The article first appeared in OpenDemocracy.
As European Union and Russian leaders meet tomorrow, Tuesday, for a bilateral summit, they find their checkered relationship in the midst of yet another reversal. After the early post-Soviet chaos and the belligerent posture under President Vladimir Putin, the buzzword these days is modernization.
In June this year, the EU and Russia launched a “Partnership for Modernization”, aimed at “advancing economies” and “bringing citizens closer together”. At the summit this week, Russia is set to receive European backing on a prize that has eluded Moscow for almost two decades: membership in the World Trade Organization, which is now in sight for 2011.
Beneath the headlines, however, Europeans have good reasons to be cautious about Russia’s modernization. At home, President Dmitry Medvedev’s many fine sounding words have not materialized into much action. Attempts at economic reform have largely been limited to the launch of much maligned “innovation projects".
The problem may well be that Medvedev’s liberal agenda lacks a power base beyond his loyal inner circle. Medvedev is widely regarded as the junior partner of a political partnership with Prime Minister Putin. The economic crisis has also to a certain extent worked against him, strengthening the more hard-nosed segments of the Russian ruling elite, together with their fondness for state capitalism. The populist tone of Medvedev’s state-of-the nation address last week would appear to confirm the weakness of his position.
There is no denying, however, that the Westpolitik of the Medvedev-Putin ‘tandem’ represents a more nuanced balancing act. The reset with the United States is real and has resulted in a more cooperative posture with Washington on a whole range of issues from Iran to Afghanistan. Russia has now agreed to cooperate, albeit somewhat grudgingly, on the missile defense shield in Europe.
Moscow has also reconciled with some of its European neighbors, most notably Poland. Just a few days ago, the Russian Duma voted a bill acknowledging Stalin’s responsibilities in the 1940 massacre of some 20,000 Polish officers in Katyn.
In truth, then, Europe has failed to grasp the foreign policy potential of Russia’s modernization. Ill-conceived as it may have been, Medvedev’s call for a new security architecture in Europe was motivated by the inadequacy of existing frameworks. Yet the Europeans referred the Russian proposal to the OSCE—one of the very frameworks that need reform—and in so doing effectively brushed it aside. Moreover, despite the prospective green light on the WTO, German Chancellor Angela Merkel rejected recent suggestions for a free trade area between the EU and Russia.
"The EU remains Russia’s largest trade partner and the main importer of its hydrocarbons. No matter Moscow’s posture, this interdependence constitutes a huge leverage"
Despite such difficulties, however, the prospective WTO deal offers a very direct clue as to how Brussels can and should pursue broader objectives in its Russia policy.
Back in 2004, the EU gave a resolute push to Russia’s WTO membership through another bilateral deal in which, among other things, dropped demands the liberalization of Russia’s gas monopoly, Gazprom. A surprising development followed a couple of months later, when Russia — after a period of long opposition — unexpectedly ratified the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. Russia’s ratification was decisive in obtaining quorum for the treaty. In other words, in exchange for a European concession on trade, Moscow made a significant contribution to one of Europe’s key foreign policy priorities.
This kind of log-rolling between unconnected issues can be replicated to advance relations in a whole host of dossiers: from climate negotiations, which are again in a quandary, to more contentious aspects of energy cooperation. This, at least is what EU officials privately hope.
Clearly, the “Europeanization” of Russia — assuming it ever started — is now long over. At the same time, the EU remains Russia’s largest trade partner and the main importer of its hydrocarbons. No matter Moscow’s posture, this interdependence constitutes a huge leverage.
The EU can do business with Russia without selling short the values upon which it was founded. Pragmatism is what the Kremlin has always demanded of Brussels. And it is only with a heavy dose of pragmatism, that Europe can hope to entice Russia to some of its cherished goals.
Tuesday 7 December 2010
Tuesday 10 August 2010
Europe's Butterfly Effect
This article first appeared on openDemocracy.
Amid an increasingly competitive global environment where Europe's future aspirations on the world stage have been questioned, Fabrizio Tassinari argues that focusing on the finer issues could help Europe to colour the bigger picture.
According to chaos theory, the butterfly effect refers to those tiny events leading to major, long-term variations in a system. The metaphor provides a moderately optimistic outlook for Europe’s influence in the 21st century world: any lasting advance in Europe’s global reach is unlikely to be executed through a grand plan; it will at best happen through some key, imperceptible, developments that may produce broader, though not entirely planned, consequences.
Strategists, always fascinated by the big picture, have rarely looked at the matter this way. During the first half of the noughties, many an observer exuded unbound confidence in Europe’s global ambitions. The introduction of the Euro and the accession of ten new member states from Europe’s east were to crown the EU as an unstoppable force in global affairs. A thinly-veiled shadenfreude for the quagmire that America was making for itself in Iraq did not hurt the cause.
The sources of Europe’s might were apparent. As multinational corporations contravening the Union’s competition rules well know, the EU is arguably the world's leading regulator. In order to sell their products in the European market, producers worldwide comply with the precautionary principle on environmental or health-related risks. Europhiles were also keen to point out that the world was being modeled on the image of Europe through the emergence of regional groupings such as the African Union and ASEAN in Southeast Asia.
Over the past couple of years, on the contrary, not a week has gone by without an irrevocable post-mortem being pronounced on Europe’s aspirations. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the new key posts of EU president and foreign policy supremo are meant to strengthen the EU’s image on the world stage. Yet, leaders of the EU member states were accused of choosing compromise figures that could not overshadow them. At the Copenhagen Climate summit in December last year, the EU performed miserably and was marginalized in the negotiations by China and the United States. The slow response to the Greek tragedy has shown that political integration lags dangerously behind the economic one.
Lisbon Treaty celebration, Portugal. Vlad Sokhin/Demotix. All rights reserved.
