obiettivi. La questione, per lo meno per me, e' che non tutto e' "relativo." Io francamente non mi sento a mio agio a liquidare con un colpo di mouse sul tasto "join cause" questioni sociali o politiche che ritengo serie. Quel che e' peggio, e qui probabilmente pecco di miopia, non ne riesco a vedere l'utilita'.
La terza considerazione e', well, sull'"amicizia". Chi mi conosce sa che non sono esattamente un fan sfegatato di Benedetto XVI. Quando pero' ho ascoltato l'altro giorno sull'autobus dei ragazzini poco piu' che decenni misurarsi a botte di centinaia su chi avesse piu' "amici" su facebook, mi sono domandato se per una volta Ratzinger non avesse qualche ragione a raccomandare prudenza riguardo i social network.
La mia personale sperimentazione non e' ancora finita--e mi auguro che l'onda di fb continui se non altro per trarne qualche considerazione piu' appronfondita. L'ultima volta, quando esplose "Second Life", non feci in tempo a vincere la mia leggendaria pigrizia informatica che il fenomeno si era gia' sgonfiato.
La prima e' sulla democratizzazione della comunicazione. Se il passaggio dal web 1.0 al 2.0 e' stato caratterizzato da un'apertura del mezzo verso il basso, qui c'e' chiaramente un'ulteriore "orizzontalizzazione". Anche chi non ha molto da scrivere, anche chi non vuole scrivere molto, puo' dire parecchio.
La seconda osservazione e' sulla relativita' del mezzo. La schermata dei cosidetti feeds degli "amici" e' l'esempio lampante che fb sa essere assai dispersivo, e probabilmente la dispersione e' anche uno dei suoi obiettivi. La questione, per lo meno per me, e' che non tutto e' "relativo." Io francamente non mi sento a mio agio a liquidare con un colpo di mouse sul tasto "join cause" questioni sociali o politiche che ritengo serie. Quel che e' peggio, e qui probabilmente pecco di miopia, non ne riesco a vedere l'utilita'.
La terza considerazione e', well, sull'"amicizia". Chi mi conosce sa che non sono esattamente un fan sfegatato di Benedetto XVI. Quando pero' ho ascoltato l'altro giorno sull'autobus dei ragazzini poco piu' che decenni misurarsi a botte di centinaia su chi avesse piu' "amici" su facebook, mi sono domandato se per una volta Ratzinger non avesse qualche ragione a raccomandare prudenza riguardo i social network.
La mia personale sperimentazione non e' ancora finita--e mi auguro che l'onda di fb continui se non altro per trarne qualche considerazione piu' appronfondita. L'ultima volta, quando esplose "Second Life", non feci in tempo a vincere la mia leggendaria pigrizia informatica che il fenomeno si era gia' sgonfiato.
Wednesday, 14 January 2009
Il tabu' Hamas
Una delle condizioni poste dalla comunita' internazionale per dialogare con Hamas e' che riconosca lo stato di Israele. Hamas, fino a prova contraria, e' un partito non uno stato. Da quando in qua i partiti devono riconoscere gli stati?
La richiesta, per inciso, non fa altro che legittimare quanto in realta' Hamas conti negli equilibri mediorientali. Autorevoli osservatori si sono da tempo sgolati a dire che non si puo' prescindere dal cercare il dialogo con Hamas. Questo non significa assecondarne i metodi o le richieste, e non significa nemmeno che il dialogo debba essere sbandierato ai quattro venti. Significa finirla con questa sceneggiata secondo la quale di (ed ad) un'organizzazione terrorista non si debba nemmeno parlare.
La richiesta, per inciso, non fa altro che legittimare quanto in realta' Hamas conti negli equilibri mediorientali. Autorevoli osservatori si sono da tempo sgolati a dire che non si puo' prescindere dal cercare il dialogo con Hamas. Questo non significa assecondarne i metodi o le richieste, e non significa nemmeno che il dialogo debba essere sbandierato ai quattro venti. Significa finirla con questa sceneggiata secondo la quale di (ed ad) un'organizzazione terrorista non si debba nemmeno parlare.
