First appeared on Global Europe
By Fabrizio Tassinari
As the EU foreign policy adage goes, it all still depends on how the expectations that many observers had raised on the new EU foreign policy architecture will match with the actual capabilities at Catherine Ahston’s disposal.
The new High Representative will be endowed of significantly enhanced institutional tools, such as a large bureaucracy and a seat in the European Commission. But this does not mean that the EU will automatically acquire a single voice on foreign policy. Despite some additional procedural innovations provided by the Lisbon treaty, national voices, especially from larger member states, will remain far louder—and and their actions weightier—than those of the EU. On relatively less sensible issues, Lady Ashton will probably have better chances to hammer her points on behalf of the EU. But in the most important foreign policy dossiers—whether Russia or the Middle East—the ball is bound to remain in the courts of the Member States. The extent to which the High Representative will appreciate these limitations will also determine her ability to shape a role for her office.
The European External Action Service (EEAS) will provide a more visible face on the ground. Ironically, one may go as far as arguing that if the EU will indeed have the proverbial, single telephone number, it will be also to the extent that selected partners will perceive the enhanced EU delegations in their countries as responsive, useful and visible to answer basic questions about the EU and its policies. On this particular point, the year 2010 will be key. The actual composition and functioning of the EEAS will say much about the EU’s presence in the world and Lady Ashton’s leadership potential.
One last point: Would have a charismatic , “traffic-stopping” politician been a better choice for the EU foreign policy chief representative? Do personalities matter? Yes and no. On the visibility side, the EU could have used a recognizable face to put in front of both successes and failures. But one needs to be realistic in that the job of the High Representative will be about coordinating national foreign policies positions as much as (if not more than) representing a common foreign policy. For this, the EU will need a consensus-builder rather than a crowd-puller and Lady Ashton’s performance will be also judged on that basis.
Friday 11 December 2009
Thursday 19 November 2009
A lesson for Nord Stream from the Arctic
First appeared in European Voice
By Pertti Joenniemi and Fabrizio Tassinari
To ease tensions in the Baltic, consider lessons learned from the race for the High North.
The EU and Russia met this week at a time when Russia's efforts to establish a new, northern pipeline through which to transport gas to Germany are making rapid progress. In the space of a few weeks, Danish, Finnish and Swedish governments have all given the green light for the Nord Stream pipeline to be laid along the bed of the Baltic Sea. All three of them seem to have reached the conclusion that the numerous security-related and environmental questions raised do not justify giving the project the red light.
But energy politics continues to divide northern Europe. Poland, the Baltic states and some sections of the public in other countries remain unconvinced about Nord Stream's rationale and about Moscow's intentions. Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister, did not ease their concerns when, in 2006, he said that Russia would use its Baltic fleet “to resolve ecological, economic and technical tasks” in the Baltic Sea. And, although the Baltic Sea Strategy, adopted by the EU last month, is being promoted as a ‘model' of co-operation, it does little to change the terms of the debate about energy in the region, which remains frozen by the perception of a Russian threat.
There is no easy way to change that perception. However, recent developments in the Arctic suggest one way to civilise the debate. When Russia laid claim to the North Pole in August 2007 by planting its flag on its seabed, an unregulated militarisation of the Arctic and a race for its unexplored riches seemed in the offing. Canada hinted that it might establish two new stations near the North Pole; Denmark sent expeditions to the area; and the US started worrying about its own thin presence in the region, as well as its lack of ice-breakers. Logistical strength – and, possibly, military might – seemed destined to determine who would emerge victorious in the competition for the High North.
Yet, in August 2008, representatives of those four countries, plus Norway, met in Greenland and agreed that issues such as navigation rights and delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf should be settled through existing international structures. They reaffirmed that the Arctic area needs no specific legal regime. By issuing a joint statement, the Ilulissat Declaration, they chose to pre-empt any further escalation.
The terms of the debate in the Baltic may have passed the point of pre-emption, given that Germany's and Russia's decision not to involve Poland in decisions about Nord Stream has been likened to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact under which, in 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union carved up Poland. Even so, the region should consider emulating the Arctic's littoral states.
Given that the region's governments meet regularly in various formats – most notably the Council of the Baltic Sea States – it would not be difficult to choreograph a joint initiative by all nine coastal states. This could produce a political declaration to the effect that any inter-state controversy related to the pipeline would be resolved by civilian – as opposed to military – means. As in the Ilulissat Declaration, the signatories would declare themselves committed to existing legal regimes and to the “orderly settlement” of conflicting claims.
Such a move might not dispel the fears of some, but it might help to tone down the rhetoric. In a region where relations are strained, that would be a valuable improvement.
Pertti Joenniemi and Fabrizio Tassinari are senior researchers at the Danish Institute for International Studies.
By Pertti Joenniemi and Fabrizio Tassinari
To ease tensions in the Baltic, consider lessons learned from the race for the High North.
The EU and Russia met this week at a time when Russia's efforts to establish a new, northern pipeline through which to transport gas to Germany are making rapid progress. In the space of a few weeks, Danish, Finnish and Swedish governments have all given the green light for the Nord Stream pipeline to be laid along the bed of the Baltic Sea. All three of them seem to have reached the conclusion that the numerous security-related and environmental questions raised do not justify giving the project the red light.
But energy politics continues to divide northern Europe. Poland, the Baltic states and some sections of the public in other countries remain unconvinced about Nord Stream's rationale and about Moscow's intentions. Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister, did not ease their concerns when, in 2006, he said that Russia would use its Baltic fleet “to resolve ecological, economic and technical tasks” in the Baltic Sea. And, although the Baltic Sea Strategy, adopted by the EU last month, is being promoted as a ‘model' of co-operation, it does little to change the terms of the debate about energy in the region, which remains frozen by the perception of a Russian threat.
There is no easy way to change that perception. However, recent developments in the Arctic suggest one way to civilise the debate. When Russia laid claim to the North Pole in August 2007 by planting its flag on its seabed, an unregulated militarisation of the Arctic and a race for its unexplored riches seemed in the offing. Canada hinted that it might establish two new stations near the North Pole; Denmark sent expeditions to the area; and the US started worrying about its own thin presence in the region, as well as its lack of ice-breakers. Logistical strength – and, possibly, military might – seemed destined to determine who would emerge victorious in the competition for the High North.
Yet, in August 2008, representatives of those four countries, plus Norway, met in Greenland and agreed that issues such as navigation rights and delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf should be settled through existing international structures. They reaffirmed that the Arctic area needs no specific legal regime. By issuing a joint statement, the Ilulissat Declaration, they chose to pre-empt any further escalation.
The terms of the debate in the Baltic may have passed the point of pre-emption, given that Germany's and Russia's decision not to involve Poland in decisions about Nord Stream has been likened to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact under which, in 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union carved up Poland. Even so, the region should consider emulating the Arctic's littoral states.
Given that the region's governments meet regularly in various formats – most notably the Council of the Baltic Sea States – it would not be difficult to choreograph a joint initiative by all nine coastal states. This could produce a political declaration to the effect that any inter-state controversy related to the pipeline would be resolved by civilian – as opposed to military – means. As in the Ilulissat Declaration, the signatories would declare themselves committed to existing legal regimes and to the “orderly settlement” of conflicting claims.
Such a move might not dispel the fears of some, but it might help to tone down the rhetoric. In a region where relations are strained, that would be a valuable improvement.
Pertti Joenniemi and Fabrizio Tassinari are senior researchers at the Danish Institute for International Studies.