For all the present gloom, the truth is as always somewhere in the middle. The EU was never meant to take the world by a storm; but it is not a delusional conclave of old countries either. From sub-Saharan Africa to the Palestinian authority, the EU remains the largest donor in many parts of the globe. For all the troubles of Turkey's EU bid, the prospective accession of the Balkan countries within the next decade will constitute an accomplishment of historic proportions, especially in light of the European blunders of the 1990s.
Above all, and typically for the European integration project, the EU global power will have to be found in the myriad technical measures that nobody really notices, and that will spill over into other fields, gradually and almost accidentally amounting to a strategic vision.
An example makes the point. A couple of months ago, a group of wise persons headed by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales, and on which these pages have commented extensively, released a set of recommendations on the future of Europe for the next 20 years. One foreign policy priority focused on the introduction of a common visa policy and a consular service within the EU’s nascent diplomatic service.
Why such an emphasis on something so technical which most western citizens will most probably never even hear about? Because at the moment, EU visa application for third country nationals can be a cumbersome, arbitrary and often humiliating process. Many of the younger and better educated migrants craved by Europe give up and continue to opt for the US’s east coast or Silicon Valley instead. The release of visas concerns what kind of immigrants Europe receives and how it welcomes them. So what is at stake is the future of Europe’s aging populations and of its anemic labor markets. A more integrated bureaucracy is only a minor piece in the intricate puzzle of Europe’s troubled immigration policy. Immigration itself is not the most obvious foreign policy priority. But as in much of the history of the EU, the domestic and foreign realms often coalesce and bureaucracy might just be the only place available to start making change.
The ongoing global disorder has determined an increasingly competitive environment. The fault lines between conflict and cooperation among a plethora of different world actors are going to get fuzzier. Europe is not equipped to react swiftly and boldly. It will stand a chance if it identifies small niches where it tries to perform better. To be sure, even the smallest of measures needs serious political backing in order to fly. The hope is that the European butterfly flapping its wings in some remote corner of the world will eventually produce major, tangible effects elsewhere; starting from the non-smoking rooms of many European capitals.
Amid an increasingly competitive global environment where Europe's future aspirations on the world stage have been questioned, Fabrizio Tassinari argues that focusing on the finer issues could help Europe to colour the bigger picture.
According to chaos theory, the butterfly effect refers to those tiny events leading to major, long-term variations in a system. The metaphor provides a moderately optimistic outlook for Europe’s influence in the 21st century world: any lasting advance in Europe’s global reach is unlikely to be executed through a grand plan; it will at best happen through some key, imperceptible, developments that may produce broader, though not entirely planned, consequences.
Strategists, always fascinated by the big picture, have rarely looked at the matter this way. During the first half of the noughties, many an observer exuded unbound confidence in Europe’s global ambitions. The introduction of the Euro and the accession of ten new member states from Europe’s east were to crown the EU as an unstoppable force in global affairs. A thinly-veiled shadenfreude for the quagmire that America was making for itself in Iraq did not hurt the cause.
The sources of Europe’s might were apparent. As multinational corporations contravening the Union’s competition rules well know, the EU is arguably the world's leading regulator. In order to sell their products in the European market, producers worldwide comply with the precautionary principle on environmental or health-related risks. Europhiles were also keen to point out that the world was being modeled on the image of Europe through the emergence of regional groupings such as the African Union and ASEAN in Southeast Asia.
Over the past couple of years, on the contrary, not a week has gone by without an irrevocable post-mortem being pronounced on Europe’s aspirations. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the new key posts of EU president and foreign policy supremo are meant to strengthen the EU’s image on the world stage. Yet, leaders of the EU member states were accused of choosing compromise figures that could not overshadow them. At the Copenhagen Climate summit in December last year, the EU performed miserably and was marginalized in the negotiations by China and the United States. The slow response to the Greek tragedy has shown that political integration lags dangerously behind the economic one.
Lisbon Treaty celebration, Portugal. Vlad Sokhin/Demotix. All rights reserved.
For all the present gloom, the truth is as always somewhere in the middle. The EU was never meant to take the world by a storm; but it is not a delusional conclave of old countries either. From sub-Saharan Africa to the Palestinian authority, the EU remains the largest donor in many parts of the globe. For all the troubles of Turkey's EU bid, the prospective accession of the Balkan countries within the next decade will constitute an accomplishment of historic proportions, especially in light of the European blunders of the 1990s.
Above all, and typically for the European integration project, the EU global power will have to be found in the myriad technical measures that nobody really notices, and that will spill over into other fields, gradually and almost accidentally amounting to a strategic vision.
An example makes the point. A couple of months ago, a group of wise persons headed by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales, and on which these pages have commented extensively, released a set of recommendations on the future of Europe for the next 20 years. One foreign policy priority focused on the introduction of a common visa policy and a consular service within the EU’s nascent diplomatic service.
Why such an emphasis on something so technical which most western citizens will most probably never even hear about? Because at the moment, EU visa application for third country nationals can be a cumbersome, arbitrary and often humiliating process. Many of the younger and better educated migrants craved by Europe give up and continue to opt for the US’s east coast or Silicon Valley instead. The release of visas concerns what kind of immigrants Europe receives and how it welcomes them. So what is at stake is the future of Europe’s aging populations and of its anemic labor markets. A more integrated bureaucracy is only a minor piece in the intricate puzzle of Europe’s troubled immigration policy. Immigration itself is not the most obvious foreign policy priority. But as in much of the history of the EU, the domestic and foreign realms often coalesce and bureaucracy might just be the only place available to start making change.
The ongoing global disorder has determined an increasingly competitive environment. The fault lines between conflict and cooperation among a plethora of different world actors are going to get fuzzier. Europe is not equipped to react swiftly and boldly. It will stand a chance if it identifies small niches where it tries to perform better. To be sure, even the smallest of measures needs serious political backing in order to fly. The hope is that the European butterfly flapping its wings in some remote corner of the world will eventually produce major, tangible effects elsewhere; starting from the non-smoking rooms of many European capitals.