Wednesday, 7 January 2009
History repeating
Non mi ero accorto che da quando Ulibo, la scuola dell'allora Ulivo, ha chiuso i battenti, anche governareper, l'annessa rivista, non esiste piu'. Peccato, perche' era un ottimo serbatoio d'idee. Nella circostanza, mi sono andato a ripescare un pezzo che scrissi esattamente tre anni fa sulla crisi Russia-Ucraina del gennaio 2006. Potrei averlo scritto stamattina sulla crisi del gennaio 2009.
L’Europa e la questione russa
Di Fabrizio Tassinari (*)
Le aspirazioni di politica estera ed alcuni degli interessi vitali dell’Unione Europea (Ue) sono stati di recente scossi dalla questione, spinosa e al contempo sottovalutata, delle relazioni con
L’evento scatenante è stata la contesa sorta fra Mosca e l’Ucraina sul prezzo del gas esportato dal gigante russo Gazprom e sul susseguente blocco, durante i primi giorni di gennaio, dell’approvvigionamento di metano, buona parte del quale attraversa l’Ucraina per raggiungere l’Europa.
Sebbene in apparenza distante e marginale, questa controversia affonda le sue radici in un contesto ben più complesso e rilevante per il futuro dell’Europa.
Innanzitutto, la querelle russo-ucraina ripropone prepotentemente il problema della dipendenza energetica europea. L’Ue attualmente importa circa il 50% del proprio fabbisogno energetico da fornitori esterni, quali
Il sillogismo che emerge da queste cifre è piuttosto elementare: l’economia dell’Ue è fortemente legata all’importazione di gas e petrolio. Gli idrocarburi provengono da paesi notoriamente instabili. Ergo, le ambizioni economiche dell’Ue sono condizionate dai precari equilibri politici che caratterizzano i suoi fornitori energetici.
Negli ultimi anni, l’Ue si è cullata all’idea di aver trovato nella Russia di Vladimir Putin una controparte pragmatica e credibile nel settore energetico. Dopo gli ultimi sviluppi, che includono anche misteriose esplosioni ai gasdotti meridionali che raggiungono
La seconda conseguenza della cosiddetta ‘guerra del gas’ è di natura più squisitamente geo-politica. Il nuovo corso filo-occidentale inaugurato un anno fa in Ucraina dalla pacifica ‘rivoluzione arancione’, così come l’analoga ‘rivoluzione delle rose’ in Georgia, non solo un sintomo del progressivo sgretolamento del sistema di alleanze post-sovietico. Rappresentano anche e soprattutto un anelito di democrazia e libertà che si richiama esplicitamente agli ideali del 1989.
Al di là di solenni dichiarazioni d’intenti, però, l’Europa non ha risposto a queste aspirazioni di cambiamento con un segnale chiaro ed inequivocabile. Bruxelles, preoccupata dalle ripercussioni interne dello storico allargamento del 2004, si è limitata ad includere questi paesi nella sua nuova Politica Europea di Vicinato, nella quale l’Unione non si assume alcun impegno in merito ad una loro futura prospettiva di adesione. Di conseguenza, le pressioni del Cremino acquistano nuova linfa, di cui questo ricatto energetico costituisce una prova evidente.
Una terza riflessione dev’essere necessariamente rivolta al complesso delle relazioni euro-russe. L’Unione Europea e
La realtà sul campo, purtroppo, scredita entrambi le interpretazioni. Da un lato, la strategia russa verso l’Unione Europea appare guidata una sorta di divide et impera. Mosca coltiva relazioni privilegiate con quei paesi membri, in particolare
La strategia dell’Ue verso
La conclusione che si deve trarre dall’episodio di Capodanno è dunque tanto ovvia quanto preoccupante: l’ambiguità dell’Ue riguardo alla Russia si traduce in un immobilismo che non giova né agli interessi vitali dell’Unione, né all’immagine di se stessa che l’Europa intende proiettare al di fuori dei propri confini.
Saturday, 3 January 2009
Huntington & Hamas
E' morto alla vigilia di natale uno dei teorici delle relazioni internazionali che ammiro di piu': non tanto (o non solo) per cio' che diceva, ma per come lo diceva. Huntington divenne universalmente noto dal 1993 in poi per la pubblicazione del saggio The Clash of Civilizations.