Thursday 5 November 2009
Defusing the enlargement hype
First appeared on E!Sharp
No panacea: the carrot of EU accession has not yet persuaded Bosnia's leaders to set aside their differences. Photograph: European Commission
Presenting his annual progress report on the applicant countries in October, Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that “political de-mining” was part of the EU's job when it came to enlargement. He was referring to the countries of the western Balkans, with their persistent infighting. But he might as well have been talking about some of the EU's existing members.
With the Lisbon Treaty finally ratified, the enlargement debate may soon return to the top of the EU agenda. The “wideners” will be back to stress the importance of further expansion for Europe’s global aspirations. Opponents will reiterate warnings about the challenge enlargement poses to the European polity and its identity. Both lines of argument have strong justifications. Yet both tend to overlook a basic point: EU expansion has helped to foster prosperity, spread peace and consolidate democracy in the candidate countries and in Europe as a whole.
First and foremost, enlargement is a tool for achieving those goals, not the goal itself. And the EU is not ready to lay down that tool just yet. Brussels' credibility in the Balkans rests on its ability to fulfil the membership pledge as soon as the applicant countries have met the agreed conditions (though as Bosnia's enduring fragility shows, that pledge is not always sufficient to keep candidates on the reform track). The recent Turkish-Armenian accord may lend a new lease of life to Ankara’s EU bid, which should in turn remind EU governments that their contradictory position on Turkey cannot be maintained indefinitely. The domestic mayhem in countries such as Ukraine and Moldova means that their accession is not a topic for now - but the EU will, at some point, have to find a conclusive answer to these states' long-term membership aspirations.
Only when the EU resolves this principled ambiguity will it be able to focus on the instruments at its disposal. And when that happens, it will become clear that in many key areas, the path before Europe is largely laid out already. "Deep" free trade arrangements, such as that being negotiated with Ukraine, will open up the EU market and spur substantial economic integration with its neighbours. Some neighbours have provided significant assets in specific EU foreign policy missions - witness the Moroccan troops deployed in Bosnia. Visa liberalisation is the name of the game in the Balkans.
So in time, some of the EU's neighbours may be surprised to discover that the difference between member state and partner state is increasingly blurred. A candidate country like Turkey may have to swallow a restrictive EU accession deal, replete with exceptions and "safeguards". But for a country such as Israel, which is in many fields deeply integrated with the EU already, the question of membership has long been redundant.
No neighbourhood policy or "privileged partnership” will ever match the appeal of membership. Yet the only way for the EU to break free of the circular enlargement debate of the past half-decade is for it to focus on the concrete benefits that existing instruments can deliver, and to keep bickering to a minimum.
No panacea: the carrot of EU accession has not yet persuaded Bosnia's leaders to set aside their differences. Photograph: European Commission
Presenting his annual progress report on the applicant countries in October, Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that “political de-mining” was part of the EU's job when it came to enlargement. He was referring to the countries of the western Balkans, with their persistent infighting. But he might as well have been talking about some of the EU's existing members.
With the Lisbon Treaty finally ratified, the enlargement debate may soon return to the top of the EU agenda. The “wideners” will be back to stress the importance of further expansion for Europe’s global aspirations. Opponents will reiterate warnings about the challenge enlargement poses to the European polity and its identity. Both lines of argument have strong justifications. Yet both tend to overlook a basic point: EU expansion has helped to foster prosperity, spread peace and consolidate democracy in the candidate countries and in Europe as a whole.
First and foremost, enlargement is a tool for achieving those goals, not the goal itself. And the EU is not ready to lay down that tool just yet. Brussels' credibility in the Balkans rests on its ability to fulfil the membership pledge as soon as the applicant countries have met the agreed conditions (though as Bosnia's enduring fragility shows, that pledge is not always sufficient to keep candidates on the reform track). The recent Turkish-Armenian accord may lend a new lease of life to Ankara’s EU bid, which should in turn remind EU governments that their contradictory position on Turkey cannot be maintained indefinitely. The domestic mayhem in countries such as Ukraine and Moldova means that their accession is not a topic for now - but the EU will, at some point, have to find a conclusive answer to these states' long-term membership aspirations.
Only when the EU resolves this principled ambiguity will it be able to focus on the instruments at its disposal. And when that happens, it will become clear that in many key areas, the path before Europe is largely laid out already. "Deep" free trade arrangements, such as that being negotiated with Ukraine, will open up the EU market and spur substantial economic integration with its neighbours. Some neighbours have provided significant assets in specific EU foreign policy missions - witness the Moroccan troops deployed in Bosnia. Visa liberalisation is the name of the game in the Balkans.
So in time, some of the EU's neighbours may be surprised to discover that the difference between member state and partner state is increasingly blurred. A candidate country like Turkey may have to swallow a restrictive EU accession deal, replete with exceptions and "safeguards". But for a country such as Israel, which is in many fields deeply integrated with the EU already, the question of membership has long been redundant.
No neighbourhood policy or "privileged partnership” will ever match the appeal of membership. Yet the only way for the EU to break free of the circular enlargement debate of the past half-decade is for it to focus on the concrete benefits that existing instruments can deliver, and to keep bickering to a minimum.
Friday 2 October 2009
But it’s not as if the EU handles its neighbourhood very adroitly
First appeared on Europe's World
Autumn 2009
by Fabrizio Tassinari
At the start of his country’s EU presidency, Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt remarked that: “Our credibility in the wider world depends on how successful we are in our own part of the world.” Nick Witney explains in his perceptive yet provocative article why this is so. He draws our attention to the ‘return of geography’ as a basis for assessing Europe’s threat perceptions. From energy dependency to immigration, many of the most daunting challenges that are shaping the EU’s security agenda are to be found in the arc of countries around its eastern and southern borders.
Witney’s main point concerns Europe’s relations with the Islamic world, and its position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A higher EU profile is sorely needed. In the candid report that the UN’s Middle East envoy Alvaro de Soto submitted upon his resignation, for example, he mentions the EU only a few times. And when he does, it is to say that, “Europeans have spent more money in boycotting the [Palestinian Authority] than they did when they were supporting it”. He also says that the EU’s border-monitoring mission between Gaza and Egypt has been “fraught with difficulties” and that “somewhat comically” the Middle East Quartet is made up of six parties since the EU is represented by three principals. All these flaws have once again become painfully apparent in the aftermath of the most recent Gaza conflict.
But Witney’s analysis is perhaps too dismissive when he addresses Russia and eastern Europe. It is true that Russia – whether measured in economic terms or by its rusting military capabilities –, may not in the long run live up to the “strategic partner” status it has obtained from Brussels. And there are good reasons for hoping that the EU will eventually prove to be the more attractive lodestone for the former-Soviet republics on its borders. Yet the cacophony of voices shooting to be heard in the Russia debate remains a textbook case of Europe’s under-performing foreign policy. Meanwhile, the Eastern Partnership doesn’t constitute a panacea for Ukraine or Moldova, and despite their severe shortcomings the political leaderships in those countries have not even welcomed it. Put another way, for now the EU is very far from applying Witney’s recipe of “forbearance and firmness.”
The broader point, of course, is that Europe cannot choose its neighbours, but must nevertheless decide what it wants to do with them. Throughout the second half of this decade, the EU’s enlargement policy has been mired in inward-looking squabbles, and the “light” enlargement version proposed through the European Neighbourhood Policy hasn’t quite taken off. Until recently, all this could be justified as an element of Europe’s ‘constructive ambiguity’, and indeed its successful “Bing-Bang” enlargement in 2004 made the phrase look apposite enough. But the regrettable truth is that there is not much that is constructive in the EU’s ambiguous policy mix towards its neighbours.
The EU’s ability to deal with its neighbours is not only a litmus test for its global aspirations. The neighbours in effect hold up a mirror to the EU’s own identity and influence. Sadly, the image it reflects is not very pretty.