Friday 2 July 2010
Concretezza
Concluding remarks to the online debate on the EU-Balkans relations at Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso.
Proseguo da dove ho terminato l’intervento iniziale: meno chiacchiere e più fatti. È un’osservazione sulla quale la maggior parte dei molti spunti interessanti emersi in questo dibattito non dovrebbe aver difficoltà a convergere. Eppure, cosa vuol dire concretamente ?
Una cosa che in questa fase si può chiedere all’Ue e ai governi dei Balcani occidentali é di “portarsi avanti” con il lavoro. Ci sono diverse cose che devono essere fatte prima di avviare il processo di adesione vero e proprio. Prima fra tutte, il cosiddetto “screening’”: ovvero un’analisi complessiva, ministero per ministero, dello status quo in termini di riforme compiute e/o delle inadempienze tecnico-amministrative dei Paesi aspiranti all’adesione. Sulla base di questa analisi, la Commissione deve poi produrre un “parere” sul livello di riforme raggiunto dai singoli Stati. Procedure queste, che normalmente portano via un anno, se non più.
Non entro nei dettagli: chi fosse interessato può leggere un eccellente rapporto pubblicato dal European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) che spiega il meccanismo. La sostanza è la seguente: in un momento di crisi economica e “fatica da allargamento”, il segnale più concreto della nostra volontà di far avvicinare i Balcani all’Europa è di cominciare quel lavoro che dovremo fare comunque per negoziare l’adesione.
Nel 2005, quando la Commissione presieduta da Giuliano Amato produsse il suo rapporto, l’Ue emergeva dall’allargamento ad Est, dall’introduzione dell’Euro e si confrontava con i fallimenti degli Stati Uniti in Iraq. Era un’Europa ambiziosa e fiduciosa, e anch’io apprezzai quella presa di posizione così esplicita e forte. A prescindere dall’opportunità o meno di dare scadenze, su cui mi sono espresso nel precedente intervento, il rapporto della Commissione ricevette giustamente plausi, perché la caratura ed il peso dei membri di quel gruppo segnalavano uno slancio politico significativo.
A cinque anni di distanza, le cose si sono complicate. O meglio, quella tesi potrebbe e dovrebbe essere difesa da quegli uomini di governo (in Europa pochi, al momento) che sostengono il processo di allargamento; l’osservatore si limita a leggere ed interpretare Il clima circostante, che purtroppo non si presta a slanci.
Detto questo, l’osservatore non è mai perfettamente neutrale. Quindi per riprendere la frase di un lettore, se dovessi scommettere i fatidici 10 euro, spererei nell’adesione dell’ultimo Paese dei Balcani occidentali all’Unione europea entro il 2020.
Saturday 19 June 2010
Balcani: accelerare o rallentare
Sto partecipando a questo dibattito online sui Balcani. Esperimento interessante.
Friday 23 April 2010
Hidden values
First appeared on Global Europe
By Fabrizio Tassinari and Julie Herschend Christoffersen
Much has been said of the choice of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy; probably too much has been said about her initial performance. Yet, analysis on the institutional tools at Catherine Ashton’s disposal has been scant — or at least as ungenerous as the coverage of her first months in office. The EU’s External Action Service (EAS) is the case in point par excellence. In recent weeks, the mentions of the EAS in the international media have often been conflated to the ongoing bickering over the establishment of the service. But the substance, let alone the potential, of this fundamental, post-Lisbon innovation remains understudied.
With 136 delegations and some 6000 diplomats and employees spread across the globe, the EU will be represented by a foreign service roughly of the size of Germany’s. The newly obtained mandate to represent the CFSP grants EU delegations power to handle EU policies jointly — including trade, development, environment and foreign and security policies.
To be sure, the ongoing power struggle on the service underpins issues of real substance. The Commission’s desire to maintain its influence over the delegations applies to policy-areas traditionally managed from Brussels. Development, trade and EU enlargement are still included in the administration of the Commission, but the EAS will have desks covering these areas. Beneath the turf war between the Council and the Commission over staffing is a genuine anxiety about the clash of culture between national and EU diplomats. Ashton has asked the experienced Danish diplomat Poul Skytte Christoffersen to help her solve some of these problems — a move that underlines the need for the High Representative to appoint powerful deputies.
As it often happens, however, the brouhaha over institutions overshadows the hidden value of EU initiatives. Once fully in operation, the EAS will represent EU foreign policies around the world and around the clock. As an old Commission hand told one of the authors of this article, the EAS: ”will think about Europe, and it will do it all the time”.
The EAS may give smaller member states a say and a face in corners of the globe where they could never afford to be represented. Big European countries which still project geopolitical clout and strive to retain it could see this presence as a nuisance. For them, the EAS will rather have to carve a niche out of member states’ policy and representation gaps, especially at a time when a number of national ministries face budget constraints.
Above all, there is the issue of how the EAS will represent the EU, and more generally of Europe’s ability to project power globally. Severe blows to the Union’s alleged ”soft power” — most recently the marginal role played by the EU at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen — will require the EU to implement and communicate more effectively the great deal of things that it already does in the world. This includes the not-negligible “hard power” that the EU already musters in the field of civilian and military crisis management. Strategically, the ability to deliver in this sphere constitutes a most formidable task for the forthcoming service.
In the best of scenarios, the EAS will equip EU foreign policy with the degree of coordination, responsiveness, and — yes — unity, that Lady Ashton’s chimerical “red phone” was never quite meant to provide. It will take time, and the intra-institutional battles in Brussels are far from over. But if one is in search of improvements in post-Lisbon EU foreign policy, it eventually might be that getting a line to one of the delegations’ switchboards will do the trick.
