First appeared in European Voice
By Pertti Joenniemi and Fabrizio Tassinari
To ease tensions in the Baltic, consider lessons learned from the race for the High North.
The EU and Russia met this week at a time when Russia's efforts to establish a new, northern pipeline through which to transport gas to Germany are making rapid progress. In the space of a few weeks, Danish, Finnish and Swedish governments have all given the green light for the Nord Stream pipeline to be laid along the bed of the Baltic Sea. All three of them seem to have reached the conclusion that the numerous security-related and environmental questions raised do not justify giving the project the red light.
But energy politics continues to divide northern Europe. Poland, the Baltic states and some sections of the public in other countries remain unconvinced about Nord Stream's rationale and about Moscow's intentions. Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister, did not ease their concerns when, in 2006, he said that Russia would use its Baltic fleet “to resolve ecological, economic and technical tasks” in the Baltic Sea. And, although the Baltic Sea Strategy, adopted by the EU last month, is being promoted as a ‘model' of co-operation, it does little to change the terms of the debate about energy in the region, which remains frozen by the perception of a Russian threat.
There is no easy way to change that perception. However, recent developments in the Arctic suggest one way to civilise the debate. When Russia laid claim to the North Pole in August 2007 by planting its flag on its seabed, an unregulated militarisation of the Arctic and a race for its unexplored riches seemed in the offing. Canada hinted that it might establish two new stations near the North Pole; Denmark sent expeditions to the area; and the US started worrying about its own thin presence in the region, as well as its lack of ice-breakers. Logistical strength – and, possibly, military might – seemed destined to determine who would emerge victorious in the competition for the High North.
Yet, in August 2008, representatives of those four countries, plus Norway, met in Greenland and agreed that issues such as navigation rights and delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf should be settled through existing international structures. They reaffirmed that the Arctic area needs no specific legal regime. By issuing a joint statement, the Ilulissat Declaration, they chose to pre-empt any further escalation.
The terms of the debate in the Baltic may have passed the point of pre-emption, given that Germany's and Russia's decision not to involve Poland in decisions about Nord Stream has been likened to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact under which, in 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union carved up Poland. Even so, the region should consider emulating the Arctic's littoral states.
Given that the region's governments meet regularly in various formats – most notably the Council of the Baltic Sea States – it would not be difficult to choreograph a joint initiative by all nine coastal states. This could produce a political declaration to the effect that any inter-state controversy related to the pipeline would be resolved by civilian – as opposed to military – means. As in the Ilulissat Declaration, the signatories would declare themselves committed to existing legal regimes and to the “orderly settlement” of conflicting claims.
Such a move might not dispel the fears of some, but it might help to tone down the rhetoric. In a region where relations are strained, that would be a valuable improvement.
Pertti Joenniemi and Fabrizio Tassinari are senior researchers at the Danish Institute for International Studies.
Thursday 19 November 2009
Thursday 5 November 2009
Defusing the enlargement hype
First appeared on E!Sharp
No panacea: the carrot of EU accession has not yet persuaded Bosnia's leaders to set aside their differences. Photograph: European Commission
Presenting his annual progress report on the applicant countries in October, Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that “political de-mining” was part of the EU's job when it came to enlargement. He was referring to the countries of the western Balkans, with their persistent infighting. But he might as well have been talking about some of the EU's existing members.
With the Lisbon Treaty finally ratified, the enlargement debate may soon return to the top of the EU agenda. The “wideners” will be back to stress the importance of further expansion for Europe’s global aspirations. Opponents will reiterate warnings about the challenge enlargement poses to the European polity and its identity. Both lines of argument have strong justifications. Yet both tend to overlook a basic point: EU expansion has helped to foster prosperity, spread peace and consolidate democracy in the candidate countries and in Europe as a whole.