Autumn 2009
by Fabrizio Tassinari
At the start of his country’s EU presidency, Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt remarked that: “Our credibility in the wider world depends on how successful we are in our own part of the world.” Nick Witney explains in his perceptive yet provocative article why this is so. He draws our attention to the ‘return of geography’ as a basis for assessing Europe’s threat perceptions. From energy dependency to immigration, many of the most daunting challenges that are shaping the EU’s security agenda are to be found in the arc of countries around its eastern and southern borders.
Witney’s main point concerns Europe’s relations with the Islamic world, and its position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A higher EU profile is sorely needed. In the candid report that the UN’s Middle East envoy Alvaro de Soto submitted upon his resignation, for example, he mentions the EU only a few times. And when he does, it is to say that, “Europeans have spent more money in boycotting the [Palestinian Authority] than they did when they were supporting it”. He also says that the EU’s border-monitoring mission between Gaza and Egypt has been “fraught with difficulties” and that “somewhat comically” the Middle East Quartet is made up of six parties since the EU is represented by three principals. All these flaws have once again become painfully apparent in the aftermath of the most recent Gaza conflict.
But Witney’s analysis is perhaps too dismissive when he addresses Russia and eastern Europe. It is true that Russia – whether measured in economic terms or by its rusting military capabilities –, may not in the long run live up to the “strategic partner” status it has obtained from Brussels. And there are good reasons for hoping that the EU will eventually prove to be the more attractive lodestone for the former-Soviet republics on its borders. Yet the cacophony of voices shooting to be heard in the Russia debate remains a textbook case of Europe’s under-performing foreign policy. Meanwhile, the Eastern Partnership doesn’t constitute a panacea for Ukraine or Moldova, and despite their severe shortcomings the political leaderships in those countries have not even welcomed it. Put another way, for now the EU is very far from applying Witney’s recipe of “forbearance and firmness.”
The broader point, of course, is that Europe cannot choose its neighbours, but must nevertheless decide what it wants to do with them. Throughout the second half of this decade, the EU’s enlargement policy has been mired in inward-looking squabbles, and the “light” enlargement version proposed through the European Neighbourhood Policy hasn’t quite taken off. Until recently, all this could be justified as an element of Europe’s ‘constructive ambiguity’, and indeed its successful “Bing-Bang” enlargement in 2004 made the phrase look apposite enough. But the regrettable truth is that there is not much that is constructive in the EU’s ambiguous policy mix towards its neighbours.
The EU’s ability to deal with its neighbours is not only a litmus test for its global aspirations. The neighbours in effect hold up a mirror to the EU’s own identity and influence. Sadly, the image it reflects is not very pretty.
Monday 28 September 2009
At Last
Taking a novel approach to the current situation in Europe, foreign policy analyst Fabrizio Tassinari transforms external policy concerns about Europe's neighborhood into questions about Europe's internal future. His contention: that the situation on Europe's periphery is an unforgiving mirror of its identity crisis, institutional paralysis, ineffectual foreign policy, and morbid fear of migrants and multiculturalism.
Looking at each of the countries and regions surrounding Europe, from Russia and Turkey to the Western Balkans and North Africa, Tassinari unravels the challenges facing the EU, weighs the record of its policies, and explains how both can be traced back to Europe's inherent insecurity. Turning conventional wisdom on its head, he argues that gradual and diversified forms of integration with its many neighbors is Europe's best alternative to a progressive, but inexorable fragmentation of the EU. The ability to meet this challenge will not only test Europe's unfulfilled global aspirations, it will be crucial to its very survival.
Friday 18 September 2009
The neighborhood is the test case
First appeared on Global Europe
The EU as a global actor (4) / An interview with Fabrizio Tassinari
Friday, 18 September 2009
How would you describe the European Union’s role in today’s international affairs, with regards to its neighbourhood as well as to the wider world?
Judging by the rhetoric of some European statesmen, as well as by the opinion of European citizens, the hopes surrounding Europe’s role in the world are all too often higher than what the EU can actually deliver.
It is no doubt frustrating to listen to the cacophony of European voices on key dossiers such as Russia or the Middle East. It is disappointing to witness the slowness characterizing the build-up of the EU defense capabilities.
At the same time, some of the less visible things that the EU is doing on the world stage, especially in those fields that may not be strictly categorized as “international affairs,” are remarkable. The goal of a rule-based world shaped by norms promoted also by the EU, for example, has already made considerable advances. Contravening EU competition laws may end up being extremely costly for non-compliant corporations. Producers worldwide comply with EU rules on environmental and health-related hazards in order to sell their products in the European market.
In other words: the EU still punches below its weight, but it could do much worse and we do not always realize it.
What role would you like to see the EU play on the world stage? On what regions and issues should the EU focus in its foreign relations?
Let me start by saying that I disagree with those, especially on the other side of the Atlantic, who regard Europe as a delusional conclave of countries locked in its own “post-historical” oasis of peace. Europe is one of the world regions that feels most challenged by globalization, whether because of its stagnant demography or unease with multiculturalism. However, it is also the region that, by creating the most cohesive model of regional integration, has in many ways anticipated globalization.
As I argue in my forthcoming book Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, the EU’s backyard is in many ways Europe’s miniature globalization. From immigration to energy dependency, many of the key strategic challenges facing the EU happen to coalesce in the ring of countries that surround it: the Balkans, Turkey, Eastern Europe and North Africa. In this diverse region, the EU has the opportunity and the need to move away from the inward-looking mood of the past years. That is because the neighborhood is a test-case of Europe’s global aspiration. Perhaps more importantly, it is because the way in which the EU deals with each of these countries and regions says so much about the EU’s own identity and power.
Fast forward -- do you expect that in 2020 the EU will speak with one voice and act in concert?
Horizon scanning is risky and inevitably subject to error. On the other hand, it is probably fair to say that on some of the major issues on which the EU is expected to deliver, ten years might suffice to see some tangible results.
If the Lisbon Treaty enters in force, the next decade will already give us a pretty good idea as to how the new EU foreign policy architecture operates. By 2020, the EU might have taken in most of the Balkan states as members, the planned Nabucco gas pipeline might be operational (and remind Europe's policy makers that it does not solve EU's energy conundrum). Turkey is unlikely to have become a member of the EU by the time, but the EU may have resolved to have provided a membership perspective to Ukraine and Moldova.
All these things notwithstanding, speaking with one voice and acting in concert may be too tall an order in the next ten years. Some member states will not give up their foreign policy prerogatives in favor of a yet-unclear EU role. Because of this, issues ranging from UN reform to relations with Russia are likely to remain elusive. But then again, one should not set expectations too high. An EU that acts pragmatically on some of these sensible dossier, if necessary thanks to the action of a smaller number of EU member states willing to forge ahead, would be a realistic and most welcome aspiration.
Fabrizio Tassinari is head of the Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
The EU as a global actor (4) / An interview with Fabrizio Tassinari
Friday, 18 September 2009
How would you describe the European Union’s role in today’s international affairs, with regards to its neighbourhood as well as to the wider world?
Judging by the rhetoric of some European statesmen, as well as by the opinion of European citizens, the hopes surrounding Europe’s role in the world are all too often higher than what the EU can actually deliver.
It is no doubt frustrating to listen to the cacophony of European voices on key dossiers such as Russia or the Middle East. It is disappointing to witness the slowness characterizing the build-up of the EU defense capabilities.
At the same time, some of the less visible things that the EU is doing on the world stage, especially in those fields that may not be strictly categorized as “international affairs,” are remarkable. The goal of a rule-based world shaped by norms promoted also by the EU, for example, has already made considerable advances. Contravening EU competition laws may end up being extremely costly for non-compliant corporations. Producers worldwide comply with EU rules on environmental and health-related hazards in order to sell their products in the European market.