By Fabrizio Tassinari and Julie Herschend Christoffersen
Much has been said of the choice of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy; probably too much has been said about her initial performance. Yet, analysis on the institutional tools at Catherine Ashton’s disposal has been scant — or at least as ungenerous as the coverage of her first months in office. The EU’s External Action Service (EAS) is the case in point par excellence. In recent weeks, the mentions of the EAS in the international media have often been conflated to the ongoing bickering over the establishment of the service. But the substance, let alone the potential, of this fundamental, post-Lisbon innovation remains understudied.
With 136 delegations and some 6000 diplomats and employees spread across the globe, the EU will be represented by a foreign service roughly of the size of Germany’s. The newly obtained mandate to represent the CFSP grants EU delegations power to handle EU policies jointly — including trade, development, environment and foreign and security policies.
To be sure, the ongoing power struggle on the service underpins issues of real substance. The Commission’s desire to maintain its influence over the delegations applies to policy-areas traditionally managed from Brussels. Development, trade and EU enlargement are still included in the administration of the Commission, but the EAS will have desks covering these areas. Beneath the turf war between the Council and the Commission over staffing is a genuine anxiety about the clash of culture between national and EU diplomats. Ashton has asked the experienced Danish diplomat Poul Skytte Christoffersen to help her solve some of these problems — a move that underlines the need for the High Representative to appoint powerful deputies.
As it often happens, however, the brouhaha over institutions overshadows the hidden value of EU initiatives. Once fully in operation, the EAS will represent EU foreign policies around the world and around the clock. As an old Commission hand told one of the authors of this article, the EAS: ”will think about Europe, and it will do it all the time”.
The EAS may give smaller member states a say and a face in corners of the globe where they could never afford to be represented. Big European countries which still project geopolitical clout and strive to retain it could see this presence as a nuisance. For them, the EAS will rather have to carve a niche out of member states’ policy and representation gaps, especially at a time when a number of national ministries face budget constraints.
Above all, there is the issue of how the EAS will represent the EU, and more generally of Europe’s ability to project power globally. Severe blows to the Union’s alleged ”soft power” — most recently the marginal role played by the EU at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen — will require the EU to implement and communicate more effectively the great deal of things that it already does in the world. This includes the not-negligible “hard power” that the EU already musters in the field of civilian and military crisis management. Strategically, the ability to deliver in this sphere constitutes a most formidable task for the forthcoming service.
In the best of scenarios, the EAS will equip EU foreign policy with the degree of coordination, responsiveness, and — yes — unity, that Lady Ashton’s chimerical “red phone” was never quite meant to provide. It will take time, and the intra-institutional battles in Brussels are far from over. But if one is in search of improvements in post-Lisbon EU foreign policy, it eventually might be that getting a line to one of the delegations’ switchboards will do the trick.
Thursday 22 April 2010
Ghosts at the Borders
This interview on my book, by Laura Delsere, first appeared in English and Italian on the
Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso portal.
According to Tim Judah "every EU foreign minister should immediately read this book". In Why Europe Fears its Neighbors, Fabrizio Tassinari talks of the EU’s anxiety about those just beyond its borders. We interviewed him
“This is the book which all EU foreign ministers should read immediately”: Tim Judah, the Balkan correspondent for the British weekly, The Economist. The book, Why Europe Fears its Neighbors, (published by Praeger Security International and coming out in Italy soon), portrays Europe’s demographic and identity crisis and the challenges of globalisation and multiculturalism. The author, Fabrizio Tassinari, is director of the Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). In order to achieve its ambition for global power, the EU should confront the spectres located exactly on its borders. The book explores the EU’s relationship with the East and the Mediterranean, but we have asked the author to talk primarily on the challenges posed by the EU’s long eastern border.
Why this book now?
This book results from five years of work. I started by observing the “enlargement fatigue” and released the book to coincide with the new momentum from the Lisbon Treaty. First, the neighbourhood is not the same for everyone: for a Pole, the neighbour is Russia, certainly not Libya. Nevertheless, many EU members share the siege mentality: at the borders, we see migration, drug trafficking, and energy insecurity. This, however, is the moment for a new approach: rather than agonize over how to limit the enlargement, the EU should focus on practical and gradual integration of its neighbors. Enlargement, far from being a threat, has so far supported development and democracy.
Why is it important that the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy, Lady Ashton, chose to make her first official visits to Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Pristina?
Despite the unkind comments about Ashton’s inexperience in foreign affairs, she made an important choice to first visit the Balkans. She could have started with Ankara or Tel Aviv, but, in the medium term, the Balkans will be the test for the European Union’s credibility in international forums. By landing in Sarajevo, Ashton played a modest card in view of global scenarios, but which has the merit of being pragmatic, of having achievable goals. In addition, Ashton leads the creation of the first European External Action Service (EEAS) that will have permanent EU delegations in 136 countries of the world. We will see the results over the next decade.
Bosnia and Kosovo are two tests for the EU, where the EU invested considerable resources, not without considerable waste, with modest results so far. What are the major errors and what are their consequences?
Bosnia, in the coming months, rather than a return to violence, has an objective risk of secession. As described by the former Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, the EU has to aim for “electroshock treatment” and “political demining”, which will prevent the internal infighting in Bosnia. My thesis is that the prospect of EU membership does not warm hearts without new developments in the life of citizens, such as visa liberalization. With her visit to Kosovo, Ashton sent a strong message to some European capitals, such as Spain, current holder of the EU rotating presidency and among the EU member states that do not recognise Pristina. In reality, a divided institution now supervises the independence of the new state. In addition to bureaucratic contradictions with the unjustifiable result of funding going to the wrong hands, political issues also make Kosovo a thorn in the side.
Does the EU exert sufficient pressure in the fight against corruption in Bosnia and Kosovo? The elections occur in an opaque institutional and social reality.
The pressure on Kosovo, as previously on Serbia, Macedonia, and Croatia, has not been sufficiently firm. There were reasons for greater flexibility after the arrests of Gotovina and Karadzic, but that sends the signal that the non-member governments actually pull the strings. Good governance and less bureaucracy could have avoided these errors, and it could have demanded, through incentives, or suspension of funding, progress in public administration reform, hence reducing the mix of private interests and government.
