Friday 30 September 2011

The Arab Summer and Europe's Umpteenth Hour

This article, co-written with Pawel Swieboda, appeared on E!Sharp

As the Arab spring turns into a politically hot, Indian summer of transition, Europeans interrogate themselves on what kind of support they will be able to provide. For better or for worse, territorial vicinity and a long history of relations have already marked the response to these multiple crises in a uniquely European way. The EU has much to offer to the brave peoples that toppled corrupt regimes or are pushing them to reform all across the region: from institution building to civil society support and everything in between. Yet, the uprisings have exposed severe constraints on the vision of a genuine European foreign policy.

The upheaval took place over one year after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty reforming the EU, whose principal innovation was indeed the creation of an EU foreign minister in everything but name, in the person of Catherine Ashton, and of a putative diplomatic corps. Yet, leadership on Libya has come from two national capitals, London and Paris, while the Brussels establishment was often prominently absent from the decision-making process. European governments were united in not seeing a role for the EU’s fledgling defense policy. In the cases of the Egyptian and Syrian uprisings, France, Britain and Germany have displayed more convergent responses; yet, their joint statements calling for transition barely made a reference to their common EU allegiance.

To be fair, some of the growing criticisms of Europe’s foreign policy ineffectiveness lack perspective. It is not plausible that a larger number of bureaucrats fielded on the ground will fundamentally alter Europe’s position in any reshaping of the world order. Her generous shuttle diplomacy notwithstanding, it is not realistic to expect that the number of miles covered by Lady Ashton will arrest Europe’s relative decline.

Even so, the reasons why Europe has so far punched below its weight are real and profound. As a consensus-based organization, the EU is typically slow in reacting to crises. Moreover, while Brussels may have earned some legitimacy on the basis of the policies that it implements, its largely technocratic apparatus lacks the kind of ‘input legitimacy’ that a democratic selection of political representatives can provide. The disconnect between a slow-moving bureaucracy and the higher profile role of key governments is mutually detrimental and hinders the great many things that the EU already does on the ground. The deepening crisis of the Euro and much-feared waves of migrants further exacerbate European introspection.

The Arab spring may yet turn into another “hour of Europe”, where, as in the Balkans in the 1990s, the EU fails to grasp challenges occurring in its backyard. It can equally well turn into a formative experience pushing the EU to display a greater sense of responsibility for its immediate neighbourhood. The EU’s foreign policy will remain the lowest common denominator of what European governments already agree upon—or let the EU do. But Europe’s collective responses must be viewed as a kind of variable geometry, with some things done by Brussels, others done by groupings of selected European countries, some issues best being tackled multilaterally, and others being left to bilateral negotiation.

The EU orthodoxy tends to see such trends as a sign of fragmentation, but there is nothing wrong in delegating decision-making to the actors and mechanisms that are best suited to address individual issues, as long as someone in Europe actually does take charge.
A case in point is offered by Poland. As the largest of the new member states that entered the EU in 2004, Warsaw is the current holder of the rotating EU presidency and an increasingly influential player. Also, it is the only European country to have escaped the recession since 2008. Holding the rotating presidency, it must now invest more in teamwork rather than its individual clout in the field of foreign policy.

Yet, Poland has made a point in using its first-ever presidency to provide leadership in the EU’s external affairs. As the Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski put it, he is acting as a ‘loyal deputy’ to Lady Ashton, a phrase that it would be hard to imagine coming from the lips of any of his counterparts from larger European countries.

More than that, Poland is using its own recent history, untainted by colonial ties and characterised by a successful transition to democracy, to present the European case in North Africa and the Middle East. Senior Solidarnosc personalities, including former President Lech Wałęsa, headed Polish government delegations in Tunis and Cairo. Sikorski was the first Western minister to visit Benghazi. In cooperation with Al-Jazeera, Warsaw has in store a programme to recount the Polish experience of democratisation. It is too early to tell whether this approach will bear fruit. At the same time, by being bold about what Europe can deliver and realistic about what it cannot, the Polish experience may point the way towards the kind of enlightened self-interest which Europe sorely needs.