Quello che è successo alla Turchia negli ultimi due anni farebbe invidia all'Italia, se non fosse che qui fanno sul serio.
L'attentato terroristico ieri è un'altra spallata al futuro europeo di Ankara. La prossima potrebbe venire a giorni dalla Corte Costituzionale che si pronuncerà sulla richiesta di sciogliere il partito di maggioranza AKP e di proibire a decine di alti funzionari, incluso il PM Erdogan e il Presidente di fare politica. Il tutto per le loro tendenze islamiste.
Questi i fatti, e questo anche in apparenza il punto fondamentale. L'AKP sta islamizzando la Turchia e i falchi laici (soprattutto lo stato maggiore dell'esercito) devo raddrizzare nuovamente il paese in direzione 'kemalista.'
La dialettica laicismo/religione non dice tutto, però. Innanzitutto non spiega completamente la recente serie di impressionanti errori tattici di Erdogan: insistere sulla nomina di Gül alla presidenza, una forzatura forse evitabile; cercare di riformare la costituzione (del 1980 e scritta dai militari, bisogna aggiungere) senza consultare l'opposizione; infine la storia del velo nelle università, la goccia che ha fatto traboccare il vaso.
Ci sono stati segnali piuttosto evidenti, soprattutto nell'hinterland dell'Anatolia di una graduale involuzione tradizionalista e religiosa, a partire dal consumo di alcohol. Ma dubito profondamente che la decisione strategica di Erdogan fosse quella di ritornare al califfato. E' stato più europeista di tutti i suoi predecessori laici, e ha sempre detto di vedere l'AKP come una specie di partito democristiano alla tedesca. Però di scelte discutibili e a mio parere erronee ne ha fatte. Poteva contare su una maggioranza schiacciante dal 2007 e l'ha usata in modo sconsiderato.
L'altro elemento che scardina il dualismo laicismo/religione è proprio il ruolo dell'Ue. Mentre Erdogan si guadagnava le stellette di campione a Bruxelles, i laici sono fondamentalmente diventati il gruppo più anti-europeo della Turchia. Perchè? La risposta più ovvia è che molte delle riforme dettate dall'Ue vanno proprio in direzione di quella diversità sociale e culturale che secondo i Kemalisti rappresenta il cavallo di Troia per l'islamizzazione. L'altra, più scomoda verità è però che queste riforme, specialmente riguardo al controllo civile delle autorità militari, scardinano i pilastri del potere delle forze armate turche.
Dietro a questo scontro filosofico e culturale, in altre parole, si annidano motivi ben più terreni. Il fatto è che la situazione si sta deteriorando ogni giorno che passa. Peccato davvero.
Monday, 28 July 2008
Tuesday, 22 July 2008
Il macellaio
Nell'ultimo decennio pare dunque che si sia nascosto sotto falso nome, una barba 'Saddam-esca' e facendo un lavoro simile a quello che faceva prima di entrare in 'politica.' E proprio a Belgrado; quella Belgrado che lo aveva tanto maltrattato quando non era nessuno, poi pompato quando trucidava vittime inermi e ora protetto per un decennio.
Le modalita' e le circostanze dell'arresto di Radovan Karadzic, uno degli ultimi macellai della guerra nell'ex-Yugoslavia in liberta', sono fondamentali per misurarne le conseguenze. L'arresto e' importante, importantissimo: per la Serbia che vuole entrare in Europa, per la credibilita' della giustizia internazionale, per le famiglie delle vittime di stragi come quella di Srebrenica.
Decisivo, pero', ancora no: non per chisura delle ferite della guerra, che in Bosnia rimangono ancora aperte. E soprattutto non ancora per la transizione della Serbia. Ad un Karadzic che lavorava nascosto in una clinica di periferia sotto falso nome fa da contraltare un Mladic ancora in liberta', che probabilmente puo' godere di una protezione molto meglio organizzata (era un generale), e che ha responsabilita' materiali molto piu' pesanti.
Come dicono oltre-oceano: "the jury is still out." Io, nel frattempo, ne discuto stasera alla tv danese.