You have written that energy security, crime, and migration, are the EU’s fears vis-à-vis the East. In view of these fears, could it be helpful for all the Western Balkan countries to enter into the EU by 2014, the 100th anniversary of World War I, which started in Sarajevo?
This is not a new debate, but the so-called “regatta” model for Central Europe in 2004, that is, all together in the EU, through a process of internal competition, which rewards the best, was based on conditions now missing in the Western Balkans. Croatia, which is bound to enter in 2012, is the only certain case, whereas in the other Balkan countries, the compliance with EU standards is more dubious and unclear in the long term. Thus, I do not agree with Amato’s proposal “everyone at the same time”. It seems populist. A second hypothesis, entry into the EU with varying arrangements would mean to create accessions of Type B, for example with one country being an EU member state but its citizens not having the freedom of movement in the Union. This model is more appropriate for Turkey, not the Balkans where it would open ethnic conflict. Better to move, step by step, when the countries are ready. However, if we look at the number of these new states and their national dimensions, the Balkans is not an insurmountable challenge for the EU.
Is Turkey the major challenge?
The EU above all fears the size of the country and the cost of entry. An estimate of the annual cost in terms of EU funds necessary for Ankara’s accession amounts to 0.20 % of the EU’s GDP. If we think that the EU’s budget now is 1.35 % of its GDP, it is a substantial amount. With its 70 million people, Turkey will change the balance between the big EU states. The framework for the EU-Turkey accords already contains possible restrictions to Ankara’s full membership in sectors such as free movement of people, structural policies, and agriculture. Hence, through the mode of the varying arrangements, the Turkish request to the EU has already radically changed the mechanisms of European integration. Even though a privileged partnership does not have the same attraction as EU membership, it is good for breaking the impasse and concentrating on the potential benefits. Otherwise, the process of accession would lose ground before the ever more intense politicisation of the debate on whether or not Turkey is Europe.
Will the economic crisis stop enlargement?
It would certainly influence it. The economic crisis will contribute to creating an EU with several faces when it comes to enlargement. The issue will come on the agenda in countries such as the Netherlands in the next national elections. The fear from enlargement will always weigh more in countries with stronger migration from the Balkans, such as Sweden and Switzerland. Switzerland reacted with the anti-minaret referendum. Enlargement will suffer in the next decade but there is the need to overcome this. Different types of partnership with Brussels need to be given time and space.
Looking at the EU’s eastern partnership with the Caucasus, what levers of soft power could the EU possibly use with respect to Russia’s activity in the spheres of geopolitics and energy, and Russia’s offer to local governments guarantee the status quo as opposed to the democratic progress requested by the EU?
In the Caucasus, Moscow challenges the EU at a geopolitical level and at the level of normative influence. Reform and the rule of law should be emphasised even though local heads of states do not favour it. Specific changes in the life of citizens are preferred: but the EU struggles to give visas while Russia distributes passports with both hands. The energy issue is also critical: the EU seeks market integration, whereas Moscow divides the EU through bilateral deals. In the realpolitik of the pipelines, as in the war in Georgia in 2008, Europe lost.
In addition to the South Caucasus, the North Caucasus is more unstable and yet has great expectations from the EU. What benefits can it count on?
The eastern partnership is primarily bilateral, with funding, which is in reality small, and today it deals with the waning enthusiasm for the coloured revolutions. For the North Caucasus, the funding goes primarily for cross-border cooperation, that is, to the regions, which have more legitimacy with the people than the central governments. It is complicated to include the Russians in this process. In response to the tense political and diplomatic climate with individual countries, such as Poland and Estonia, Moscow has reportedly allocated over 200 million Euros only for cross-border cooperation from the Caucasus to the Baltic republics. Cross-border cooperation can help where cooperation with states in not possible: for example, by restarting the economy of the border areas by building roads, doing a peer-review of the funds in view of the endemic corruption. For example, Kaliningrad represented a successful case, for the Polish, Lithuanian, and Russian reality, thanks to the regional funds. It was a step ahead in the reduction of the greyest area in the Russian enclave in the EU.
You have defined the eastern partnership as an “ambiguous mix”. What are the ingredients?
From the Balkans to the Caucasus, the EU risks repeating the mistakes made in Ukraine. Why did we lose it? The Orange Revolution meant free elections. Ten years ago, this was not a done deal. However, the EU was less rigorous on strategic issues, such as the energy market or corruption, which are most obvious for the citizens. And, it remained ambiguous on the issue of accession, with the door neither opened nor closed.
Why is gradual integration a guarantee against internal fragmentation of the EU?
These countries will always be our neighbours. If we ignore them, in the long run, we will have problems with internal cohesion, and as in our Russian relations, the EU will be ever more divided. We will be weaker if we do not pay attention to our borders.
Where should the EU end?
I am in favour of the Balkans, Turkey, and, in the future, also Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine. I do not think it is possible to include the Caucasus, both for geopolitical reasons as well as reasons of domestic interest. I wouldn’t say that Azerbaijan feels attracted to the EU in the same way as Moldova.
Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso portal.
According to Tim Judah "every EU foreign minister should immediately read this book". In Why Europe Fears its Neighbors, Fabrizio Tassinari talks of the EU’s anxiety about those just beyond its borders. We interviewed him
“This is the book which all EU foreign ministers should read immediately”: Tim Judah, the Balkan correspondent for the British weekly, The Economist. The book, Why Europe Fears its Neighbors, (published by Praeger Security International and coming out in Italy soon), portrays Europe’s demographic and identity crisis and the challenges of globalisation and multiculturalism. The author, Fabrizio Tassinari, is director of the Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). In order to achieve its ambition for global power, the EU should confront the spectres located exactly on its borders. The book explores the EU’s relationship with the East and the Mediterranean, but we have asked the author to talk primarily on the challenges posed by the EU’s long eastern border.
Why this book now?