In other words: the EU still punches below its weight, but it could do much worse and we do not always realize it.
What role would you like to see the EU play on the world stage? On what regions and issues should the EU focus in its foreign relations?
Let me start by saying that I disagree with those, especially on the other side of the Atlantic, who regard Europe as a delusional conclave of countries locked in its own “post-historical” oasis of peace. Europe is one of the world regions that feels most challenged by globalization, whether because of its stagnant demography or unease with multiculturalism. However, it is also the region that, by creating the most cohesive model of regional integration, has in many ways anticipated globalization.
As I argue in my forthcoming book Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, the EU’s backyard is in many ways Europe’s miniature globalization. From immigration to energy dependency, many of the key strategic challenges facing the EU happen to coalesce in the ring of countries that surround it: the Balkans, Turkey, Eastern Europe and North Africa. In this diverse region, the EU has the opportunity and the need to move away from the inward-looking mood of the past years. That is because the neighborhood is a test-case of Europe’s global aspiration. Perhaps more importantly, it is because the way in which the EU deals with each of these countries and regions says so much about the EU’s own identity and power.
Fast forward -- do you expect that in 2020 the EU will speak with one voice and act in concert?
Horizon scanning is risky and inevitably subject to error. On the other hand, it is probably fair to say that on some of the major issues on which the EU is expected to deliver, ten years might suffice to see some tangible results.
If the Lisbon Treaty enters in force, the next decade will already give us a pretty good idea as to how the new EU foreign policy architecture operates. By 2020, the EU might have taken in most of the Balkan states as members, the planned Nabucco gas pipeline might be operational (and remind Europe's policy makers that it does not solve EU's energy conundrum). Turkey is unlikely to have become a member of the EU by the time, but the EU may have resolved to have provided a membership perspective to Ukraine and Moldova.
All these things notwithstanding, speaking with one voice and acting in concert may be too tall an order in the next ten years. Some member states will not give up their foreign policy prerogatives in favor of a yet-unclear EU role. Because of this, issues ranging from UN reform to relations with Russia are likely to remain elusive. But then again, one should not set expectations too high. An EU that acts pragmatically on some of these sensible dossier, if necessary thanks to the action of a smaller number of EU member states willing to forge ahead, would be a realistic and most welcome aspiration.
Fabrizio Tassinari is head of the Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Wednesday 29 July 2009
The Autumn to Come
As vacations approach, I have finalized a number of initiatives that will hopefully be in full swing by the time I come back in early Fall. The initiatives are all aimed at presenting and discussing my forthcoming book Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors. As it turns out, it will be two mini-tours: one, more extended across time and space, in Europe and the other, shorter one in the U.S.
For Europe, I have two, possibly three, events in schedule for now: a book launch in Stockholm on October 5-6, at the Baltic Development Forum, a Davos-like organization for Northern Europe which this year will feature the Swedish, Finnish and Latvian Prime Ministers, Jeremy Rifkin, Lilia Shevtsova, and... HRH Pricess Victoria of Sweden (wonder what she will have to say about Europe's neighbors..). Beginning of November, I will then launch the book in Copenhagen, at my home institution the Danish Institute for International Studies with my former CEPS colleague Michael Emerson and--hopefully--the former Ukranian foreign Minister Borys Tarasjuk as discussants. Later in the spring, I will be at the University of Cambridge and hope to arrange a small event there as well.
In the U.S. the main book-launch event in late October will be in Washington D.C., kindly hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and co-sponsored by the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins' SAIS. Other two initiatives, also during that U.S. trip in late October, are still in the making but look quite promising so far. I should present an academic paper based on the book at the Forum for Contemporary Europe at Stanford University as well as at at the Center for European Studies at Harvard.
And now, Inshallah, holidays!
For Europe, I have two, possibly three, events in schedule for now: a book launch in Stockholm on October 5-6, at the Baltic Development Forum, a Davos-like organization for Northern Europe which this year will feature the Swedish, Finnish and Latvian Prime Ministers, Jeremy Rifkin, Lilia Shevtsova, and... HRH Pricess Victoria of Sweden (wonder what she will have to say about Europe's neighbors..). Beginning of November, I will then launch the book in Copenhagen, at my home institution the Danish Institute for International Studies with my former CEPS colleague Michael Emerson and--hopefully--the former Ukranian foreign Minister Borys Tarasjuk as discussants. Later in the spring, I will be at the University of Cambridge and hope to arrange a small event there as well.
In the U.S. the main book-launch event in late October will be in Washington D.C., kindly hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and co-sponsored by the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins' SAIS. Other two initiatives, also during that U.S. trip in late October, are still in the making but look quite promising so far. I should present an academic paper based on the book at the Forum for Contemporary Europe at Stanford University as well as at at the Center for European Studies at Harvard.
And now, Inshallah, holidays!
Friday 19 June 2009
Where Should the EU End?
This article appeared on the Washington Post's PostGlobal
In retrospect, the historic European Union expansion of May 2004 carries more than a hint of irony. The accession of eight former communist nations of Central Europe was in many ways a high point for Europe. The EU monitored these countries' transition towards liberal democracy; it influenced their political culture and guided economic transformation.
It wasn't a miracle, as one might mistakenly believe from listening to the European vulgate. But it is safe to say that the EU accompanied a remarkable development. When viewed alongside the quagmire that America was making for itself in Iraq at the time, enlargement became the epitome of Europe's power and of the scale of its ambitions.
Alas, EU enlargement has since turned into an unforgiving mirror of European paralysis. Just one year after the Eastern expansion, popular referenda in France and the Netherlands rejected the so-called Constitutional Treaty aiming at reforming EU institutions. The no vote signaled widespread dissatisfaction with the overall course of Europe, and it coalesced in a generic enlargement fatigue. The French non notoriously came down to the "Polish plumber," the imaginary new EU citizen threatening the Gallic labor market with his pipes and screws.
In January 2007, then, the EU fulfilled the ill-fated promise of admitting Bulgaria and Romania. In order to assuage their fear of being left behind, Brussels had given the two Balkan countries an entry date, irrespective of their record on domestic reforms. Those judicial and administrative reforms have slowed since the countries' accession, as contract killings and corruption at the highest levels have remained the norm.
As for the other Balkans, the troubled nations of the former Yugoslavia, the EU has reiterated ad nauseam its commitment to their "European perspective." But much of the region remains in a political and security limbo, and Brussels has fed into it by trying to adjust its scrupulous criteria and conditions to the precarious situation on the ground. The result is that, with the possible exception of Croatia, it is unclear to the Balkan people if and when they will accede to the Union.
The EU has also partly frozen accession talks with Turkey, shortly after it took the momentous step of opening those talks. It did so because of Turkey's reluctance to open its ports to vessels coming from Cyprus. Turkey's size, its large Muslim population, and geographical location are clearly the real reason for Europe's hesitance. Still, the problem is that Ankara has lost its momentum for reform, and Europe has lost its credibility.
Each of these instances shows different facets of the European malaise. EU institutions, conceived half a century ago, have adjusted as the Union has taken in more countries, but do require comprehensive reforms in order to function effectively with 30-plus potential members. Pending approval by the Irish, the forthcoming Lisbon treaty will go some way to correcting that, but it can do nothing to rewind the half-decade that Europe has lost.
EU expansion was also expected to bring about an ever more diverse Union. Yet, in western Europe, support for further expansion is at an all-time low, even in traditionally pro-enlargement countries such as Britain and Italy. In the wake of the global financial maelstrom earlier this year, politicians from the new member states warned about the descent of a new "iron curtain" in Europe. Economic and social differences have brought out profound divisions, rather than deepening the Union's cherished diversity.
