At Last

Taking a novel approach to the current situation in Europe, foreign policy analyst Fabrizio Tassinari transforms external policy concerns about Europe's neighborhood into questions about Europe's internal future. His contention: that the situation on Europe's periphery is an unforgiving mirror of its identity crisis, institutional paralysis, ineffectual foreign policy, and morbid fear of migrants and multiculturalism.

Looking at each of the countries and regions surrounding Europe, from Russia and Turkey to the Western Balkans and North Africa, Tassinari unravels the challenges facing the EU, weighs the record of its policies, and explains how both can be traced back to Europe's inherent insecurity. Turning conventional wisdom on its head, he argues that gradual and diversified forms of integration with its many neighbors is Europe's best alternative to a progressive, but inexorable fragmentation of the EU. The ability to meet this challenge will not only test Europe's unfulfilled global aspirations, it will be crucial to its very survival.

The neighborhood is the test case

First appeared on Global Europe

The EU as a global actor (4) / An interview with Fabrizio Tassinari

Friday, 18 September 2009

How would you describe the European Union’s role in today’s international affairs, with regards to its neighbourhood as well as to the wider world?
Judging by the rhetoric of some European statesmen, as well as by the opinion of European citizens, the hopes surrounding Europe’s role in the world are all too often higher than what the EU can actually deliver.

It is no doubt frustrating to listen to the cacophony of European voices on key dossiers such as Russia or the Middle East. It is disappointing to witness the slowness characterizing the build-up of the EU defense capabilities.

At the same time, some of the less visible things that the EU is doing on the world stage, especially in those fields that may not be strictly categorized as “international affairs,” are remarkable. The goal of a rule-based world shaped by norms promoted also by the EU, for example, has already made considerable advances. Contravening EU competition laws may end up being extremely costly for non-compliant corporations. Producers worldwide comply with EU rules on environmental and health-related hazards in order to sell their products in the European market.

In other words: the EU still punches below its weight, but it could do much worse and we do not always realize it.

What role would you like to see the EU play on the world stage? On what regions and issues should the EU focus in its foreign relations?
Let me start by saying that I disagree with those, especially on the other side of the Atlantic, who regard Europe as a delusional conclave of countries locked in its own “post-historical” oasis of peace. Europe is one of the world regions that feels most challenged by globalization, whether because of its stagnant demography or unease with multiculturalism. However, it is also the region that, by creating the most cohesive model of regional integration, has in many ways anticipated globalization.

As I argue in my forthcoming book Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, the EU’s backyard is in many ways Europe’s miniature globalization. From immigration to energy dependency, many of the key strategic challenges facing the EU happen to coalesce in the ring of countries that surround it: the Balkans, Turkey, Eastern Europe and North Africa. In this diverse region, the EU has the opportunity and the need to move away from the inward-looking mood of the past years. That is because the neighborhood is a test-case of Europe’s global aspiration. Perhaps more importantly, it is because the way in which the EU deals with each of these countries and regions says so much about the EU’s own identity and power.

Fast forward -- do you expect that in 2020 the EU will speak with one voice and act in concert?
Horizon scanning is risky and inevitably subject to error. On the other hand, it is probably fair to say that on some of the major issues on which the EU is expected to deliver, ten years might suffice to see some tangible results.

If the Lisbon Treaty enters in force, the next decade will already give us a pretty good idea as to how the new EU foreign policy architecture operates. By 2020, the EU might have taken in most of the Balkan states as members, the planned Nabucco gas pipeline might be operational (and remind Europe's policy makers that it does not solve EU's energy conundrum). Turkey is unlikely to have become a member of the EU by the time, but the EU may have resolved to have provided a membership perspective to Ukraine and Moldova.

All these things notwithstanding, speaking with one voice and acting in concert may be too tall an order in the next ten years. Some member states will not give up their foreign policy prerogatives in favor of a yet-unclear EU role. Because of this, issues ranging from UN reform to relations with Russia are likely to remain elusive. But then again, one should not set expectations too high. An EU that acts pragmatically on some of these sensible dossier, if necessary thanks to the action of a smaller number of EU member states willing to forge ahead, would be a realistic and most welcome aspiration.



Fabrizio Tassinari is head of the Foreign Policy and EU Studies Unit at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)