This book results from five years of work. I started by observing the “enlargement fatigue” and released the book to coincide with the new momentum from the Lisbon Treaty. First, the neighbourhood is not the same for everyone: for a Pole, the neighbour is Russia, certainly not Libya. Nevertheless, many EU members share the siege mentality: at the borders, we see migration, drug trafficking, and energy insecurity. This, however, is the moment for a new approach: rather than agonize over how to limit the enlargement, the EU should focus on practical and gradual integration of its neighbors. Enlargement, far from being a threat, has so far supported development and democracy.
Why is it important that the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy, Lady Ashton, chose to make her first official visits to Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Pristina?
Despite the unkind comments about Ashton’s inexperience in foreign affairs, she made an important choice to first visit the Balkans. She could have started with Ankara or Tel Aviv, but, in the medium term, the Balkans will be the test for the European Union’s credibility in international forums. By landing in Sarajevo, Ashton played a modest card in view of global scenarios, but which has the merit of being pragmatic, of having achievable goals. In addition, Ashton leads the creation of the first European External Action Service (EEAS) that will have permanent EU delegations in 136 countries of the world. We will see the results over the next decade.
Bosnia and Kosovo are two tests for the EU, where the EU invested considerable resources, not without considerable waste, with modest results so far. What are the major errors and what are their consequences?
Bosnia, in the coming months, rather than a return to violence, has an objective risk of secession. As described by the former Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, the EU has to aim for “electroshock treatment” and “political demining”, which will prevent the internal infighting in Bosnia. My thesis is that the prospect of EU membership does not warm hearts without new developments in the life of citizens, such as visa liberalization. With her visit to Kosovo, Ashton sent a strong message to some European capitals, such as Spain, current holder of the EU rotating presidency and among the EU member states that do not recognise Pristina. In reality, a divided institution now supervises the independence of the new state. In addition to bureaucratic contradictions with the unjustifiable result of funding going to the wrong hands, political issues also make Kosovo a thorn in the side.
Does the EU exert sufficient pressure in the fight against corruption in Bosnia and Kosovo? The elections occur in an opaque institutional and social reality.
The pressure on Kosovo, as previously on Serbia, Macedonia, and Croatia, has not been sufficiently firm. There were reasons for greater flexibility after the arrests of Gotovina and Karadzic, but that sends the signal that the non-member governments actually pull the strings. Good governance and less bureaucracy could have avoided these errors, and it could have demanded, through incentives, or suspension of funding, progress in public administration reform, hence reducing the mix of private interests and government.
You have written that energy security, crime, and migration, are the EU’s fears vis-à-vis the East. In view of these fears, could it be helpful for all the Western Balkan countries to enter into the EU by 2014, the 100th anniversary of World War I, which started in Sarajevo?
This is not a new debate, but the so-called “regatta” model for Central Europe in 2004, that is, all together in the EU, through a process of internal competition, which rewards the best, was based on conditions now missing in the Western Balkans. Croatia, which is bound to enter in 2012, is the only certain case, whereas in the other Balkan countries, the compliance with EU standards is more dubious and unclear in the long term. Thus, I do not agree with Amato’s proposal “everyone at the same time”. It seems populist. A second hypothesis, entry into the EU with varying arrangements would mean to create accessions of Type B, for example with one country being an EU member state but its citizens not having the freedom of movement in the Union. This model is more appropriate for Turkey, not the Balkans where it would open ethnic conflict. Better to move, step by step, when the countries are ready. However, if we look at the number of these new states and their national dimensions, the Balkans is not an insurmountable challenge for the EU.
Is Turkey the major challenge?
The EU above all fears the size of the country and the cost of entry. An estimate of the annual cost in terms of EU funds necessary for Ankara’s accession amounts to 0.20 % of the EU’s GDP. If we think that the EU’s budget now is 1.35 % of its GDP, it is a substantial amount. With its 70 million people, Turkey will change the balance between the big EU states. The framework for the EU-Turkey accords already contains possible restrictions to Ankara’s full membership in sectors such as free movement of people, structural policies, and agriculture. Hence, through the mode of the varying arrangements, the Turkish request to the EU has already radically changed the mechanisms of European integration. Even though a privileged partnership does not have the same attraction as EU membership, it is good for breaking the impasse and concentrating on the potential benefits. Otherwise, the process of accession would lose ground before the ever more intense politicisation of the debate on whether or not Turkey is Europe.
Will the economic crisis stop enlargement?
It would certainly influence it. The economic crisis will contribute to creating an EU with several faces when it comes to enlargement. The issue will come on the agenda in countries such as the Netherlands in the next national elections. The fear from enlargement will always weigh more in countries with stronger migration from the Balkans, such as Sweden and Switzerland. Switzerland reacted with the anti-minaret referendum. Enlargement will suffer in the next decade but there is the need to overcome this. Different types of partnership with Brussels need to be given time and space.
Looking at the EU’s eastern partnership with the Caucasus, what levers of soft power could the EU possibly use with respect to Russia’s activity in the spheres of geopolitics and energy, and Russia’s offer to local governments guarantee the status quo as opposed to the democratic progress requested by the EU?
In the Caucasus, Moscow challenges the EU at a geopolitical level and at the level of normative influence. Reform and the rule of law should be emphasised even though local heads of states do not favour it. Specific changes in the life of citizens are preferred: but the EU struggles to give visas while Russia distributes passports with both hands. The energy issue is also critical: the EU seeks market integration, whereas Moscow divides the EU through bilateral deals. In the realpolitik of the pipelines, as in the war in Georgia in 2008, Europe lost.
In addition to the South Caucasus, the North Caucasus is more unstable and yet has great expectations from the EU. What benefits can it count on?