Le modalita' e le circostanze dell'arresto di Radovan Karadzic, uno degli ultimi macellai della guerra nell'ex-Yugoslavia in liberta', sono fondamentali per misurarne le conseguenze. L'arresto e' importante, importantissimo: per la Serbia che vuole entrare in Europa, per la credibilita' della giustizia internazionale, per le famiglie delle vittime di stragi come quella di Srebrenica.
Decisivo, pero', ancora no: non per chisura delle ferite della guerra, che in Bosnia rimangono ancora aperte. E soprattutto non ancora per la transizione della Serbia. Ad un Karadzic che lavorava nascosto in una clinica di periferia sotto falso nome fa da contraltare un Mladic ancora in liberta', che probabilmente puo' godere di una protezione molto meglio organizzata (era un generale), e che ha responsabilita' materiali molto piu' pesanti.
Come dicono oltre-oceano: "the jury is still out." Io, nel frattempo, ne discuto stasera alla tv danese.
Thursday, 10 July 2008
La (ri)Fondazione
Fra toni sopra le righe (eufemismo) e leggi discutibili (eufemismo), un'iniziativa lodevole.
Tuesday, 8 July 2008
La mia
Alla fine anch'io ho dovuto dire la mia sull'Unione del Mediterraneo.
[Comment] How the Union for the Mediterranean will work
FABRIZIO TASSINARI
07.07.2008 @ 06:31 CET
EUOBSERVER / COMMENT - Ever since Nicolas Sarkozy tried to bulldoze his plans for a Mediterranean Union into the European debate, the new scheme seems to have made the headlines mostly for the amount of bashing it has received. Yet, if the initiative has a shot at working, it is for reasons that are both the same and completely the opposite of those initially dreamed up by the French.
Sarkozy had envisioned something that would do to the Mediterranean what Monnet and Schuman did to Europe in the 1950s: a bold integration initiative of which "our children will be proud." July 13th, when the plan is to be officially launched, is supposed to be "the day when all of us will have to meet history." That this inspired rhetoric has fallen on deaf ears is an understatement. European capitals, most notably Berlin, politely turned down the original idea on at least three counts: it was feared it would further weaken the common EU foreign policy; it was regarded as a surrogate for Turkey's EU membership bid; and it was seen as a potential competitor to the European Union itself.
After some wrangling among key EU member states, the baton has since passed to the European Commission, which unveiled its proposal in May. At face value, the Commission has been forced into the EU's characteristic institutional overkill. The new initiative will be embedded in the existing framework, the so-called Barcelona process. It will complement and upgrade its ongoing work. Its new official name: 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.'
A diverse bunch of unruly neighbours
Even diluted as it now is, this new enterprise is still an inevitable outcome of the most serious flaws of the EU's Mediterranean policy. For over a decade, the EU has chased a quixotic, comprehensive rapprochement with a diverse bunch of unruly neighbours spanning from Morocco to Jordan. The Barcelona process, after all, is modelled on the three-basket architecture of the 1975 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Yet, the Middle East and North Africa have hardly moved closer the political standards that the EU has timidly sought to promote. Authoritarian regimes in the South appear as resilient as ever. The Middle East stagnates in its perilous stalemate. Most worryingly, the vision of a single Mediterranean space umbilically bound to the EU by historical ties and economic interdependence has been trumped by the prevalent European perception of its Southern backyard as the prime source of illegal migration, fundamentalism and terror.
This sorry record can explain why recent initiatives in the region go in the direction of a diversification and devolution of EU policies. The European Neighbourhood Policy has added a bilateral dimension to the cumbersome deals that the EU had sealed with its Southern counterparts under the Barcelona regime. Europe has called (without much success so far) for a more substantial South-South cooperation among North African and Middle Eastern countries. Faced with the longstanding paralysis of the political dialogue, the EU has placed more emphasis on the cultural and social realm of its policies.
Gradual devolution
Also, in light of the present post-Irish referendum gloom, the Union for the Mediterranean represents another step in the direction of this gradual devolution. The new initiative will focus on specific projects in areas such as energy, environment, and transports. Its secretariat will effectively be a technical office for project coordination. It will be chaired by two rotating consul-like figures, one from Europe and one from a North African country. But it is more logical to imagine these personalities speaking for their respective constituencies than on behalf of the Mediterranean as a whole.