Above all, the predicament of these past five years has made it plain that the EU enlargement policy is unsustainable in the long run. Expansion is routinely described as Europe's most successful foreign policy. But taking in country after country hardly qualifies as a foreign policy at all. The question is not whether the EU will again be ready to expand; it is where the EU ought to end.
Given the plethora of stakeholders in the European arena, a firm decision on this is not easy to take. But it is the single move likely to shift the focus away from enlargement as an existential question, and back to European integration as the paramount means for fostering prosperity and spreading peace on the Continent.
Enlargement has provided a powerful tool to achieve these goals. But it is now sinking the EU because it has become a goal unto itself.
Fabrizio Tassinari is a Senior Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies and a non-Resident Fellow at Johns Hopkins' SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations. His book, Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, will be published in September.
In retrospect, the historic European Union expansion of May 2004 carries more than a hint of irony. The accession of eight former communist nations of Central Europe was in many ways a high point for Europe. The EU monitored these countries' transition towards liberal democracy; it influenced their political culture and guided economic transformation.
It wasn't a miracle, as one might mistakenly believe from listening to the European vulgate. But it is safe to say that the EU accompanied a remarkable development. When viewed alongside the quagmire that America was making for itself in Iraq at the time, enlargement became the epitome of Europe's power and of the scale of its ambitions.
Alas, EU enlargement has since turned into an unforgiving mirror of European paralysis. Just one year after the Eastern expansion, popular referenda in France and the Netherlands rejected the so-called Constitutional Treaty aiming at reforming EU institutions. The no vote signaled widespread dissatisfaction with the overall course of Europe, and it coalesced in a generic enlargement fatigue. The French non notoriously came down to the "Polish plumber," the imaginary new EU citizen threatening the Gallic labor market with his pipes and screws.
In January 2007, then, the EU fulfilled the ill-fated promise of admitting Bulgaria and Romania. In order to assuage their fear of being left behind, Brussels had given the two Balkan countries an entry date, irrespective of their record on domestic reforms. Those judicial and administrative reforms have slowed since the countries' accession, as contract killings and corruption at the highest levels have remained the norm.
As for the other Balkans, the troubled nations of the former Yugoslavia, the EU has reiterated ad nauseam its commitment to their "European perspective." But much of the region remains in a political and security limbo, and Brussels has fed into it by trying to adjust its scrupulous criteria and conditions to the precarious situation on the ground. The result is that, with the possible exception of Croatia, it is unclear to the Balkan people if and when they will accede to the Union.
The EU has also partly frozen accession talks with Turkey, shortly after it took the momentous step of opening those talks. It did so because of Turkey's reluctance to open its ports to vessels coming from Cyprus. Turkey's size, its large Muslim population, and geographical location are clearly the real reason for Europe's hesitance. Still, the problem is that Ankara has lost its momentum for reform, and Europe has lost its credibility.
Each of these instances shows different facets of the European malaise. EU institutions, conceived half a century ago, have adjusted as the Union has taken in more countries, but do require comprehensive reforms in order to function effectively with 30-plus potential members. Pending approval by the Irish, the forthcoming Lisbon treaty will go some way to correcting that, but it can do nothing to rewind the half-decade that Europe has lost.
EU expansion was also expected to bring about an ever more diverse Union. Yet, in western Europe, support for further expansion is at an all-time low, even in traditionally pro-enlargement countries such as Britain and Italy. In the wake of the global financial maelstrom earlier this year, politicians from the new member states warned about the descent of a new "iron curtain" in Europe. Economic and social differences have brought out profound divisions, rather than deepening the Union's cherished diversity.
Above all, the predicament of these past five years has made it plain that the EU enlargement policy is unsustainable in the long run. Expansion is routinely described as Europe's most successful foreign policy. But taking in country after country hardly qualifies as a foreign policy at all. The question is not whether the EU will again be ready to expand; it is where the EU ought to end.
Given the plethora of stakeholders in the European arena, a firm decision on this is not easy to take. But it is the single move likely to shift the focus away from enlargement as an existential question, and back to European integration as the paramount means for fostering prosperity and spreading peace on the Continent.
Enlargement has provided a powerful tool to achieve these goals. But it is now sinking the EU because it has become a goal unto itself.
Fabrizio Tassinari is a Senior Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies and a non-Resident Fellow at Johns Hopkins' SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations. His book, Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, will be published in September.
Sunday 31 May 2009
Parliamentary debut
On May 25th, I received a 7 a.m. phone call with the request to speak at 3pm at the Danish Parliament (Folketinget) on the European future of Ukraine.
Last minute things like this, I have discovered, are excellent to forget, and therefore win, anxiety.
Saturday 23 May 2009
In Belgrade with B.
Just back from Belgrade after a remarkable conference by the Atlantik Brucke, a German organization bringing together "young leaders" (mind the inverted commas) from Europe and America. I took back the impression that Serbia has shifted gear. Thanks to a young, motivated, and cosmopolitan ruling class, Serbia seems at last willing to meet Europe on its own turf of rules and conditions, while remaining patient in the face of Brussels' continued ambiguity.
As it often happens in the Balkans, however, much of the tone of the discussion centered on Serbia's past, and on how much this past is embedded to the present. I have a particular feeling about this--on which I elaborate further in my forthcoming book: That much of this focus on the past has now become an obsession. It is a useful obsession for those who claim to justify in that way every one of the region's shortcomings. It is also useful for those Europeans who are concerned about the Balkans. My take is that from corruption to criminality, both Serbia and Europe have much more mundane and yet serious issues to worry about. This emphasis on what historian Maria Todorova calls the "monopoly of barbarity" marks the Balkans as a permanent Europen exception, which it is not.
Last time I was in Belgrade was in April 2008, on the night in which Berlusconi won again general elections and was back at at the helm as PM. Little over a year later, one has got to remark that travelling around Europe as an Italian has never been funnier if it weren't so sad.
As it often happens in the Balkans, however, much of the tone of the discussion centered on Serbia's past, and on how much this past is embedded to the present. I have a particular feeling about this--on which I elaborate further in my forthcoming book: That much of this focus on the past has now become an obsession. It is a useful obsession for those who claim to justify in that way every one of the region's shortcomings. It is also useful for those Europeans who are concerned about the Balkans. My take is that from corruption to criminality, both Serbia and Europe have much more mundane and yet serious issues to worry about. This emphasis on what historian Maria Todorova calls the "monopoly of barbarity" marks the Balkans as a permanent Europen exception, which it is not.
Last time I was in Belgrade was in April 2008, on the night in which Berlusconi won again general elections and was back at at the helm as PM. Little over a year later, one has got to remark that travelling around Europe as an Italian has never been funnier if it weren't so sad.
Thursday 30 April 2009
Creative destruction
About a year ago, I was sitting at a dinner table in Venice in the rather sorry position of conference rapporteur. Keynote speaker that day was Sergio Marchionne, CEO of Fiat, the Italian automaker. Speaking at the beginning of the subprime-triggered financial crisis, Marchionne centered his whole speech on the need for "creative destruction."
Today, Chrysler heads for "surgical bankrupcy", right after which Fiat will take over a 20% stake in the restructured U.S. automaker, possibly to rise by 51% in 2013. For Marchionne at least, this seems to be a case of creative destruction indeed.
Today, Chrysler heads for "surgical bankrupcy", right after which Fiat will take over a 20% stake in the restructured U.S. automaker, possibly to rise by 51% in 2013. For Marchionne at least, this seems to be a case of creative destruction indeed.
Thursday 9 April 2009
Fogh, Twitter, and other European stories...