The eastern partnership is primarily bilateral, with funding, which is in reality small, and today it deals with the waning enthusiasm for the coloured revolutions. For the North Caucasus, the funding goes primarily for cross-border cooperation, that is, to the regions, which have more legitimacy with the people than the central governments. It is complicated to include the Russians in this process. In response to the tense political and diplomatic climate with individual countries, such as Poland and Estonia, Moscow has reportedly allocated over 200 million Euros only for cross-border cooperation from the Caucasus to the Baltic republics. Cross-border cooperation can help where cooperation with states in not possible: for example, by restarting the economy of the border areas by building roads, doing a peer-review of the funds in view of the endemic corruption. For example, Kaliningrad represented a successful case, for the Polish, Lithuanian, and Russian reality, thanks to the regional funds. It was a step ahead in the reduction of the greyest area in the Russian enclave in the EU.
You have defined the eastern partnership as an “ambiguous mix”. What are the ingredients?
From the Balkans to the Caucasus, the EU risks repeating the mistakes made in Ukraine. Why did we lose it? The Orange Revolution meant free elections. Ten years ago, this was not a done deal. However, the EU was less rigorous on strategic issues, such as the energy market or corruption, which are most obvious for the citizens. And, it remained ambiguous on the issue of accession, with the door neither opened nor closed.
Why is gradual integration a guarantee against internal fragmentation of the EU?
These countries will always be our neighbours. If we ignore them, in the long run, we will have problems with internal cohesion, and as in our Russian relations, the EU will be ever more divided. We will be weaker if we do not pay attention to our borders.
Where should the EU end?
I am in favour of the Balkans, Turkey, and, in the future, also Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine. I do not think it is possible to include the Caucasus, both for geopolitical reasons as well as reasons of domestic interest. I wouldn’t say that Azerbaijan feels attracted to the EU in the same way as Moldova.
Monday 29 March 2010
First book review!
"[Tassinari's] writing style is robust, colourful and well spiced with cultural and historical references. If the result ends up somewhere between academic prose and quality journalism, the factual underpinning and referencing leaving nothing wanting" from Alyson Bailes' book review in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23:1, March 2010.
Wednesday 3 February 2010
Europe's role in losing Ukraine
First appeared on openDemocracy
On the eve of the crucial run-off in Ukraine's presidential election, Fabrizio Tassinari argues that enlargement fatigue in the EU has meant that since the Orange Revolution Ukraine has been offered no real prospect of joining Europe
”It’s so good that you hold free elections now. But why so often?” The joke, making the rounds these days in Kiev, encapsulates the past five years of western disenchantment towards Ukraine. However, closer scrutiny has much to tell us about what has gone so badly wrong in Europe's policy towards its large neighbour, with its population of 46 million.
There is a reason why the “Orange revolution” that spectacularly swept President Viktor Yushchenko to power has faded away. It is because Ukraine has proved to be ungovernable. The presidential elections that ushered in the revolution took place in 2004-2005; parliamentary elections were called in 2006; then early parliamentary elections were held in 2007. This plethora of elections is telling.
On Sunday 7 February, the run-off presidential election will tell us whether Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko or former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovic will make it to the highest post. We can only hope for a clear outcome. The alternative will be further chaos.
Either way, Kiev is still marred by what British scholar Andrew Wilson calls “virtual politics:” Free and fair election do take place regularly now, and this is by no means a small feat. Yet, from the ability of the government to implement policies, to the quality of the public services and the level of corruption, Ukraine’s record remains disappointing. According to the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, Kiev’s performance on these issues has been worse than that of some North African autocracies.
As it happens, improving Ukraine’s governance standards was supposed to be the paramount objective of European policy.
At the time of the Orange Revolution, EU High Representative Javier Solana and the then presidents of Poland and Lithuania proved highly reactive when it came to defusing the brewing crisis. Their engagement helped broker an agreement that led to the presidential election being re-run, and then to the highpoint of this bloodless upheaval.
The troubles for Brussels came after those outstanding events. All that the EU was able to offer in the immediate aftermath of the revolution was a ten-point update to a technical “Action Plan” that had been negotiated by Yushchenko’s predecessor. Since then, the EU has stepped up its assistance; it has launched new initiatives and offered more money. But it has not properly accounted for the fact that the Orange revolutionaries have plunged the country into utter disarray.
Part of the problem is that the EU watered down its conditions. Europe's principal mechanism by way of supporting a partner country’s domestic transformation has been a rigorous set of penalties and incentives. However, in the case of Ukraine, the EU has not suspended agreements or cut off funding when Kiev strayed from its commitments.
On the other hand, Brussels has been vague about what Ukraine can aspire to if it complies with EU rules. Crucially, the EU has always stopped short of offering the one thing most Ukrainians yearn for: the prospect of membership in the EU.
Make no mistake about it: the squabbling of its politicians and the cosy relationship between business and government are problems of Ukraine’s own making. Brussels cannot be blamed. Yet the two most significant reasons behind Europe's ambiguous policy on Ukraine have remarkably little to do with that country.
The first concerns Europe’s enlargement “fatigue”. The 2004 expansion of the EU into Central Europe generated worries about the Union’s decision-making processes and its legitimacy. In 2010 we may no longer hear European policy makers claiming that bringing Ukraine into the EU would be like the United States taking in Mexico, as then Commissioner Günther Verheugen put it. Even so, the EU has not moved away from its vague formulas, which basically tell Kiev that the door is neither open nor shut.
The second reason, which is not unrelated, is Russia, of course. European engagement has never really been about replacing Russia, whose ties to Ukraine are historical and cultural, as much as they are economic and political. However, some European countries have been concerned by the aftershocks of Ukraine’s European aspirations.
The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia provided the most blatant example of possible aftershocks. In Ukraine’s case, the consequences have most notably concerned energy politics. The disruption of gas deliveries from Russia first hit news in January 2006, when supplies to Europe plunged by a third in one day. Ever since then, Ukraine—through which about 80% of Russian gas exports to Europe pass—has been at the centre of endless squabbles with Moscow over energy transit.