Put another way, rather than heralding a new era of Mediterranean unity, this new scheme will at best provide substance to some sector-specific cooperation and counter Brussels' centralizing tendencies. Whether and how this move will change the way Europeans perceive threats emanating from the South remains to be seen. But the involuntary moral of this saga may well be that the sooner the EU stops looking at its Southern periphery as the chimerical 'Mediterranean', the better it will be equipped to deal with its troubles.
[Comment] How the Union for the Mediterranean will work
FABRIZIO TASSINARI
07.07.2008 @ 06:31 CET
EUOBSERVER / COMMENT - Ever since Nicolas Sarkozy tried to bulldoze his plans for a Mediterranean Union into the European debate, the new scheme seems to have made the headlines mostly for the amount of bashing it has received. Yet, if the initiative has a shot at working, it is for reasons that are both the same and completely the opposite of those initially dreamed up by the French.
Sarkozy had envisioned something that would do to the Mediterranean what Monnet and Schuman did to Europe in the 1950s: a bold integration initiative of which "our children will be proud." July 13th, when the plan is to be officially launched, is supposed to be "the day when all of us will have to meet history." That this inspired rhetoric has fallen on deaf ears is an understatement. European capitals, most notably Berlin, politely turned down the original idea on at least three counts: it was feared it would further weaken the common EU foreign policy; it was regarded as a surrogate for Turkey's EU membership bid; and it was seen as a potential competitor to the European Union itself.
After some wrangling among key EU member states, the baton has since passed to the European Commission, which unveiled its proposal in May. At face value, the Commission has been forced into the EU's characteristic institutional overkill. The new initiative will be embedded in the existing framework, the so-called Barcelona process. It will complement and upgrade its ongoing work. Its new official name: 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.'
A diverse bunch of unruly neighbours
Even diluted as it now is, this new enterprise is still an inevitable outcome of the most serious flaws of the EU's Mediterranean policy. For over a decade, the EU has chased a quixotic, comprehensive rapprochement with a diverse bunch of unruly neighbours spanning from Morocco to Jordan. The Barcelona process, after all, is modelled on the three-basket architecture of the 1975 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Yet, the Middle East and North Africa have hardly moved closer the political standards that the EU has timidly sought to promote. Authoritarian regimes in the South appear as resilient as ever. The Middle East stagnates in its perilous stalemate. Most worryingly, the vision of a single Mediterranean space umbilically bound to the EU by historical ties and economic interdependence has been trumped by the prevalent European perception of its Southern backyard as the prime source of illegal migration, fundamentalism and terror.
This sorry record can explain why recent initiatives in the region go in the direction of a diversification and devolution of EU policies. The European Neighbourhood Policy has added a bilateral dimension to the cumbersome deals that the EU had sealed with its Southern counterparts under the Barcelona regime. Europe has called (without much success so far) for a more substantial South-South cooperation among North African and Middle Eastern countries. Faced with the longstanding paralysis of the political dialogue, the EU has placed more emphasis on the cultural and social realm of its policies.
Gradual devolution
Also, in light of the present post-Irish referendum gloom, the Union for the Mediterranean represents another step in the direction of this gradual devolution. The new initiative will focus on specific projects in areas such as energy, environment, and transports. Its secretariat will effectively be a technical office for project coordination. It will be chaired by two rotating consul-like figures, one from Europe and one from a North African country. But it is more logical to imagine these personalities speaking for their respective constituencies than on behalf of the Mediterranean as a whole.
Put another way, rather than heralding a new era of Mediterranean unity, this new scheme will at best provide substance to some sector-specific cooperation and counter Brussels' centralizing tendencies. Whether and how this move will change the way Europeans perceive threats emanating from the South remains to be seen. But the involuntary moral of this saga may well be that the sooner the EU stops looking at its Southern periphery as the chimerical 'Mediterranean', the better it will be equipped to deal with its troubles.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