La correzione delle bozze del mio libro prende gran parte del tempo in queste settimane, ma mi ha comunque permesso un paio di scorribande nelle terre e nei temi che mi appassionano.
Prima di tutto un interessante viaggio a Kiev, in un'Ucraina apparentemente devastata dalla crisi economica. Tastare il polso della situazione con ministri ed attivisti nella stessa sala, era un'occasione imperdibile per chi fa il mio lavoro. Ne ho tratto la conclusione che se l'Ucraina sta veramente messa come lamentano le sue autorita' l'Occidente e l'Europa hanno meno responsabilita' di quanto credessi. E' un paese dove lo spreco di risorse umane e' quasi offensivo. Come spesso capita in quei paesi, la sperequazione economica si vede ad ogni angolo--con tante BMW and Mercedes di alta cilindrata quanti sono i mendicanti. Poi ho incontrato casualmente alcuni cantanti lirici dell'Arena di Verona, che mi hanno invitato ad un concerto e fatto sbollire un po' il nervosismo.
Al mio ritorno mi sono ritrovato a discutere in TV della Turchia che si opponeva all'elezione del Primo Ministro Danese Anders Fogh Rasmussen a Segretario Generale della NATO. Ringraziando il cielo, l'ho fatto prima della mediazione di Berlusconi. E comunque la mia impressione e' che i Turchi facessero sul serio. Sono davvero contrari a Fogh, e non a torto a mio parere. Per il nuovo Segretario Generale, o cambia un po' modus operandi, oppure il suo nuovo lavoro si trasformera' in una specie di contrappasso dantesco per quello che ha combinato in occasione della vicenda delle vignette di Maometto (il vicesegretario e' un turco).
Per il resto nell'ultima settimana sono spettatore dalla cosiddetta rivoluzione "Twitter" in Moldova, dove circa 15.000 giovani sono scesi in piazza per protestare contro i risultati elettorali e comunicano fra di loro attraverso il social network di micro-messaging. E' un evento per molti versi simile alle rivoluzioni arancioni e rosa in Ucraina e Georgia. Il problema e' che sono entrambi finite piuttosto male, e francamente (cinicamente) non vedo perche' questa dovrebbe finire diversamente: il sistema paese in quelle terre e' in practica un feudo appannaggio di pochi boss e relative famiglie. Non si puo' ignorare una rivoluzione del genere, ma non ci si deve neanche illudere.
Come tutti, sono rimasto basito, furioso e commosso da quanto sta avvenendo in Abruzzo. Ma di questo, per rispetto, evito di commentare.
Prima di tutto un interessante viaggio a Kiev, in un'Ucraina apparentemente devastata dalla crisi economica. Tastare il polso della situazione con ministri ed attivisti nella stessa sala, era un'occasione imperdibile per chi fa il mio lavoro. Ne ho tratto la conclusione che se l'Ucraina sta veramente messa come lamentano le sue autorita' l'Occidente e l'Europa hanno meno responsabilita' di quanto credessi. E' un paese dove lo spreco di risorse umane e' quasi offensivo. Come spesso capita in quei paesi, la sperequazione economica si vede ad ogni angolo--con tante BMW and Mercedes di alta cilindrata quanti sono i mendicanti. Poi ho incontrato casualmente alcuni cantanti lirici dell'Arena di Verona, che mi hanno invitato ad un concerto e fatto sbollire un po' il nervosismo.
Al mio ritorno mi sono ritrovato a discutere in TV della Turchia che si opponeva all'elezione del Primo Ministro Danese Anders Fogh Rasmussen a Segretario Generale della NATO. Ringraziando il cielo, l'ho fatto prima della mediazione di Berlusconi. E comunque la mia impressione e' che i Turchi facessero sul serio. Sono davvero contrari a Fogh, e non a torto a mio parere. Per il nuovo Segretario Generale, o cambia un po' modus operandi, oppure il suo nuovo lavoro si trasformera' in una specie di contrappasso dantesco per quello che ha combinato in occasione della vicenda delle vignette di Maometto (il vicesegretario e' un turco).
Per il resto nell'ultima settimana sono spettatore dalla cosiddetta rivoluzione "Twitter" in Moldova, dove circa 15.000 giovani sono scesi in piazza per protestare contro i risultati elettorali e comunicano fra di loro attraverso il social network di micro-messaging. E' un evento per molti versi simile alle rivoluzioni arancioni e rosa in Ucraina e Georgia. Il problema e' che sono entrambi finite piuttosto male, e francamente (cinicamente) non vedo perche' questa dovrebbe finire diversamente: il sistema paese in quelle terre e' in practica un feudo appannaggio di pochi boss e relative famiglie. Non si puo' ignorare una rivoluzione del genere, ma non ci si deve neanche illudere.
Come tutti, sono rimasto basito, furioso e commosso da quanto sta avvenendo in Abruzzo. Ma di questo, per rispetto, evito di commentare.
Friday 13 March 2009
Iniezione americana
E' andata a finire che ho trascorso una settimana marcatamente americana senza mai attraversare l'Atlantico.
Prima di tutto ho moderato un'interessante discussione organizzata dalla NATO al Ministero degli Esteri danese. La domanda ridondante e quasi ossessiva era ovviamente cosa fara' e cosa chiedera' Obama agli europei.
Poi il presidente Obama e il ministro Clinton hanno confermato la nomina della mia (ora ex) collega Esther come sottosegretario agli esteri per le organizzazioni internazionali. Occhio e croce, credo sia una delle posizioni piu' alte che si possano raggiungere al Dipartimento di Stato senza la conferma del Congresso.
Ieri e' uscito il mio primo (e spero non ultimo) articolo sul "PostGlobal" del Washington Post. In tempi meno grami, sarei stato meno clemente verso l'Unione europea. Ma per ora credo che possa bastare.
Infine, ho finalmente ricevuto e cominciato a leggere la mia prima copia del New York Review of Books alla quale alla fine ho deciso di abbonarmi. Per chiunque voglia staccare per un po' da Berlusconi e Mourinho, ma se e' per questo anche dal ManU. o Sarkozy, la Review mi sembra una boccata di ossigeno purissimo.
Prima di tutto ho moderato un'interessante discussione organizzata dalla NATO al Ministero degli Esteri danese. La domanda ridondante e quasi ossessiva era ovviamente cosa fara' e cosa chiedera' Obama agli europei.
Poi il presidente Obama e il ministro Clinton hanno confermato la nomina della mia (ora ex) collega Esther come sottosegretario agli esteri per le organizzazioni internazionali. Occhio e croce, credo sia una delle posizioni piu' alte che si possano raggiungere al Dipartimento di Stato senza la conferma del Congresso.
Ieri e' uscito il mio primo (e spero non ultimo) articolo sul "PostGlobal" del Washington Post. In tempi meno grami, sarei stato meno clemente verso l'Unione europea. Ma per ora credo che possa bastare.
Infine, ho finalmente ricevuto e cominciato a leggere la mia prima copia del New York Review of Books alla quale alla fine ho deciso di abbonarmi. Per chiunque voglia staccare per un po' da Berlusconi e Mourinho, ma se e' per questo anche dal ManU. o Sarkozy, la Review mi sembra una boccata di ossigeno purissimo.
Sunday 1 March 2009
Roba tosta
Mentre gli europei (occidentali) rifiutano un piano di salvataggio per l'Europa orientale e si aggrappano allo specchio della solidarieta' comunitaria per scongiurare il fantasma del protezionismo, Obama augura buona domenica proprio cosi':
"I know that oil and gas companies won’t like us ending nearly $30 billion in tax breaks, but that’s how we’ll help fund a renewable energy economy that will create new jobs and new industries. I know these steps won’t sit well with the special interests and lobbyists who are invested in the old way of doing business, and I know they’re gearing up for a fight as we speak. My message to them is this: So am I." (Barack Obama, Podcast della Casa Bianca, 28 febbraio 2009).