Between pipeline geopolitics and obscure middlemen, energy has never been an easy target for reform in Eastern Europe. But Europe has moved slowly and without much coordination over such a strategically crucial issue,.
Above all, Europe’s failure has been tangible for those in Ukraine who most deserve to benefit from closer ties to the EU: the men and women in the street.
European angst about the economy and immigration has undermined the millions of Euros thrown at improving the welfare of this and other large neighbours.
The point is illustrated by a little story that appeared in the European media a couple of years ago. It was about twenty kids from the Ukrainian countryside who braved the freezing winter and travelled 500 kilometers to Kiev at their own expense to apply for EU visas. There they were asked to sing outside the consulate buildings in order to prove that they really were a folk choir invited to a European festival, as they claimed.
The episode may be crude, but only as crude as the moral of these past five years: As long as Europeans continue to look inward, as long as those just outside it feel as if they have been left behind, whatever the EU does beyond its borders risks being pointless. Worse still, it may end up being counterproductive.
Fabrizio Tassinari, is Head of Foreign Policy and EU studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies
On the eve of the crucial run-off in Ukraine's presidential election, Fabrizio Tassinari argues that enlargement fatigue in the EU has meant that since the Orange Revolution Ukraine has been offered no real prospect of joining Europe
”It’s so good that you hold free elections now. But why so often?” The joke, making the rounds these days in Kiev, encapsulates the past five years of western disenchantment towards Ukraine. However, closer scrutiny has much to tell us about what has gone so badly wrong in Europe's policy towards its large neighbour, with its population of 46 million.
There is a reason why the “Orange revolution” that spectacularly swept President Viktor Yushchenko to power has faded away. It is because Ukraine has proved to be ungovernable. The presidential elections that ushered in the revolution took place in 2004-2005; parliamentary elections were called in 2006; then early parliamentary elections were held in 2007. This plethora of elections is telling.
On Sunday 7 February, the run-off presidential election will tell us whether Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko or former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovic will make it to the highest post. We can only hope for a clear outcome. The alternative will be further chaos.
Either way, Kiev is still marred by what British scholar Andrew Wilson calls “virtual politics:” Free and fair election do take place regularly now, and this is by no means a small feat. Yet, from the ability of the government to implement policies, to the quality of the public services and the level of corruption, Ukraine’s record remains disappointing. According to the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, Kiev’s performance on these issues has been worse than that of some North African autocracies.
As it happens, improving Ukraine’s governance standards was supposed to be the paramount objective of European policy.
At the time of the Orange Revolution, EU High Representative Javier Solana and the then presidents of Poland and Lithuania proved highly reactive when it came to defusing the brewing crisis. Their engagement helped broker an agreement that led to the presidential election being re-run, and then to the highpoint of this bloodless upheaval.
The troubles for Brussels came after those outstanding events. All that the EU was able to offer in the immediate aftermath of the revolution was a ten-point update to a technical “Action Plan” that had been negotiated by Yushchenko’s predecessor. Since then, the EU has stepped up its assistance; it has launched new initiatives and offered more money. But it has not properly accounted for the fact that the Orange revolutionaries have plunged the country into utter disarray.
Part of the problem is that the EU watered down its conditions. Europe's principal mechanism by way of supporting a partner country’s domestic transformation has been a rigorous set of penalties and incentives. However, in the case of Ukraine, the EU has not suspended agreements or cut off funding when Kiev strayed from its commitments.
On the other hand, Brussels has been vague about what Ukraine can aspire to if it complies with EU rules. Crucially, the EU has always stopped short of offering the one thing most Ukrainians yearn for: the prospect of membership in the EU.
Make no mistake about it: the squabbling of its politicians and the cosy relationship between business and government are problems of Ukraine’s own making. Brussels cannot be blamed. Yet the two most significant reasons behind Europe's ambiguous policy on Ukraine have remarkably little to do with that country.
The first concerns Europe’s enlargement “fatigue”. The 2004 expansion of the EU into Central Europe generated worries about the Union’s decision-making processes and its legitimacy. In 2010 we may no longer hear European policy makers claiming that bringing Ukraine into the EU would be like the United States taking in Mexico, as then Commissioner Günther Verheugen put it. Even so, the EU has not moved away from its vague formulas, which basically tell Kiev that the door is neither open nor shut.
The second reason, which is not unrelated, is Russia, of course. European engagement has never really been about replacing Russia, whose ties to Ukraine are historical and cultural, as much as they are economic and political. However, some European countries have been concerned by the aftershocks of Ukraine’s European aspirations.
The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia provided the most blatant example of possible aftershocks. In Ukraine’s case, the consequences have most notably concerned energy politics. The disruption of gas deliveries from Russia first hit news in January 2006, when supplies to Europe plunged by a third in one day. Ever since then, Ukraine—through which about 80% of Russian gas exports to Europe pass—has been at the centre of endless squabbles with Moscow over energy transit.
Between pipeline geopolitics and obscure middlemen, energy has never been an easy target for reform in Eastern Europe. But Europe has moved slowly and without much coordination over such a strategically crucial issue,.
Above all, Europe’s failure has been tangible for those in Ukraine who most deserve to benefit from closer ties to the EU: the men and women in the street.
European angst about the economy and immigration has undermined the millions of Euros thrown at improving the welfare of this and other large neighbours.
The point is illustrated by a little story that appeared in the European media a couple of years ago. It was about twenty kids from the Ukrainian countryside who braved the freezing winter and travelled 500 kilometers to Kiev at their own expense to apply for EU visas. There they were asked to sing outside the consulate buildings in order to prove that they really were a folk choir invited to a European festival, as they claimed.
The episode may be crude, but only as crude as the moral of these past five years: As long as Europeans continue to look inward, as long as those just outside it feel as if they have been left behind, whatever the EU does beyond its borders risks being pointless. Worse still, it may end up being counterproductive.
Fabrizio Tassinari, is Head of Foreign Policy and EU studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies
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