First and foremost, enlargement is a tool for achieving those goals, not the goal itself. And the EU is not ready to lay down that tool just yet. Brussels' credibility in the Balkans rests on its ability to fulfil the membership pledge as soon as the applicant countries have met the agreed conditions (though as Bosnia's enduring fragility shows, that pledge is not always sufficient to keep candidates on the reform track). The recent Turkish-Armenian accord may lend a new lease of life to Ankara’s EU bid, which should in turn remind EU governments that their contradictory position on Turkey cannot be maintained indefinitely. The domestic mayhem in countries such as Ukraine and Moldova means that their accession is not a topic for now - but the EU will, at some point, have to find a conclusive answer to these states' long-term membership aspirations.
Only when the EU resolves this principled ambiguity will it be able to focus on the instruments at its disposal. And when that happens, it will become clear that in many key areas, the path before Europe is largely laid out already. "Deep" free trade arrangements, such as that being negotiated with Ukraine, will open up the EU market and spur substantial economic integration with its neighbours. Some neighbours have provided significant assets in specific EU foreign policy missions - witness the Moroccan troops deployed in Bosnia. Visa liberalisation is the name of the game in the Balkans.
So in time, some of the EU's neighbours may be surprised to discover that the difference between member state and partner state is increasingly blurred. A candidate country like Turkey may have to swallow a restrictive EU accession deal, replete with exceptions and "safeguards". But for a country such as Israel, which is in many fields deeply integrated with the EU already, the question of membership has long been redundant.
No neighbourhood policy or "privileged partnership” will ever match the appeal of membership. Yet the only way for the EU to break free of the circular enlargement debate of the past half-decade is for it to focus on the concrete benefits that existing instruments can deliver, and to keep bickering to a minimum.
No panacea: the carrot of EU accession has not yet persuaded Bosnia's leaders to set aside their differences. Photograph: European Commission
Presenting his annual progress report on the applicant countries in October, Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that “political de-mining” was part of the EU's job when it came to enlargement. He was referring to the countries of the western Balkans, with their persistent infighting. But he might as well have been talking about some of the EU's existing members.
With the Lisbon Treaty finally ratified, the enlargement debate may soon return to the top of the EU agenda. The “wideners” will be back to stress the importance of further expansion for Europe’s global aspirations. Opponents will reiterate warnings about the challenge enlargement poses to the European polity and its identity. Both lines of argument have strong justifications. Yet both tend to overlook a basic point: EU expansion has helped to foster prosperity, spread peace and consolidate democracy in the candidate countries and in Europe as a whole.
First and foremost, enlargement is a tool for achieving those goals, not the goal itself. And the EU is not ready to lay down that tool just yet. Brussels' credibility in the Balkans rests on its ability to fulfil the membership pledge as soon as the applicant countries have met the agreed conditions (though as Bosnia's enduring fragility shows, that pledge is not always sufficient to keep candidates on the reform track). The recent Turkish-Armenian accord may lend a new lease of life to Ankara’s EU bid, which should in turn remind EU governments that their contradictory position on Turkey cannot be maintained indefinitely. The domestic mayhem in countries such as Ukraine and Moldova means that their accession is not a topic for now - but the EU will, at some point, have to find a conclusive answer to these states' long-term membership aspirations.
Only when the EU resolves this principled ambiguity will it be able to focus on the instruments at its disposal. And when that happens, it will become clear that in many key areas, the path before Europe is largely laid out already. "Deep" free trade arrangements, such as that being negotiated with Ukraine, will open up the EU market and spur substantial economic integration with its neighbours. Some neighbours have provided significant assets in specific EU foreign policy missions - witness the Moroccan troops deployed in Bosnia. Visa liberalisation is the name of the game in the Balkans.
So in time, some of the EU's neighbours may be surprised to discover that the difference between member state and partner state is increasingly blurred. A candidate country like Turkey may have to swallow a restrictive EU accession deal, replete with exceptions and "safeguards". But for a country such as Israel, which is in many fields deeply integrated with the EU already, the question of membership has long been redundant.
No neighbourhood policy or "privileged partnership” will ever match the appeal of membership. Yet the only way for the EU to break free of the circular enlargement debate of the past half-decade is for it to focus on the concrete benefits that existing instruments can deliver, and to keep bickering to a minimum.
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