"I know that oil and gas companies won’t like us ending nearly $30 billion in tax breaks, but that’s how we’ll help fund a renewable energy economy that will create new jobs and new industries. I know these steps won’t sit well with the special interests and lobbyists who are invested in the old way of doing business, and I know they’re gearing up for a fight as we speak. My message to them is this: So am I." (Barack Obama, Podcast della Casa Bianca, 28 febbraio 2009).
Friday 20 February 2009
Tempismo
Mentre il Pd crolla (segue commento dopo il teatrino di sabato), e diversi paesi dell'Europa orientale sono sull'orlo della bancarotta (non sono sicuro se per quando arrivero' a Kiev fra un paio di settimane, l'Ucraina esistera' ancora), ho pensato bene di cambiare casacca e accettare un'offerta del Danish Institute for International Studies--che la rivista americana Foreign Policy ha recentemente incoronato come una delle quattro "stelle del mondo delle think-tank"--dove co-dirigero' un progetto sul futuro dell'"ordine liberale."
Con democrazia e mercati che vacillano, mi sembra tutto interessante assai.
Secondo Foreign Policy, fra l'altro, tutti gli istituti di ricerca con i quali sono (o sono stato) affiliato sono rappresentati: il CEPS di Brussels è quinto in Europa, il Wilson Center di Washington è sesto in America. Anche il Center for Transatlantic Relations, che ad essere precisi non è una think-tank ma parte dell'università, è fra i top-30.
Con democrazia e mercati che vacillano, mi sembra tutto interessante assai.
Secondo Foreign Policy, fra l'altro, tutti gli istituti di ricerca con i quali sono (o sono stato) affiliato sono rappresentati: il CEPS di Brussels è quinto in Europa, il Wilson Center di Washington è sesto in America. Anche il Center for Transatlantic Relations, che ad essere precisi non è una think-tank ma parte dell'università, è fra i top-30.
Monday 2 February 2009
Tre brevi su FB
Un mese di iscrizione e 120 "amici" dopo, mi sento di fare un paio di considerazioni su Facebook.
La prima e' sulla democratizzazione della comunicazione. Se il passaggio dal web 1.0 al 2.0 e' stato caratterizzato da un'apertura del mezzo verso il basso, qui c'e' chiaramente un'ulteriore "orizzontalizzazione". Anche chi non ha molto da scrivere, anche chi non vuole scrivere molto, puo' dire parecchio.
La seconda osservazione e' sulla relativita' del mezzo. La schermata dei cosidetti feeds degli "amici" e' l'esempio lampante che fb sa essere assai dispersivo, e probabilmente la dispersione e' anche uno dei suoi obiettivi. La questione, per lo meno per me, e' che non tutto e' "relativo." Io francamente non mi sento a mio agio a liquidare con un colpo di mouse sul tasto "join cause" questioni sociali o politiche che ritengo serie. Quel che e' peggio, e qui probabilmente pecco di miopia, non ne riesco a vedere l'utilita'.
La terza considerazione e', well, sull'"amicizia". Chi mi conosce sa che non sono esattamente un fan sfegatato di Benedetto XVI. Quando pero' ho ascoltato l'altro giorno sull'autobus dei ragazzini poco piu' che decenni misurarsi a botte di centinaia su chi avesse piu' "amici" su facebook, mi sono domandato se per una volta Ratzinger non avesse qualche ragione a raccomandare prudenza riguardo i social network.
La mia personale sperimentazione non e' ancora finita--e mi auguro che l'onda di fb continui se non altro per trarne qualche considerazione piu' appronfondita. L'ultima volta, quando esplose "Second Life", non feci in tempo a vincere la mia leggendaria pigrizia informatica che il fenomeno si era gia' sgonfiato.
La prima e' sulla democratizzazione della comunicazione. Se il passaggio dal web 1.0 al 2.0 e' stato caratterizzato da un'apertura del mezzo verso il basso, qui c'e' chiaramente un'ulteriore "orizzontalizzazione". Anche chi non ha molto da scrivere, anche chi non vuole scrivere molto, puo' dire parecchio.
La seconda osservazione e' sulla relativita' del mezzo. La schermata dei cosidetti feeds degli "amici" e' l'esempio lampante che fb sa essere assai dispersivo, e probabilmente la dispersione e' anche uno dei suoi obiettivi. La questione, per lo meno per me, e' che non tutto e' "relativo." Io francamente non mi sento a mio agio a liquidare con un colpo di mouse sul tasto "join cause" questioni sociali o politiche che ritengo serie. Quel che e' peggio, e qui probabilmente pecco di miopia, non ne riesco a vedere l'utilita'.
La terza considerazione e', well, sull'"amicizia". Chi mi conosce sa che non sono esattamente un fan sfegatato di Benedetto XVI. Quando pero' ho ascoltato l'altro giorno sull'autobus dei ragazzini poco piu' che decenni misurarsi a botte di centinaia su chi avesse piu' "amici" su facebook, mi sono domandato se per una volta Ratzinger non avesse qualche ragione a raccomandare prudenza riguardo i social network.
La mia personale sperimentazione non e' ancora finita--e mi auguro che l'onda di fb continui se non altro per trarne qualche considerazione piu' appronfondita. L'ultima volta, quando esplose "Second Life", non feci in tempo a vincere la mia leggendaria pigrizia informatica che il fenomeno si era gia' sgonfiato.
Wednesday 14 January 2009
Il tabu' Hamas
Una delle condizioni poste dalla comunita' internazionale per dialogare con Hamas e' che riconosca lo stato di Israele. Hamas, fino a prova contraria, e' un partito non uno stato. Da quando in qua i partiti devono riconoscere gli stati?
La richiesta, per inciso, non fa altro che legittimare quanto in realta' Hamas conti negli equilibri mediorientali. Autorevoli osservatori si sono da tempo sgolati a dire che non si puo' prescindere dal cercare il dialogo con Hamas. Questo non significa assecondarne i metodi o le richieste, e non significa nemmeno che il dialogo debba essere sbandierato ai quattro venti. Significa finirla con questa sceneggiata secondo la quale di (ed ad) un'organizzazione terrorista non si debba nemmeno parlare.
La richiesta, per inciso, non fa altro che legittimare quanto in realta' Hamas conti negli equilibri mediorientali. Autorevoli osservatori si sono da tempo sgolati a dire che non si puo' prescindere dal cercare il dialogo con Hamas. Questo non significa assecondarne i metodi o le richieste, e non significa nemmeno che il dialogo debba essere sbandierato ai quattro venti. Significa finirla con questa sceneggiata secondo la quale di (ed ad) un'organizzazione terrorista non si debba nemmeno parlare.
Wednesday 7 January 2009
History repeating
Non mi ero accorto che da quando Ulibo, la scuola dell'allora Ulivo, ha chiuso i battenti, anche governareper, l'annessa rivista, non esiste piu'. Peccato, perche' era un ottimo serbatoio d'idee. Nella circostanza, mi sono andato a ripescare un pezzo che scrissi esattamente tre anni fa sulla crisi Russia-Ucraina del gennaio 2006. Potrei averlo scritto stamattina sulla crisi del gennaio 2009.