Li' teorizzava l'ascesa di fattori culturali e religiosi in sostituzione dell'ideologia come elementi chiave nella definizione dell'ordine internazionale. La teoria fu popolare da subito ma e' stata ripresa, piuttosto arbitrariamente, dopo l'11 settembre per spiegare l'ascesa del terrorismo internazionale (in un modo che Huntington generalmente ripudiava).
The Clash of Civilizations ha fornito sicuramente un ottimo strumento a quanti volessero spiegare la radicalizzazione dell'Islam politico nel Medio Oriente e l'ascesa di movimenti come Hamas in Palestina ed Hezbollah in Libano. E fornisce sicuramente un'ottima spiegazione a quanti cerchino di giustificare l'attacco di Israele o la "resistenza" di Hamas di queste ore.
Il conflitto arabo-israeliano e' troppo complesso per consentire di prendere una parte o l'altra in modo aprioristico. Non si puo' non constatare la "sproporzione" dell'attacco israeliano (con ovvie motivazioni di politica interna a fomentarlo), cosi' come non si possa minimizzare il fatto che Gaza sia di fatto un "failed state" prima ancora di diventare stato.
In questo senso, c'e' una parte meno nota del lavoro di Huntington che a mio parere da una spiegazione accurata anche se pessimistica degli eventi di queste ore. Nel libro The Third Wave, Huntington spiegava la "transizione" verso la democrazia dopo la fine della guerra fredda e come paesi che si allontanassero dalla dittatura fossero gradualmente diretti verso la democrazia.
Ecco, questo principio ha ispirato una delle pochissime prese di posizione della comunita' internazionale nei confronti dell'Autorita' Palestinese negli ultimi anni: favorire le elezioni in modo che queste rafforzassero la democrazia nei Territori. Le elezioni hanno prodotto la vittoria di Hamas, la radicalizzazione del confronto politico nei Territori prima ancora che con Israele e la sconfitta politica e morale del presidente palestinese Abbas.
Il mondo arabo ed i territori in particolare non sono "in transizione" verso nessun posto. Non verso la democrazia e sicuramente non verso la pace.
Li' teorizzava l'ascesa di fattori culturali e religiosi in sostituzione dell'ideologia come elementi chiave nella definizione dell'ordine internazionale. La teoria fu popolare da subito ma e' stata ripresa, piuttosto arbitrariamente, dopo l'11 settembre per spiegare l'ascesa del terrorismo internazionale (in un modo che Huntington generalmente ripudiava).
The Clash of Civilizations ha fornito sicuramente un ottimo strumento a quanti volessero spiegare la radicalizzazione dell'Islam politico nel Medio Oriente e l'ascesa di movimenti come Hamas in Palestina ed Hezbollah in Libano. E fornisce sicuramente un'ottima spiegazione a quanti cerchino di giustificare l'attacco di Israele o la "resistenza" di Hamas di queste ore.
Il conflitto arabo-israeliano e' troppo complesso per consentire di prendere una parte o l'altra in modo aprioristico. Non si puo' non constatare la "sproporzione" dell'attacco israeliano (con ovvie motivazioni di politica interna a fomentarlo), cosi' come non si possa minimizzare il fatto che Gaza sia di fatto un "failed state" prima ancora di diventare stato.
In questo senso, c'e' una parte meno nota del lavoro di Huntington che a mio parere da una spiegazione accurata anche se pessimistica degli eventi di queste ore. Nel libro The Third Wave, Huntington spiegava la "transizione" verso la democrazia dopo la fine della guerra fredda e come paesi che si allontanassero dalla dittatura fossero gradualmente diretti verso la democrazia.
Ecco, questo principio ha ispirato una delle pochissime prese di posizione della comunita' internazionale nei confronti dell'Autorita' Palestinese negli ultimi anni: favorire le elezioni in modo che queste rafforzassero la democrazia nei Territori. Le elezioni hanno prodotto la vittoria di Hamas, la radicalizzazione del confronto politico nei Territori prima ancora che con Israele e la sconfitta politica e morale del presidente palestinese Abbas.
Il mondo arabo ed i territori in particolare non sono "in transizione" verso nessun posto. Non verso la democrazia e sicuramente non verso la pace.
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