L’Europa e la questione russa
Di Fabrizio Tassinari (*)
Le aspirazioni di politica estera ed alcuni degli interessi vitali dell’Unione Europea (Ue) sono stati di recente scossi dalla questione, spinosa e al contempo sottovalutata, delle relazioni con
L’evento scatenante è stata la contesa sorta fra Mosca e l’Ucraina sul prezzo del gas esportato dal gigante russo Gazprom e sul susseguente blocco, durante i primi giorni di gennaio, dell’approvvigionamento di metano, buona parte del quale attraversa l’Ucraina per raggiungere l’Europa.
Sebbene in apparenza distante e marginale, questa controversia affonda le sue radici in un contesto ben più complesso e rilevante per il futuro dell’Europa.
Innanzitutto, la querelle russo-ucraina ripropone prepotentemente il problema della dipendenza energetica europea. L’Ue attualmente importa circa il 50% del proprio fabbisogno energetico da fornitori esterni, quali
Il sillogismo che emerge da queste cifre è piuttosto elementare: l’economia dell’Ue è fortemente legata all’importazione di gas e petrolio. Gli idrocarburi provengono da paesi notoriamente instabili. Ergo, le ambizioni economiche dell’Ue sono condizionate dai precari equilibri politici che caratterizzano i suoi fornitori energetici.
Negli ultimi anni, l’Ue si è cullata all’idea di aver trovato nella Russia di Vladimir Putin una controparte pragmatica e credibile nel settore energetico. Dopo gli ultimi sviluppi, che includono anche misteriose esplosioni ai gasdotti meridionali che raggiungono
La seconda conseguenza della cosiddetta ‘guerra del gas’ è di natura più squisitamente geo-politica. Il nuovo corso filo-occidentale inaugurato un anno fa in Ucraina dalla pacifica ‘rivoluzione arancione’, così come l’analoga ‘rivoluzione delle rose’ in Georgia, non solo un sintomo del progressivo sgretolamento del sistema di alleanze post-sovietico. Rappresentano anche e soprattutto un anelito di democrazia e libertà che si richiama esplicitamente agli ideali del 1989.
Al di là di solenni dichiarazioni d’intenti, però, l’Europa non ha risposto a queste aspirazioni di cambiamento con un segnale chiaro ed inequivocabile. Bruxelles, preoccupata dalle ripercussioni interne dello storico allargamento del 2004, si è limitata ad includere questi paesi nella sua nuova Politica Europea di Vicinato, nella quale l’Unione non si assume alcun impegno in merito ad una loro futura prospettiva di adesione. Di conseguenza, le pressioni del Cremino acquistano nuova linfa, di cui questo ricatto energetico costituisce una prova evidente.
Una terza riflessione dev’essere necessariamente rivolta al complesso delle relazioni euro-russe. L’Unione Europea e
La realtà sul campo, purtroppo, scredita entrambi le interpretazioni. Da un lato, la strategia russa verso l’Unione Europea appare guidata una sorta di divide et impera. Mosca coltiva relazioni privilegiate con quei paesi membri, in particolare
La strategia dell’Ue verso
La conclusione che si deve trarre dall’episodio di Capodanno è dunque tanto ovvia quanto preoccupante: l’ambiguità dell’Ue riguardo alla Russia si traduce in un immobilismo che non giova né agli interessi vitali dell’Unione, né all’immagine di se stessa che l’Europa intende proiettare al di fuori dei propri confini.
Saturday 3 January 2009
Huntington & Hamas
E' morto alla vigilia di natale uno dei teorici delle relazioni internazionali che ammiro di piu': non tanto (o non solo) per cio' che diceva, ma per come lo diceva. Huntington divenne universalmente noto dal 1993 in poi per la pubblicazione del saggio The Clash of Civilizations.
Li' teorizzava l'ascesa di fattori culturali e religiosi in sostituzione dell'ideologia come elementi chiave nella definizione dell'ordine internazionale. La teoria fu popolare da subito ma e' stata ripresa, piuttosto arbitrariamente, dopo l'11 settembre per spiegare l'ascesa del terrorismo internazionale (in un modo che Huntington generalmente ripudiava).
The Clash of Civilizations ha fornito sicuramente un ottimo strumento a quanti volessero spiegare la radicalizzazione dell'Islam politico nel Medio Oriente e l'ascesa di movimenti come Hamas in Palestina ed Hezbollah in Libano. E fornisce sicuramente un'ottima spiegazione a quanti cerchino di giustificare l'attacco di Israele o la "resistenza" di Hamas di queste ore.
Il conflitto arabo-israeliano e' troppo complesso per consentire di prendere una parte o l'altra in modo aprioristico. Non si puo' non constatare la "sproporzione" dell'attacco israeliano (con ovvie motivazioni di politica interna a fomentarlo), cosi' come non si possa minimizzare il fatto che Gaza sia di fatto un "failed state" prima ancora di diventare stato.
In questo senso, c'e' una parte meno nota del lavoro di Huntington che a mio parere da una spiegazione accurata anche se pessimistica degli eventi di queste ore. Nel libro The Third Wave, Huntington spiegava la "transizione" verso la democrazia dopo la fine della guerra fredda e come paesi che si allontanassero dalla dittatura fossero gradualmente diretti verso la democrazia.
Ecco, questo principio ha ispirato una delle pochissime prese di posizione della comunita' internazionale nei confronti dell'Autorita' Palestinese negli ultimi anni: favorire le elezioni in modo che queste rafforzassero la democrazia nei Territori. Le elezioni hanno prodotto la vittoria di Hamas, la radicalizzazione del confronto politico nei Territori prima ancora che con Israele e la sconfitta politica e morale del presidente palestinese Abbas.
Il mondo arabo ed i territori in particolare non sono "in transizione" verso nessun posto. Non verso la democrazia e sicuramente non verso la pace.
Li' teorizzava l'ascesa di fattori culturali e religiosi in sostituzione dell'ideologia come elementi chiave nella definizione dell'ordine internazionale. La teoria fu popolare da subito ma e' stata ripresa, piuttosto arbitrariamente, dopo l'11 settembre per spiegare l'ascesa del terrorismo internazionale (in un modo che Huntington generalmente ripudiava).
The Clash of Civilizations ha fornito sicuramente un ottimo strumento a quanti volessero spiegare la radicalizzazione dell'Islam politico nel Medio Oriente e l'ascesa di movimenti come Hamas in Palestina ed Hezbollah in Libano. E fornisce sicuramente un'ottima spiegazione a quanti cerchino di giustificare l'attacco di Israele o la "resistenza" di Hamas di queste ore.
Il conflitto arabo-israeliano e' troppo complesso per consentire di prendere una parte o l'altra in modo aprioristico. Non si puo' non constatare la "sproporzione" dell'attacco israeliano (con ovvie motivazioni di politica interna a fomentarlo), cosi' come non si possa minimizzare il fatto che Gaza sia di fatto un "failed state" prima ancora di diventare stato.
In questo senso, c'e' una parte meno nota del lavoro di Huntington che a mio parere da una spiegazione accurata anche se pessimistica degli eventi di queste ore. Nel libro The Third Wave, Huntington spiegava la "transizione" verso la democrazia dopo la fine della guerra fredda e come paesi che si allontanassero dalla dittatura fossero gradualmente diretti verso la democrazia.
Ecco, questo principio ha ispirato una delle pochissime prese di posizione della comunita' internazionale nei confronti dell'Autorita' Palestinese negli ultimi anni: favorire le elezioni in modo che queste rafforzassero la democrazia nei Territori. Le elezioni hanno prodotto la vittoria di Hamas, la radicalizzazione del confronto politico nei Territori prima ancora che con Israele e la sconfitta politica e morale del presidente palestinese Abbas.
Il mondo arabo ed i territori in particolare non sono "in transizione" verso nessun posto. Non verso la democrazia e sicuramente non verso la pace.
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